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AN EXAMINATION OF METHODS OF IMPROVING AUDIT 
JUDGMENT 
Abstract 
This study examined three methods of improving audit judgment, namely inoculation, 
the group process, and counterexplanation. Prior research found that auditors' 
judgments were not always optimum. An important question this study asked was 
whether the use of inoculation, the group process and counterexplanation leads to more 
effective judgments. 
In Experiment One, I proposed that inoculation will reduce the effect of framing so that 
participants exposed to the inoculation treatment will not display a framing effect, while 
participants not exposed to the treatment will. In addition, I hypothesised that the 
relation between audit experience and responsiveness to training has an inverted-U 
shaped value function. The results showed this to be the case. No interaction effect 
between framing and inoculation was observed, but the order of writing supporting and 
opposing arguments as required by the inoculation treatment led to a primacy effect. 
The second experiment posited ~hat the use of audit groups will improve individual 
auditors' judgments in a going-concern evaluation task. The results showed that not only 
were audit group judgments more conservative, but consensus was also higher among 
audit group judgments. To explain the hypothesised differences between audit group and 
individual auditor judgments, I examined groups' and individuals' self-reported cue 
usage, cue selection and cue weighting. The results showed that both groups and 
individuals were equally proficient in cue weighting, but the groups selected more 
iii 
going-concern problem indicators as well as mitigating factors compared to the 
individuals. 
Experiment Three contained two main parts. In part one, groups and individuals 
performed an audit of an inventory balance. The results showed that the group process 
results in more accurate judgments among auditors. The results also showed that groups 
were more confident in addition to being better calibrated. In the second part of 
Experiment Three, I conjectured that there are positive as well as negative aspects of 
counterexplanation, and that the group process may be an effective way of enhancing the 
positive aspects and reducing the negative aspects of counterexplanation. To test this, I 
required participants to counterexplain their initial judgment prior to making a final 
judgment. The results showed that counterexplaining inaccurate judgments led to more 
accurate judgments, whereas counterexplaining accurate judgments led to less accurate 
judgments. I ulso found inconclusive evidence that th~ group process may enhance the 
positive aspects and mitigate the negative aspects of counterexplanation. 
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION .· · 
Auditing studies i~ the l970's and early 1980's typically examined audit judgments in . 
an uncertain environment. These studies. reveal various fallacies in audit judgments (see 
. ·. ·. . 
. Solomon and Shields, 1995). According to Solomon and Shi~lds, later studies attempt . 
to. explain observed auditor behaviour using the heuristi~s · and biases approach of 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman et al. (1982). Consequently, numerous 
. " 
· studies report that audit judgments are subject to various heuristics and biases (refer 
Smith and Kida, 1993). For example, auditors have a confirmatory bias (Church, 1991), · 
their judgments are affected ·by. the curse of knowledge1 (Kennedy, 1995),. ~he ~ost 
. . . 
recently obtained information c~es are weighted more heavily ~h?Il the earlier-obtained 
information cuel (Asare, 1992), , i~nd ,their judgments. are also 'affected by th~ . 
• • • • • I • • \~- • • -. • • • • • •• 
explan~tion' effect3 (Koonce, 19.92). ~h~le identifying and explaining auditor behaviou~ 
is vital and necessary, the next phase in the development of auditjudgment research 
should be aimed at discovering means of correcting sub-optimal audit judgments. There 
is evidence in the literature of the beginnings of such a trend, for example, Heiman 
(1990), Koonce (1992) and Kennedy (1993; 1995) examine how audit judgments may 
.. be improved . 
. Judgment improving techniques include . · accountability4, inoculation5, and . 
counterexplanation 6• and has bee1 l a :bund. to. lead to higher judgment consistericy (Libby. 
· · 1 · The curse of knowledge is the inability of p~op[e to. Ignore their own k~owledge when t~aking ' · 
predictions about other people's knowledge (Kennedy, 1995). . ·· · 
· 
2 Prior psychology literature also finds a primacy effect (refer Hogarth and Einhorn 19n). :.:.: · 
· · 
3 When the event explained is judged more likely to occur than the unexplnined event, an explana~ion · 
effect occu~': · · · · 
. 4 Accountability refers to the need to justify one.'s judgment to others. 
·~ .=. 
.. ·. 
-_- and Libby, 1989). These techniques ·work by requiring decision-makers t_o consider all 
.· -~ppropriate information cues, co~bine these ·cue~.more effectively, a~d thereby, reduce 
.· cognitive strain (Jiam.balvo and Waller, 1984). It is often assumed that the effect of 
. judgment improving techniques is always positive. However, these techniques · 
S()metimes lead to ineffective judgments (Jiambalvo and Waller, 1984). This study 
,
1
•• examines_ three judgment improving techniques - namely, inoculation, group process · 
: . anct'-'countere_xplanation -_'and_their effect(s) ori' audit judgments. . 
.. One tech~ique. suggested hi. the psychology lite~ature is based on inoculation theory .. 
. . . . . . . .. . . 
(Anderson,·· 1982). The incjc~lation treatment requires decision-makers to consider all f! 
possible solutions to a problem before being shown any information about the problem. · 
.. •• • • • 1 -~-
·T_his should l_ead to more effective judgments because the decision-maker is open to the: 
·existence of opposing arguments (Anderson, 1982). No prior auditing study has· 
'· 
. considered·. this technique~ consequently we lcnow lhtle" of its' effectiveness. The 
· --~xamination of this techniq~e \\'ould ad4 to the Hmited pool of tools. available to the 
·au_diting profession~ In this thesis, l propose' that inoculation will reduce the effect of 
·framing so that participants exposed to the inoculation treatment will not display a 
framing effect, whereas participants not exposed to the treatment will. In addition, I 
hypothesise that the relation between audit experience and responsiveness to training 
has an inverted-U shaped value function. The testing of this hypothesis would identify 
,:· the auditors most respcmsive to training as there is surprisingly little literature on the 
· ., .relation between audit experience and responsiveness to this. Consequently, this study 
· · s ·.• In-~culation theory requires the decision-maker to con~ider both (or all) alternatives to a problem 
. . · befqre being shown any information on the problem._.. 
· · .. 
6
., . , , Decision~makers are required to consider why the chosen alternative may be incorrect and/or why the 
alternath,e rejected may be correct. 
. . 
· ...•... · .. '· ... 
2 
:·.: .. . :.: · .. ···· 
. examines the effect of,inoculation on the framing.of internal control evaluations as well 
as the effect that audit experience has on an auditor's responsiveness to inoculation. 
· Prior studies suggest that in making judgments, people generate causal explanations as a 
bridge between the information and the problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). These 
causal explanations once generated cannot be readily changed, and because of their 
inflexibility, the quality of the resultant judgment is reduced (Hoch, 1984). This 
shortcoming is further exacerbated because people underestimate how easily causal 
explanations are generated (Hoc\ 1984 ). Therefore, in the search for ways to improve 
audit judgments,· consideration should be made of whether the technjque being 
consid.ered would regulate the premature .. formation of causal explanations . 
. ;_. 
Consequently, inoculation is chosen in this investigation of alternative judgment .. 
improving tools. 
Auditors work as members of an audit group as well as on their own. The use of audit 
groups/teams is based on the assumption that these groups would improve the quality of 
the judgment. The increasing use of both audit groups to solve cciinplex problems may 
be due to the need of public accounting firms to reduce potential litigation, the incre~sed 
complexities of the reporting requirements and the general increase in the use of 
;pecialists in auditing (Schultz and Reckers;-1981). The group process involve decision-
;"·i .. . ·. : 
makers·undertaking a two-part process to arrive at a judgrnent - a private revision phase' 
. f; .. . - ., ' ... 
~nd a public weighting phase (Sniezek and Henry 1990; 1989). Du~ing the revision 
phase, the decision-maker revises his/her personal judgment in light of the views 
• presented by other group members, and this may include decomposing the problem. 
During the weighting phase, group members weigh up the various global judgments 
I.. 3 
',', 
presented by group members and arrive at a judgment. Groups are used in decision-
making based on the as~umption that. compared to individual decision-makers, they are 
more effective in making complex judgments as well as making judgments in an 
uncertain environment (Fisher and Ellis, 1990). 
An audit· group generally comprises two or mo~e ,:auditors. Audit groups may be 
interacting or non-interacting. Non-interacting gro~ps are often called "composites" or 
staticised groups. Two types of interacting groups are found in auditing (Solomon, 
1987). According to Solomon, an audit team -is hierarchical in nature and the judgment 
is often made by the most senior team member. Audit groups, on the other hand, 
comprise auditors of equal rank within the firm's hierarchy and make judgments jointly 
(Solomon, 1987). This study ex,amines the latter, i.e., interacting audit groups as well as 
individual auditors in a going concern evaluation task and an error detection task. The 
purpose of the examination is to discover whether the use of audit groups leads to more 
effective judgments compared to individual auditors. Consequently, questions that this 
study will attempt to answer include: Are audit group judgments significantly different 
from individual auditor judgments, and is consensus higher for the former than for the 
latter? Are audit groups more accurate than individual auditors, and are audit groups 
more confident and better calibrated than individual auditors? 
;', 
c\_ 
The social psychology literature suggests that decision-makers judge an event more 
likely to occur after they have provided an explanation for its occurrence. This finding 
in the .social psychology literature is rather robust and has been observed in a wide range 
. . 
, of decision-makers including auditors (Koonce, 1992). The auditing standards require 
-auditors to explain '·uieir judgment by way of. providing and documenting audit evidence 
-. n 4 
-to support a judgment. Such a requirement results in an explanation effect. This study 
· considers whether the provision of a couriterexplanation would result in more effective 
judgments by individual and groups of auditors. In counterexplaining, auditors are 
required. to consider why the chosen judgment alternative is incorrect and/or why the 
rejected alternative is correct7, Prior auditing literature suggests that counterexplanation 
may result in more effective judgments. Counterexplanation results in higher belief 
· revision (Heiman, 1990), is effective in correcting the curse of knowledge (Kennedy, 
- 1995), and reduces the explanation effect (Koonce, 1992). There is evidence in the 
literature of the increasing use of counterexplanation in practice. For example, Libby 
and Trotman (1993) find that audit reviewers pay greater attention to evidence 
_ inconsistent wit~ the conclusions reached by their audit -subordinates in analytical 
procedures. Before _this practice of requiring a counterexp]anation becomes more 
widespread, I see a need to investigate whether there are any negative effects of 
counterexplanation. Consequently, this study examines possible negative effects- of 
counterexplanation by asking: Will counterexplaining accurate judgments result in less 
accuratejudgments? I conjecture that there are positive as well as negative aspects of 
. counterexplanation, and that the group process may be all effective way of- reducing 
these negative aspects. This study will also examine whether the use of audit groups 
would mitigate the negative aspects of counterexplaining. 
The results ~ontribute to the exisdng literature by identifying the effects of three 
.-., 
methods of improving audit judgments. This adds to the limited pool of techniques 
-
7 Co~i\tcrexplanation is different from inoculation in that the fonne~- requires the decision~maker to -
-. consider why his/her judgment may be incorrect after the evidence had been vie_~ed and the judgment 
made, while inoculation requires decision-makers to consider all alternatives'io-ii pi·oblcm before 
· viewing any information. 
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avaH~ble to pu.biic a~counting fir~. ~anagement, trainers and educator~ arid· ass.ists iri · 
.. the=·ed11cation and training of auditors by identifying the conditions under which thes.e .. 
. ~~ . 
techniques are.most effective, as well as the.conditions under which their use may be 
.. count~r-prqduc.ti Ve/. >: •,: H 
. . ·;·-:.; ~ ·: . . . 
The remainder of this study is organised as follow.~ .. Ch~pter 2 reviews prior literature 
on inoculation, the group .. process and counterexplanation and discusses 'ihe related 
. . . 
. theories. Three experiments are carried out, and these;are detaile~ in Chapters 3, 4, and 
5. Chapter 3 reports the· effect of inoculation on framing as well as the effect of audit 
:i 
!• I • • Jf. . •. •. . ·· 
.. experiertc:e on inoculation irifan intemal __ .control evaluation task. Chapter 4 reports the 
. effects. of audit group~·. and individual . auditors·:. on going concern . evaluati~n. The 
.·, ! •· . 
experiment• r~po1ted in chapter 4 tests·· ~hether audi~ group a,nd individual auditor 
. judgments are different, and examines gr.cups' and 1ndividuafs.' inforrnadon p~ocessing' 
. as a means of explaining the difference(s). These include an examination of self"'. 
· reported cue usage, cu~ selection and.cue weighting. In Chapter 5, the group process and·· 
I' 
counterexplanat;on are used in a fraud detection task to examine whether group process 
. -'~ . . . . 
and counterexplanation would increase fraud detection rates. The robustness of 
··coi.mterexplanation is also tested by requiring participants who make accurate and 
inaccurate judgments to counterexplain their judgments. A summary and discussion of 
:r·· 
th1{.,1imitations of this study as well as areas for future research conclude this thesis in 
Chapter·6. 
·f:·:·;;!; .. ·.... : =. ::-:.· .. •· .. , .. ·,·.·:.· .• ·.·,.:,··.· .•. ··.:·_·.·.·.·.· .. .-.·. ,'.· .. · . ·.·~ .. 
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.CHAPTER2 
TECHNIQUES FOR IMP~OfING AUDIT JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION· 
Chapter Two discusses various techniques used in both psychology and accounting to 
improve judgment. It begins with a description cif prior litt.:rature and theories on 
' . ~ . 
inocula.tion. The next section discusses the theories and prior literature of the group 
· process. The chapter concludes with an examination of prior literature on 
counterexplanation and discusses the related theories. 
1_1 II 
INOCULATION THEORY 
Inoculation theory is borrowed from medical science where it is used to·, explain: the 
ability of people to ward off infectious diseases after a mild dose of these diseases is 
introduced to their,.bodies. Inoculatiun theory was introduced into social science as a 
., ' 
means of immunising people against persuasion (see McGuire and Papageorgis, 1962; 
Mc Gu ire, 1961 ; McGuire and Papageorgis, 1961 ). The aim of inoculation is to 
immunise people's b~liefs against persuasion by pre-exposing them to "weakened, 
defence stimulating fonns of the counte~~rguments" (McGuire and Papageorgis, 1961, 
. . 
327). The purpose of this pre-exp9~ure is to strengthen the cognitions of people by 
.-.·>/ i'i' 
. providing them with experience in> refuting counterarguments and to sensitise them to 
the existence of counterarguments (McGuire and Papageorgis, 1961 ). 
Another area where inoculation is used is in marketing communications. For example, 
in the early 70's, the Standard Oil Company was found guilty of deceptive advertising 
7 
. ·. 
,· .... ,. 
. . . 
and forced to correct the deception. Pre-empting negative publicity, Standard Oil, in its 
-subsequent.advertising, addressed the issue of the deceptive advertising as well as the -
positive claims of the company's products (Hunt, 1973). Such advertising had a positive 
effect on the image of Standard Oil instead of the negative effect anticipated by the 
- company (Hunt, 1973). The reasons for the success of inoculation in marketing studies 
are based on two aspects of this theory. First, studies by McGuire and Papageorgis 
· found that it is possible to immunise people's beliefs from subsequent counterarguments 
_ -(attacks) and that a defence which considers both supporting and opposing arguments is 
more effective than a one-sided argument (McGuire ;ind Jiapageorgis, 1962; McGuire, 
. . . ·. . ~ ·~·- .. ,- ---~-.-
1961; McGuire and Papageorgis, 1961 ). Second, marketing s~udies also found that two-
sided -arguments are more effective in creating resistance to change in the face of 
subsequent attacks (Crowley and Hoyer, 1994; Kamins and Assael, 1987).Jnocul~tion 
has also been used 'in social intervention to inoculate job seekers against setbacks 
(Caplan et al., 1989), and in decision-making to correct belief-perseverance (Anderson, 
1982). 
i.' 
_.'/ 
Some studies suggest that· causal explanations are generated automatically as a by~ 
prClduct of decision-making (e.g., Hoch, 1984; Koriat et al., 1980), so preventing their 
. . 
formation is not always possible (Anderson, 1982). Causal explanations cause the belief 
perseverance observed in social psycho~ogy and accounting studies (Tutin, 1993; 
Koonce, 1992; Ahlawat, 1992). One method of correcting belief-perseverance8 caused· 
by causal explanations is to regulate the formation of such causal explanations 
· 
8 8 elief perseverance is the tendency of people to hold firm to illogical beliefs that are resilient to 
''iogical and empirical challenges". Such beliefs may become isolated from the data that gave rise to 
them in the first place (Anderson et al., 1980). · · 
8 
:· .. ·' 
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(Anderso~, 1982). Anderson et al. (1980) provided their participants with case studies 
sugge.::ti,ve of either a positive er negative relation between risk-taking and success as a 
firefighter. ',Half the participants were required to provide a written explanation of a 
positive relation between these two factors while the other half explained a negative 
relation between risk-taking and success as a firefighter. All participants were then 
thoroughly debriefed of the fictitious nature of that relation. A post-test questionnaire 
provided a second set of measures on participants' perception of the relation between 
risk-taking and success as a firefighter, The results show a belief perseverance that 
survived the debriefing. 
Anderson (1982) was the first to introduce inoculation into decision-making as a tool 
for correcting belief perseverance. Following the arguments used by McGuire and 
Papageorgis (1961), the aim of Anderson's (1982) inoculation treatment was to sensitise 
participants to the existence of opposing arguments. In Anderson's experiment, all 
participants were required to consider the relation (whether positive or negative) 
between success as a firefighter and risk-taking propensity. As part of the inoculation 
treatment (inoculation condition), participants were, required to explain "both (or all) 
possible relations between the relevant variables prior to examining any data at all't. A 
second group (explanation condition) explained the relation after examining the case 
mate1ials. The third group (dual-explanation condition) explained the relation after 
examining the case materials and counterexplained after the debriefing, while a fourth 
group did not explain or counterexplain (control condition). All participants were then 
debriefed of the fictitious nature of this relation before the dependent measures were 
collected. Participants in the explanation and control conditions displayed more belief 
9 
,, 
perseverance than participants in the other two conditions. Anderson's results show that · 
the inoculation treatment is effective in making people more cautious about forming 
causal 'explanations and leads to a reduction in belief perseverance . 
. ·, 
In sum, inoculation has been used to immunise people against persuasion by providing 
them with experience in refuting counterarguments. This has been observed in · both 
.,, 
social psychology and marketing communications. Two-sided arguments are more 
effective than on.e-sided arguments. Inoculation is also effective in correcting belief 
perseverance by regulating the formation of causal explanations. 
In the search for decision tools,· the ,·researcher should consider the match between the 
target juclgment and the tool. For example, in correcting the premature generation of 
causal explanations. the technique(s) considered. should regulate them before they are 
: formed rather than after their formation. People construct causal relations between the 
infonnation and the target event whether or not they are formally required to do so. 
Hoch (1985) confirmed this when he found. that participants who provided an 
explanation were not significantly more accurate than participants who did not provide 
an explanation. This led him to conclude that both groups of participants must have 
generated causal explanations even though oile group was not specifically required to do · 
so. The literature also suggests that people under-estimate the ease by which causal 
explanations between rhe infonnation and the target event are formed and when formed, 
' .. . ~ j . ~ 
how enduring they may become (e.g., Ho~·h, 1984; Anderson et al., 1980). One way of 
I,' , ••• 
improving the quality of audit judgments i,s to make all evidence (both supporting and 
opposing) more salient tc. the auditor. 
10 
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Inoculation works; by pre-empting the formation of causal explanations. Prior to 
examining anyJnformation. the decision.:.maker h required to consider all possible 
solutions to a problem9• By doing so. first, the decision-maker's cognitive processes are 
rendered ip.ore versatile. As all possible relations between the relevant variables have 
been coi~~idered, the effect of confirmation biasJO is reduced. Anderson (1982) found 
. ., 
that participants in the inoculation condition were more ready to discard their beliefs 
compared to participants not exposed to the inoculation treatment. Second, all possible 
.relations then become equally available in the memory structures of the decision-maker 
as belief perseverance is a result of the overt availability of only one set of arguments. 
Inoculation makes both (or all) sets of arguments available in the memory of 
- participants and leads to the reduction in belief perseverance observed :by Anderson 
(1982). By extension then, inoculation would_ also effectively __ correct explanation 
effects 11 through making opposing arguments more salient to the decision maker. Third. 
by making such relations available, causal explanations are prevented . from forming 
prematurely and belief perseverance is diffused because the decision-maker is sep.sitised 
to _ the existence of opposing _ arguments. According to Anderson,· ,inoculation• s __ 
~ffectiveness is derived at the theory formation stage by improving clecision-niakers' 
. . . f~ 
foresight. Fourth, this -causes the decision~inaker to exercise greater. caution ·. in 
performing the subsequent task. (Anderson, 1982). Therefore, inoculation works by 
9 One decision uid considered in the literature is counterexplanation (refer Section 2.3). 
Counterexplanation works by requiring the decision-maker to consider why his/her judgment may not 
be correct, and why the alternative rejected may be correct. This is carried out ufler the decision-maker 
has already made his/her judgment. 
10 Prior psychology and some auditing studies suggest that decision-makers' cognitive processes arc 
designed to search for information that builds on their perceptions rather than information that 
contradicts them. This is referred to as confirmation bias (Church 1991: Church 1990). 
11 Explanution effect is the tendency of decision makers to judge the explained event more likely to 
occur than the unexplained event. 
11 
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· · . ·. 'demonstrating how easily both ( or all} relations can be explained, and how difficult it is.· .· · · · 
. . . . '( . . . . . ·.: .. ,,, . 
to, identify which is the correct one (Andersori; 1982) ... 
:.: --..·<~~ 
)i : 
-_,:ij 
. ,\1 
. GROUP PROCESS 
. ~~ . 
. . studies comparing the perf ormarice of groups against individuals have been carried ;ur-· ,-- ,-·- -,, 
in social psychology since the tu~ of the century with mixed r~sults. Soirie studies find 
that group judgments are superior to )ndividual judgments, while others· find· the 
,, 
opposite· to be true ( Sniezek and Henry, 1989 and 1990; Kozielecki, 1981 ; Einhorn et 
al., 1977; Janis, 1972; Wallach et al., 1962). By the early 1960's the task of integrating 
::· .. ; . : ·_, . 
the results. of these studies had become impossible due to their proliferation (McGarth · 
,,.; . 
. and Altma~. 1966). Groups1studies inauditing did not begin until the mid~l970's (e.g., 
•,•.c. -;, 
• <"• • • '·_lj ·.. . . 
. ' ' . . i{ . .· 
· Watson, 1975; Barrett and :o~t.'1,1Hey,. 1976). Since that time, the number of auditing 
studies that examined grour:s-have grown relatively slowly. This is mainly due tothe 
: . . ·--.-:::::-.·.'..··'/.. .. .· . ' . ' . . 
difficulty that aud\'ting researchers have in securing 'sufficiently large numbers of 
·participants (Solomon 1987). 
Various theori~s in p~ychology have beenused to explain the differ~nces observed ·. 
. . . 
,;:b~tween inctividuai and group judgments.·Forexample, Janis (1972) quotes the example ,.: 
. . . . 
of "the Bay of Pigs fiasco" as a negative aspect ofgr~up judgments. He attributes the 
judgments made by the late President Kennedy ·and his inner Cabine~ to t~e 
· phenomenon of "groupthink"12 and suggests three reasons why groupthink occurs. 
Groupthink occurs because of the need to preserve group cohesiveness, the secrecy of 
. the group judgment process, and when the group leader act_ively promotes his/her views, 
12 "Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental erficiency, reality testings, and moral judgment that. 
results from in-group pressures" (Janis, 1972, 9). · · · 
.·'\"" _,- .. ,.·-,, . .' 
12 
: · __ ·_··. .'-.:.' 
....... ·= 
the rest of the group feels a greater need to conform (1972). Wallach et al. (1962), using 
a. series of general knowledge questii'jns, finds that groups tend to talce more dsks13 than 
individuals and attributes this to the choice-shift phenomenon. Kozielecki ( 1981) finds 
.. 
excessive optimism, that is, groups tend to overestimate their chances of success and 
underestimate their chances of failure: Bo~:i Wallach et al. and Kozielecki attribute this 
to the group members' sense of anonymity. In an experiment on escalation of 
commitment, Whyte (1993) finds that both individuals and groups escalate their 
· commitment to an earlier investment judgment even when there is no justification for 
doing so. 
. . . . . : . . . . . . 
However, there is robust evidence supporting the proposition that grot.Jp judgments are 
. . . ~- . 
superior to individualjudgments: Social psychology studies carried out by Sniezek and 
her coHeague (e.g., S11iezek and Henry, 1989; Sniezek and Henry, 1990; Sniezek,1992) 
find that groups perform better than individuals. In a general knowledge task, Sniezek 
and Henry 0989)find thanhe group judgments of their participants were more accurate. 
than the mean or median individual judgments, and 30% of their group judgments were. 
·. : 
more accurate than the most accurate individual judgment of the members of the groups. 
Similar results are found by Sniezek and Henry ( 1990). Their participants performed a 
car purchasing task, and the results show that groups are more accurate than individuals, 
and in addition, groups outperform their best member. Group member confidence is also 
high.er but such high confidence should not be interpreted as a proxy for judgment 
,, . . . 
·•. quality (Sniezek, 1992) . 
. 
13 Forafuller discussion on risky shift, see Pruitt ( 1971). · 
I • • 
,' 13 . !.) . 
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· .. Earlier auditing studies on groups examif!.ed the structure of public a~~oµnting firms and 
. . 
· _au9it teams (Watson, 197 5), the comparison of the review process within and between · 
·:_<ti·_.. . 
.. -~. -
public accounting firms (Bamber and Hylinski, 1982), the comparison of judgment 
quality between individuals, interacting groups and composites (Solomon, 1982), and 
the differences between before- and after-group judgments (Abdel-Khalik et al., 1983). 
· Accordingto Watson (1975), "the chief factor that appears to influence both group and 
. individual behaviour is the limitations upon (or opportunities for) the amount and kind 
of interaction'' (262). Consequ~ntly, for si,mple and certain (concrete) tasks, less 
structured groups would perfonn better than structured groups, and in complex and 
uncertain tasks, structured groups would· outperform unstructured groups (Watson, 
· 1975). Watson also finds that audit teams (which are generally more structured than 
i:nanagement services teams) operate in a more certain environment tha~. management 
services teams and the. degree of certainty of t~e task environment is positively 
correlated to the structure of the teams. The behaviour of the leaders also has an effect 
on the performance of audit groups (Pratt and Jiambalvo, 1981). Behaviours· that 
encourage staff innovation, take into account . staff personal needs, practise frequent 
positive feedback and reduce negative feedback, use a time budget, and limit the variety 
· . of tasks assigned, lead to higher performance. 
Due to the constraint of large numbers of participants, most of the prior studies on audit 
groups (e.g., Trotman, 1985) required their participants to make an Glitial judgment as 
an individual. This was used as the dependent variable for the individual condition. 
Following this, participants were formed into groups where they made the same 
jµdgment a second time, and this judgment was used as the dependent variable in the 
group condition. This treatment may result in a learning effect, which may confound the 
14';. J 
results · (lselin, · .1991 ). Hence •. the findings of prior · auditing studies that used this . · 
ic 
· methodology are inconclusive and should be subjected to further testing. 
Various theories have been used to explain the findings in prior accounting and auditing 
stµdies~ These include choice-shift theory. best memb~r theory, information load theory . 
and group;.assisted judgments. The next sections ex.amine these theories ... 
:• . . ··=· 
Choke-Shift Theory · 
Choice-shift theory states that group judgments tend to be .·more. risky than . the 
judgments of individual grou~, members (see ·Paese et al., 1993; Wallac:h. et al.~, 1962). . 
Various·. psychology studies have observed this phenom~non. It has been observed 
among students (Paese et aL, l 993; M~scovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Daise, 1969), nieri . .· 
. . . . . 
. and women {Wallach et ·aL, 1962), blue-collar workers. {Jamieson,· 1°968) and 
,, 
professionals (Siegel and Zajonc, 1967). Four factors are suggested as possible · 
explanations cif the choice-shift observed in group judgments ~Pruitt, 'i 971 ). 
First, is the diffusion-of-responsibility theory suggested by Kogan and Wallach ( 1967) 
··and Wallach and Kogan (1965) 14• It is based on the assumption that risky judgments 
create stress and the group process reduces such stress (Pruitt,· 1971). Because the 
.·· responsibility for the judgment is shared among the groups members, stress is reduced 
and the group is able to make riskier judgments {Pruitt, 197 l ). In addition, choice-shift 
also occurs when the group discussion includes "novel" deliberations (Paese et al., 
1993). In ;this case, the judgment tends·.·• to 'be_ in the direction of these "novel" 
14 This refers the tendency of individuals to shift part of the if responsibility to the. other group members 
when they (the indivldunls) move from the individual decision mode to the group judgment mode. 
15 
.. deliberations. Stress exists in the auditing environment, and this stress is heightened by 
the complexity of some audit tasks, the severity of the consequences of incorrect 
judgments, and the competitive nature of the environment (for promotion and monetary 
· and other rewards). Due to these factors and to the conservative nature of auditor 
training, instead of a risky-shift, a cautious-shift among auditors is a more intuitive 
conclusion, and is supported by prior studies which find a cautious-shift among auditors 
(Barrett and O'Mulley, 1976; and Reckers and Schultz. 1982). 
· The second explanation for the observed choice-shift is familiarisation theory (P.'llitt, 
197 1 ; Bateson, 1966 ). Because group members are able to interact and discuss the 
problein on hand, this increases their familiarity with the information contained in the 
data set. Such familiarity leads to more confidence and results in riskier judgments 
(Bateson, 1966). Criticisms of this explanation are, first, it is too specific as it does not 
explain cautious~shift, and second, the familiarisation effect cannot be replicated by 
other researchers (Pruitt, 1971). This theory is untested in auditing but there is no reason 
to believe that it would be applicable to :uditors, as auditors tend to be under-confident 
rather than over-confident. 
. The third explanation for the observed choice-shift is leadership theory. This theory 
suggests that the more risk-taking members of the group could, with relative easet 
persuade the other group members to make more risky judgments (Pruitt, 1971). This 
.. explanation has some support in the psychology literature because there is a significant 
correlation between the first solution proposed by a group member and the final group 
solution (Dubrovsky et al., 1991; Sniezek, 1989; McGuire et al., 1987). These first 
16 I 
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·,' 
advocates are usually the most trilkativ~ members (Stein, 1975), most knowledgeable 
, , I) 
-_ (Regula and Julian, 1973); have le~dership qualities (Hollander, 1978; Hemphill, 1961) 
and are possibly risk-takers as well (Wallach et al., 1962). Ori the surface, such 
observations are not expected among auditors for two · reasons. First, due to the _ 
hierarchical nature of audit teams, the most.senior team member usually makes the final 
" 
, judgment, and second, .as -conservatism increase,s with experience (Smith and Kida, 
··. ~ ..-, 
1992), it is unlikely that the team leader would permit a risky-shift in the team's 
judgment. Experience and anecdotal evidence indicate a different approach. The 
economic recession of the 1980's witnessed the collapse of many jarge corporations and 
resulted in a number of lawsuits against auditors for their alleged failure to adequately 
report o_n the financial position of their clients. Not all these cases were without merit 
given the large number that were settled out of court. The·se events· suggest that the 
leadership theory is nottotally unfounded . 
. . ,,_,.-Vari~us a~counting and auditing studies have examined group judgments in the context 
of chcii~e·wshift theory. These- include Re9kers and Schultz ( 1982), Schultz and Reckers 
(1981), and Barrett and O'Malley (1976). Barrett and O'Malley (1976) examined the 
effect of choicewshift 'among auditing students. They required student participants to 
,, estimate the contingent liabilities of a medical clinic as a result of negligent practices. 
Two types of tasks were manipulated w material and immaterial tasks. Students 
performed the tas~, twice: once as an individual, and another as a member of a group. 
The results show that riskywshift is higher among group judgments than individual pre-
group judgments for the immaterial tasks and a cautiouswsbift is observed for the 
' 
· material tasks. // // 
. : : ~·: ':' .. 
•.•;·;.i, 
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In · an attempt to explain the cautious-shift phenomenon observed by Barrett and 
O'Malley, Schultz and Reckers ( 1981) used diffusion-of-responsibility theory and social 
value theory15 to explain the choice-shift phenomenon observed in the context of group 
-judgments. Auditor participants were required to make two judgments - one as an 
individual and another as a member of a groi.lp - on whether a contingency footnote 
disclosure was n~cessary. No significant difference in choice-shifts was observed 
between individual and group judgments even though group judgments were subjected 
to less variation. In addition, groups also made use of more information in making their 
-' 
judgment. 
In a follow-up experiment to test for choice-shift, Reckers and Schultz (1982) divide 
. their uncertainty disclosure tasks into three parts. In the ~rst part and for each of two 
tasks, student participants were given an explanation of the task, economic infonnation 
about the client and the latest financial report of the client. Subsequently, student 
participants made recommendations on the necessity for uncertainty disclosure. In the_ 
second part, they were randomly assigned to groups of four. Participants were required 
· ·io reach a consensu,s (if possible) on the issue of disclosure. hi - the third part, 
participants were separated and made disclosure judgments on their own. The results 
show that for high materiality cases, there was a significant cautious-shift from 
individual to group judgments; and for low materfality cases~ there was a significant 
risky-shift from individual to group judgments; These findings support those of Barrett 
and O'Maliey ( 1975). The findings of these studies suggest that auditors generally are 
not subject to the risky-shift observed among participants in the psychology· studies 
l!i · This theory suggests that when individuals move to a group judgment mode, they experience an effect 
that is revealed in the need to maintain a favourable self-perception and self·presentatlon. 
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. (except in the low materiality tasks);_,hr fact, for the high materiality tasks, a cautious~ . 
. •.; . 
. . . . . . 
. ~hift. -is . observed. °This . tendency. "towards" conservadsm could be explained by the 
cons~rvative nature of the audit environfuent . 
;I° . 
J/ 
Best Member Theory 
Best member theory is premised upon the· assu1nption that group members are able to . 
· iden~ify their- best _member and follow his/her judgment so that the judgment of .the 
. . . . 
· _.grciup is more effective than the average judgment of its members (Einhorn et al., 1977). 
·· ,. _The use of audit groups as· a vehicle for decision-making is predicated on ·· the '; · 
. . . . ·1· · .. :I 
assumption tnat group judgments are superior to fodi vidual_ judgments. As the· ~ayings :: 
.. go -'"two·heads are better than one" and "many hands inake.·work light". B11t from a 
. . ... 
review of the Iiter~ture, it' is ·unclear ·whether inter~cting audit·: group~. are definitely 
/.'' . . . 
".) 
)better. than individual audit.ors 'and composites. of. auditors as decision-making units. 
However, ~udit groups, individual auditors an~ composites of auditors will contfoue to 
. . . ·_ . . : . . · .. 
be used. There are situations · where interacting audit groups would outperform· 
. ~ . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . .. 
: _in4.ividual auditors and composites of auditors and--situaiicms where the reverse i~ true. 
' . . . ·. . . . ,· . 
. . . . . . . . . ~ \ 
· -The .chailenge is to identify these situations. . . .. 1, 
',' 
'-= 
. Three fundamental· factors detennine a group's ability to perform and these are the 
· nature of the task, the relative knowledge of the individual members and the judgment 
., 
· .. process· adopted by the group (Steiner, 1966). Based on these factors, Einhorn et al. 
·. (1977).propose that in a judgment task, the final judgment is a resuh -of "we.ighting and 
···combining of the judgments of the individual members" (159). Therefore, the means by . 
. · . . . . . 
_'r\'hich the group weighs and combines the judgments of individual members' ·and the 
; impac(9f s_uch weightings and co~binatio~s on the final juqgments would hav~ an 
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important effect on the quality of the group's judgment (Einhorn et al., 1977), Thus1 
group interaction plays an important part in determining judgment quality. Einhorn et al. ;'. ·1 
· · '';_,developed four models to measure "whether groups do misweight in actuality, and with 
,', 
", 
i 1hat frequency" (159). In the random model, the group randomly picks a member's 
· judgment as a surrogate for the group's judgment. The judgment quality of this type- of 
group is generally low ,because it assumes that members are unable to identify their 
better group members. The group's performance can be improved by simply averaging 
the judgment of its members. This leads to the second type of group (average mode]) 
where each group member's judgment is weighted equally. The disadvantage of this 
type of group is that if group members simply weigh each other's judgment equally, it 
. would be a lot more economical to take an average of individuals' Judgment than to 
have them come together as a group to make the same judgment. Best member model 
assumes that group members, through.their interaction, are able to identify and use their 
best member's judgment as a surrogate for the group judgment. While the group 
judgment may improve using this technique, it may not in all cases. This sh01tcoming is 
taken into account in the·fourth model, which is called the proportional model: A group 
may not be able to identify its best member and may mistakenly nominate the judgment 
of a less-able member. So the probability that the group may not have identified its best 
member is factored into the proportional model. 
According to Einhorn et al. (1977), the best member model outperfonns the average 
mode] at all levels of standardised bias 16• They find that standardised bias and group 
16 Two types of errors visit upon the judgments of individuals. These are random error and standardised 
bias (Einhorn el al., 1977). Random error is merely the distance between the true value and the 
judgment of the individual. This is stated as; 
b = (x, -µ) (I) 
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size affect the quality of the judgment of the random and average models. The average 
model can reduce the random error or discrepancy of the individuals' judgment and, 
where standardised bias is low (e.g., among experts), the average model may increase 
the accuracy of the judgments. But where standardised bias is large (e.g., among 
novices), the proportional model is preferred to the average model. 
Best member theory makes two assumptions. First, where standardised bias occurs, 
interaction among group members results in the identification of individual member 
expertise. and second, having individual group members with different levels of 
expertise, allows group members to follow their best member (Libby et al., (1987). For 
standardised bias to occur, a task must be reasonably complex (Einhorn et al., 1977), so 
that the more complex the task. the greater the ability of groups to outperform 
individuals by identifying their best member. It follows, therefore, that the best member 
must be significantly better than the average of the group members. If the best member 
is only marginally superior to the average of the ·group members, then the group 
judgment is only marginally better than the average of the group members (lselin, 
199 l ). In such a case, it may be more economical to simply taJce the average of 
members· judgment rather than incur the added expense of assembling a group of 
interacting decision makers. Libby et al. ( 1987) and Trotman ( 1985) find that bank loan 
officer and auditor groups respectively are able to identify their best members. and 
consequently outperform the composites. Similarly Yetton and Bottger ( 1982) find that 
group members can identify their best member, but Miner (1984) finds that such an 
where bis the random error, .r1 is the true value andµ is the mean of the individual judgments (Einhorn 
el al., 1977). Standardised bias, however, is the difference between the mean of a population of 
individual judgments and the true value and is denoted as: 
/3 = (x, • µ)la (2) 
// 
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ability is only slightly better than chance. Following best member theory approach may · 
not improve the quality of the judgment (Hall and Watson, 1970) especially when group 
members do not attempt to identify their best member and resort to a majority judgment, 
and they confuse experience with relative expertise (lselin, 1991). Using students in an 
audit task, Trotman et al. (1983) finds that their groups could not identify their best 
member. 
Various accounting a~d auditing studies have examined the effect of best member 
theory on the. effectiveness of decision groups. These include Uecker (1982). Chalos 
(1985). Libby et al. (1987), Solomon (1982), Trotman et al., (1983), Trotman and 
Y etton, · ( 1985) and. Trotman ( 1985). Student participants .were used· in Uecker' s. study, 
. . . 
which required them to· choose sample sizes to be used for quality control in an. 
infonnation system. In all, groups of three and individuals were required to choose 32 
sample sizes. Participants performed the tasks initially as individuals and later, as' 
members of a group. The results show that interacting groups performe~ better than 
composites. Even though the group process led to improved judgments; these judgments · 
were not at their best as they were outperformed by the statistical model (Uecker, 1982). 
In Chalos (1985), using best member theory, loan officers were required to make.loan 
default judgments using financial ratios and the three latest sets of financial reports. 
Significant differences between individual and group judgments were noted, that is, 
group judgments were superior to individual judgments with the groups making fewer 
errors. These included both Type I and Type II errors. Interacting loan committees. 
where /3 is the stun dard lsed bins n nd a is the p opu In ti on sto ndnrd de vi at ion (Ei nh om et a I., 197 7). 
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however, marginally outperformed composites. In addition, both composites and 
interacting groups did not perfonn as well as "the model of man" but they both 
outperformed the individuals. 
Libby et al. ( 1987) hypothesised that the effectiveness of best member theory is 
dependent upon the characteristics of the interacting groups. To test this, both ad hoc 
and practised groups were used in their experiment which required loan officers to make 
39 bankruptcy predictions. These predictions were based on the companies' financial 
profiles which comprised five financial ratios. The practised groups were made up of 
three loan,officers from the same bank while the ad hoc group members were randomly 
assigned. The same participants provided both the individual judgments and the 
interacting group judgments. No difference in perfonnance is observed between 
interacting groups, composites and the most influential member of each group. The. 
results also show that interacting groups are unable to identify their best member. Libby 
et al. suggest that interacting groups are unnecessary or the group could be disbanded 
once their best member has been identified. In addition, practised groups do not 
outperform ad hoc groups. This could be due to the fact that the advantage of practice 
may be offset by other social pressures (Libby et al., 1987). 
In an experiment with volunteer business and government administrators, lselin ( 199 l) 
finds that interacting groups do not outperform composites. The experiment 
manipulated two levels of infonnation load (high and low), three types of decision-
making units (individuals, interacting homogenous groups and interacting diverse 
groups), and two levels of task learning (these were before and after repeated-measure 
dependent variables). The experimental task required participants to predict the 
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bankruptcy/loan default of ten companies (comprising seven non-failed and three failed 
companies). Participants received five financial ratios for the low infonnation load level 
and the high information load participants received the same five financial ratios plus 
balance sheets and income statements for two years. Participants perfoI111ed four 
predictions (which were not used in the analyses) followed by another six predictions. 
They received no feed-back on these predictions. Based on the initial four judgments, 
they were designated as experts or novices, and randomly assigned to homogeneous and. 
diverse interacting groups and individuals. Homogeneous groups comprised either thre.e 
experts or three novices while diverse groups comprised one expert and two novices. 
They were then given the second six predictions in a new questionnaire and instructed 
to improve on their initial predictions. The results indicate that groups are unable to and 
do not identify their best member. 
In Solomon (1982), auditor participants were given information about the client 
including size and industry, infonnation related to the account balance lo be audited, the 
relevant internal control procedures and results of compliance testing (which included 
sample size and frequency and nature of errors detected). Participants were required to 
estimate prior probability distributions of various account balances. The results indicate 
that interacting groups are marginally superior to individuals but they (interacting 
groups) are significantly more superior to the composites. 
Trotman and his associates carried out a series of auditing studies on group judgments 
and achieved mixed results (Trotman et al., 1983; Trotman and Yetton, 1985; Trotman, 
1985). Trotman et al. (1983) required their student participants to make payroll internal 
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control evaluations. The students made the same evaluations, first, as individuals and 
second, as groups. The results, which were measured using consensus (after removal of 
the diversification effect 17), show that groups did not outperfonn composites. The 
authors attributed these results to the student participants' inability to identify the best 
member in their group and concluded that there was "no justification for the 
introduction of group judgments to replace individual judgments. Instead, we could 
simply combine independent judgments to improve perfonnance" (290). The use of 
student surrogates may have accounted for the inability of the audit groups to 
outperform the composites as the students were unable to identify their best member. 
In a follow-up study, Trotman and Yelton ( 1985) used audit managers and audit seniors 
in an audit review task and reached the same conclusion, i.e., interacting groups did not 
outperform composites. Participants evaluated whether internal controls in the payroll 
area were effective. In all, they made 15 evaluations. Participants made their evaluations 
initially as individuals. They were then randomly assigned to groups and were allowed 
to keep a copy of their initial evaluations. The groups comprised one manager (who 
performed the review process) and two audit seniors. Both interacting groups and 
composites were manipulated. The results show that interacting groups did not achieve 
higher consensus than composites in internal control evaluations. The 15 internal 
control evaluation tasks used were described as well understood and well structured. 
This being the case, they did not allow the best member to outperform the rest of the 
group, i.e., standardised bias was reduced. Prior studies (e.g., Chalos and Pickard, 1985) 
17 Diverstfication effect refers to the reduction of random errors attributed to individual judgments 
through the use of composite groups. This results in a tighter distribution of judgments around the 
mean. 
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find that groups outperform individuals by suppressing outlier behaviour among 
individuals. Because the tasks used by Trotman and Yetton were relatively simple, the 
outlier effect was reduced and consequently, no significant difference between audit 
group and composite performances was observed. 
Instead of using consensus as a surrogate for accuracy [as did Trotman et al. ( 1983) and 
Trotman et al. ( 1985)], Trotman ( 1985) measured accuracy. His auditor participants 
were required to estimate the expected dollar error for total inventory and the total 
required audit hours. Unlike prior studies, Trotman made used of practised groups. 
Composites comprised one manager and an audit senior from the same firm while 
interacting groups comprised two seniors from the same firm. Again, the same auditor 
participants provided both individual and group judgments. The results show that 
groups outperform composites, but this result could be affected by a learning effect 
(lselin 1991 ). 
Information Load Theory 
Information load theory, which was proposed by Chalos and Pickard (l 985), states that 
groups process lurge amounts of infonnution better than individuals. As individuals 
have limited information processing capacity, large amounts of information would 
normally cause cognitive strain (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992). In the case of groups, 
however, several individuals working together would compensate for the individuals' 
inadequacies. This would increase the group's corporate processing capacity and lead to 
more effective judgments. In addition, infornmtion load theory states that group 
judgments are more consistent than individual judgments. Prior psychology studies find 
that individuals weigh information cues with moderate accuracy but this individual 
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ability is applied rather inconsistently (Brehmer, 1976). This results in the inconsistent 
judgments observed among individual decision-makers compared to group judgments 
(Chalos and Pickard, 1985; Einhorn et al., 1977). This theory finds support in the results 
of Schultz and Reckers (1981). They find that, compared to individual auditor 
judgmentst audit group judgments are more consistent, and audit groups make use of 
more information in arriving at their judgment. 
For a group to work effectively, group members must pool their processing of 
information cues and integrate the cues into a solution. This normally occurs during the 
group interaction process. During this interaction, suggestions and counter-suggestions 
are put forward by group members. An effective group should be able to identify a 
suggestion as its ht-st or optimum solution. Failure to recognise this reduces the 
effectiveness of the group. When group members are unable to share information 
processing among themselves, they become less effective (lselin, 1991 ). There is 
evidence in the literature to suggest that interacting groups are better able to integrate 
their information processing to reduce the uncertainty of the task, eliminate redundant 
information search and improve judgment quality (Howell et al., 1970). To reap the 
benefits of group interaction, group members must pool and integrate information cues 
to fonn a solution (Hill, 1982). However, some studies show that, in general knowli!dge 
tasks. the group judgment processes result in a loss of information when information is 
being accumulated (e.g., Tuck.man and Lorge, 1962), combined (e.g., Howell et al., 
1970), or used in the decision-making stage (Laughlin and Branch, 1972). When group 
members are unable to share information processing -ufoong themselves, they do not 
outperform composites (Iselin, 1991 ). 
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Prior accounting studies that examine the group process using infonnation load theory 
include Chalos and Pickard (1985), Iselin (1991) and Stocks and Harrell (1995). To 
date, no auditing study has examined the difference between audit groups and individual 
auditors using this theory. In a task involving loan review. Chalos and Pickard (1985) 
hypothesise that information load theory could be ·explained by the difference in cue 
selection, cue weighting. and judgment consistency between groups and individuals. 
This is based on the assumption that groups process information and integrate 
knowledge to form a judgment more effectively and efficiently than individuals. 
Individuals, on the other hand, may interpret information inconsistently, and may miss 
important cues. so that their judgment may not be the optimum and their processing of 
information less efficient. Chalos and Pickard's results. however, show no significant 
difference in cue weighting between groups and individuals, but both these decision 
units outperform the composites. This suggests that groups and individuals are equally 
effective in their weighting of information. But, composites outperfonn both groups and 
individuals in cue selection. There is a high degree of agreement between both groups 
and individuals in their choice of cues. On the other hand, the group judgments are more 
consistent than the individual judgments. This finding supports prior literature (most 
notably Einhorn et al., 1977) that groups' ability to handle higher information loads 
would eliminate the inconsistencies of individual judgments. This study, however, 
suffers from several confoundings (see Iselin, 1991, 195). As with other group studies, 
this one also uses the same participants for both individual and group judgments. The 
second confounding is the manipulation of the infonnation load. In the low load 
condition, participants were given tl.uee financial ratios with which to make a loan 
judgment while participants in the high load condition received the same financial ratios 
plus the full set of financial report. Limiting the available infonnation to merely three 
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financial ratios increases task difficulty and reduces the external validity of the study 
(lselin, 1991 ). 
In an attempt to overcome the confoundings of Chalos and Pickard's (1985) study, 
Iselin retests information load theory with business and government administrators 
using a bankruptcy prediction task. He finds no significant difference between the 
judgments of groups and individuals as well as between participants in the different 
information load conditions. The finding that groups could not process more 
information than individuals is attributed to the inability of the group members to share 
the information processing so that they could outperform the individuals (lselin, 1991). 
The results oflselin's study are, however, affected by a limitation, that is, Iselin assumes 
that providing participants in the high load condition with more information would 
result in higher information processing. Extant psychology literature shows that this 
may not be the case. Human information processing. makes use of various biases and 
simplified processing strategies (see Hogarth, 1980). If the five financial ratios provided 
are the most salient cues, then the provision of the financial report is redundant. lselin 
did not measure cue usage as did Stocks and Harrell (19~5). Thereforet there is no 
assurance that the provision of different information loads leads to increased 
information processing between the two load conditions (especially when the 
information provided to the low load condition was adequate for bankruptcy prediction). 
Howevert perception of information load was measuredt and participants in the high 
load condition rated the infonnation load to be significantly higher than participants in 
the low load condition. lselin finds that business and government administrators are 
unable to share information processing responsibilities. Nevertheless, he does not rule 
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out the proposition that groups outperfonn individuals but believes tbat it would occur 
under some (yet unidentified) conditions. 
In an experiment that manipulates two levels of information load (high load - nine 
financial ratios; low load - six financial ratios) and two judgment modes (individuals 
and groups), Stocks and Harrell (1995) required loan officers to make financial distress 
predictions. The prediction tasks included bankruptcy, loan default. non-payment of 
preference shares dividend and sale of assets. The dependent variables were cue use, 
accuracy, consistency and consensus. Compared to individual auditors, audit groups 
made use of more cues in making judgment for both load conditions. Groups were more 
accurate than individuals in the high load condition but both groups and individuals 
were equally accurate in the low load condition. The judgments of the groups were more 
consistent in both load conditions and the same was true of judgment consensus. 
Group-Assisted Judgments 
In the audit environment, auditors often have the benefit of consulting with or seeking 
advice from colleagues on particular audit issues (Reckers and Schultz, 1982 and 1993; 
Gibbins and Emby, 1984; Solomon, 1987). Such consultation exposes the auditor to the 
views of others and may result in a change in their prior judgment (Pruitt, 1971 ). 
According to Pruitt, through the consultation process, decision makers become aware of 
information and/or arguments that they may not be aware of when working on their 
own. This pooling of arguments and counterarguments should allow groups to identify 
the optimum solution. This suggests that group-assisted judgments are more effective 
than unassisted judgments. But the findings in the psychology literature are mixed. 
Some studies find that decision-makers often perceive their own judgment to be better 
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than it really is as well as t6 be superior to those of the other group members (Lamril et 
. >:Y ~~'~l~; 1972; Myers, 1975). In addit_ion, there is a tendency to perceive the responses of the 
.,.- . ,\i r~:~>: . • ,/· . . ' . . . -
· :> (-other gro~p members to be more extreme than their own (Baron et al;. 1973). Similarly, 
.... --., '. .. 
,( '.·· . . 
·:; 
.· the results·in auditing studies are mixed and these are discussed below. 
. There are limited studies in auditing that ex3mine gtjup-assisted· judgments. and these 
. .. 1: 
;, 
include Reckers and Schultz (1982 and 1993), Johns6-n\1994) •. ~nd Abdel-Khalik et al. 
. . . . 
(1983). R~ckers and Sch~ltz (1982) examined the effect of individual versus group-
assisted judgments on. the choice-shift phenomenon. They llypothesised that group-
1' . . .. . . 
: . ' 
.. · assisted judgments would shift towards one extreme of the indlviduals' prior judgments 
und this shift w,ould be determined by _the direction of the majority's views. In addition, 
' ' 
consistency of judgment was also examined; ~tudent participants were required to .· 
detennine the adequacy of contingency disclosure. The results did not show any choice-
shift but consistency of judgment after group-assisted evaluation was found· to be 
i1 . . . . 
higher.· 
. . ' . . 
ln:Abdel-Khalik et al. 0983), the effect of group-assisted planning of external audit 
: . ;_. . 
programs·'was investigated together with types of EDP-audit techniques used by internal 
. ... ' .. . 
. auditors and levels of internal auditors' responsibilities. Th,e authors hypothesjsed that· 
individual responses are stable, and therefore, would not change as a result of group-
assisted discussion. The results show a high degree of correlation between par:ticipants' 
bef?re.:. and after-discussfon judgments. This indi~ates that group-assisted discussion 
does not have;an effect on participants· initial judgment. 
.. .. . .... . . . . 
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.· Reckers and· Schultz (1993) examined whether group-assisted discusaion has ·an effect 
on auditors' ability to identify fraud signals. Failure on the part of auditors to detect 
material fraud would incur high costs and group-assisted discussion is one '-'way of · 
reducing the cost of litigation (Reckers and Schultz, 1993). It is expected that an 
· auditor's reaction to new infonnation is dependent upon group-assisted discussion as 
well as his/her perception of the likelihood of fraud. Using an inventory task, Reckers 
and Schultz (1993) had auditor participants assess the likelihood of fraud in a given case 
before dividing them into group;;assisted participants (group-a~sisted condition) and 
· individual participants (individual condition). They were then required to make two 
assessments: first, whether the financial report contained fraud; and second;,whetherthe 
. . 
inventory balance should be written down for obsolescence. Later they reviewed the 
additional information in either a good news/bad news order or a bad news/good news 
. . 
order. Participants in the individual condition made repeated judgments on the existence 
of fraud and write-down of inventory due to obsolescence while participants ,in the 
group-assisted condition made: these judgments after consulting with . their group 
members. The results support . the hypothesis and find that audit_ors' · reaction to fraud 
. . . 
. signals improved with group assistance. 
:; ... , 
Based on the assumption that an auditor's memory forms a vital part in determining 
·· judgment quality, Johnson (1994) carried out an experiment which manipulated two 
types of judgments - individual and group-assisted judgments. two levels of time delay -.. 
· one hour and 24 hours, and two memory tasks - recall-then-recognition or recognition~ 
only. Participants were required to perform an audit workpapet review. The workpapers 
iantained descriptions of the. client's business, management, and operations as well as 
industry . data, ris,k asse~§~ents of merchandise inve!ltory and long-term debt and 
,it. 
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· ·. workpapers of work performed by an entry-level audit staff. In . part one of . the. 
experiment, participants were required to review and comment on the· workpapers. In 
part two. participants were randomly assigned to one of two memory tasks. After a ti~e 
delay of one hour or 24 hours, part three of the experiment participants were randomly· 
assigned to individual or group-assisted conditions where the tasks in part one were 
repeated. The results indicate that the number of items recalled and accuracy of recall . 
are higher for the group-assisted condition and the shorter time delay. There was an 
interaction effect between type . of judgment (individual or group-assisted) and· time 
delay •on· accuracy. and confidence .. In addition, participants in. the .group-assisted 
condition made fewer Type U errors in recognition memory. than individual auditors. 
· The group-assisted participant'~ also demonstrated over-confidence. 
In sum, choice-shift theory finds that decision-making ·groups· have a tendency to take 
. . r_. . . 
more risks than individual decision-makers. This finding in the psychology literature is 
quite · robust. However,· conflicting results· are observed in the auditing literature. · 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Auditing studies find a cautious~shift on material matters and a risky-shift on immaterial 
matters (Barrett and O'Malley, 1976; Reckers a9tl Schultz, 1982). On the other hand, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ·, - . . : .· .... ·I . . . . . .. '
Schultz and, Reckers ( 198 l) find iio difference in ·choice-shift. between· audit groups and 
· individual auditors. 
Best member theory states that throughinteracting with each other, group members are 
,· 
, able to identify their best member and use that member's judgment as a proxy for the 
group's judgment. This should enable groups to outperform individuals. Prior auditing 
. ,, . 
studies based on best member theory produce mixed results. Some repnrt that audit 
• • • 1, • • -,.J. . 
. . . ·~ 
. .. 
::groups do not. outperf onn , individual auditors (Trotman et al., 1983; Trotman and · 
. ..... 
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Yetton. 1985), while others find that audit groups do outperform individual auditors· .. 
·(Solomon, 1982; Trotman:·1985). 
Information load theory states that audit groups should be able to process larger 
amounts of information compared to individual auditors. Because of this, audit group 
judgments should be more consistent than the judgment of individual auditors. In 
addition, differences in cue selection and cue weighting should be observed. No prior 
· auditing study h~~ examined audit group judgments in the context of information load 
.,·,, I 
theory. Stur'.ies in accounting that have been premised on this theory find no difference 
in cue · selection and · cue weighting and group members are unable to share the 
information processing responsibilities (Chalos and Pickard, 1985; Iselin, 1991). 
However, group judgments are more consistent than the judgments of individual 
auditors (Chalos and Pickard, 1985). Stocks and Harrell (1995) find that, on the whole, 
. groups are able to proc~ss higher infonnation loads more effectively than individuals. 
Individual auditors working alone, may not be aware· of all the arguments and 
counterarguments surrounding a particular task. Consultation with colleagues may 
highlight the existence of such arguments. Group-assisted judgments are based on these 
assumptions. Prior auditing studies show that group-assistance results in higher 
consistency (Reckers and Schultz, 1982), improves auditors' detection of fraud signals 
(Reckers and Schultz, 1993), and increases auditors' recall of information and accuracy 
of recall (Stocks and Harrell, 1995). Abdel-Khalik et al. (1983) on the other hand, find 
that group discussion has no effect on individual auditor's judgments. 
34 
{t) 
,_;.,:,' j,\· 
u 
COUNTEREXPLANATION 
Counterexplanation is the provision of reasons that either speak against or provide 
evidence against the chosen ultemative, or speak for or point towards the alternative 
rejected (Koriat et al., 1980). It is seldom required in decision-making and decision-
makers do not habitually counterexplain. Counterexplanation has led to more effective 
judgments in the social psychology literature. In a general knowledge task, Koriat et al. 
(1980) used counterexplanation with some success to correct over-confidence in student 
participants. Half the partkipums wrote explanations in support of their judgments and 
the other half wrote counterexplanutions. They then rated their confidence in having 
made an accurate judgment. The results show that counterexplanation is useful in 
reducing over-confidence in students' judgments, as over-confidence is partly due to the 
neglect of disconfirming information (Koriat et al., 1980). Hoch ( 1985) finds similar 
over-confidence with student participants, and like Koriat et al., hypothesises that such 
over~confidence could be mitigated by the use of counterexplanation. Final~year 
university students were required to predict their job prospects at graduation in nine 
months' time. Participants in the manipulation groups then wrote explanations and/or 
counterexplanations. Hoch divided his participants into four groups; a control group, a 
pro group (who wrote explamllions), a con group (who wrote counterexplamitions), and 
a pro-con group (who wrote both explanations and counterexplanations). Students, 
consistent with prior psychology studies, were over-confident in their judgments and 
this over-confidence was corrected after the provision of a counterexplanation. The 
control group and the pro group showed similar high confidence which supported Koriat 
et al.'s prior findings. 
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The provision .of a counterexplanation before an explanation results in lower lik,elihood 
judgments while the provision of an explanation before a counterexplanation does not 
(Hoch, 1984). This is because, in the latter case, the provision of the first set of reasons 
interferes with decision-makers' ability to consider counterexplanations, and therefore, 
an explanation effect is observed (Hoch, 1984). 
Ross et al. (1975) demonstrate that people's beliefs in social theories are amazingly 
resilient to change. Such beliefs can be based on very little information and can survive 
. . 
even after the initial information has been totally 1~1scredited (Anderson et al., 1980). 
Ii! 
Anderson ( 1982) predicts that such belief per~everanc.i:',.can be corrected. The 
. ~ \ . . 
procedures were described above. The results show that, in acldition to the effectiveness 
. 1,.i . 
:"_.: 
of inoculation in correcting belief perseverance, counterexplanation is similarly 
effective in debiasing belief perseverance. 
Anderson and Sechler ( 1986) used counterexplanation to correct belief perseverance in 
social theories. As stated above, prior studie:r show that people's beliefs in social 
theories are surprisingly resilient to change. Exposure to new data may result in even 
more extreme beliefs, especially for emotive social theories such as capital punishment 
(Lord et al.t 1979). In an experiment by Anderson and Sechler, participants were divided 
into four groups. In Group One, p~rticipants were required to explain the positive 
relation between success as a firefighter and risk-taking propensity (a nonemotional 
issue); Group Two explained the negative relation between success as a firefighter and 
risk-taking propensity. Group Three participants wrote both positive and negative 
re1ations and Group Four did not either explain or counterexplain. Participants were 
then required to consider the suitability of 16 applicants for the position of firefighter. 
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Four pieces of information were provided for each applicant: gender of applicant, risk 
preference, intelligence and physical capabilities. These characteristics were combined 
in a 24 factorial resulting in 16 cases. Participants rated each applicant on a seven-point 
scale anchored by very unacceptable and very acceptable. The results indicate that 
counterexplanation successfully reduces the explanation effect as the latter is partly due 
t·o ignoring alternative arguments. 
The studie~ by Koriat et al. (1980), Anderson ~1982), Hoch (1984), Hoch (1985), and 
Anderson and Sechler (1986) involve the application of counterexplanation in 
knowledge tasks. The real test for counterexplanation is in domain-specific tasks. Tutin · 
(1993) finds that counterexplanation is only marginally effective in reducing the 
explanation effect. among clinical psychologists. Participants received two detailed 
patient case histories. each containing approximately 1,400 words. Significant judgment 
differences were noted between participants who explained/counterexplained a 
particular case first and participants who explained/counterexplained the same case 
second. Physiological reasons could have confounded the results. While domain-
specific studies are limited. the initial results of the use of counterexplanation among 
auditors appear encouraging (Heiman, 1990; Koonce. 1992; Kennedy, 1995). 
On the premise that counterexplanation is often required for analytical procedures, 
Heiman (1990) gave all participants case materials containing the current year's 
unaudited financial report together with three financial ratios. Participants were asked to 
· respond to the following question: "Given the fact that a financial statement error 
occurred and affected the ratios on the previous page, how likely do you think it is that 
·. the error was next period's credit sales being recorded in the current period?" Here, 
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participants made their first likelihood judgment (pre-test judgment). After which, they 
were divided into three groups. One group of participants considered five 
counterexplanations offered by the experimenter (experimenter-provided group). The 
second group generated their own counterexplanations for the error (self-generated 
group), while a third group acted as a control. Subsequently, all participants made a 
post-test likelihood judgment. A within-subject interaction between pre-test/post-test 
likelihood judgments and source of alternative is observed. As predicted, the between-
;.subject post-test likelihood judgment of the experimenter-provided group was 
significantly lower than their pre-test likelihood judgment. Significant within-subjects 
pre-test and post-test likelihood judgment differences were also observed. The results 
support the proposition th:1t counterexplanation affects likelihood judgments. In a 
second experiment, for the two manipulation conditions, the number of 
counterexplanations considered by participants was varied in number and in strength. 
The results indicate that auditors' likelihood judgments are affected by the number of 
counterexplanations considered but, contrary to prior studies (most notably Einhorn and 
Hogarth [ 1986]), not by the strength of the counterexplunations. 
Using an analytical review Koonce ( 1992) carried out an experiment where the ord~r of 
explanation and counterexplanation was changed. After reading the case materials •. 
participants either wrote explanations prior counterexplanations or vice versa. A third 
group wrote only explanations. An explanation effect is observed for the explanation-
only group. For the dual-explanation groups, a recency effect was observed, i.e., 
counterexplanation was effective in reducing the explanation effect but only in the 
group that explained before counterexplaining. This finding contradicts Hoch (1984). 
Hoch found a primacy effect instead and used the inference theory to explain his results. 
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In sum. counterexplanation is effective in correcting over-confidence (Koriat et al.; 
1980; Hoch, 1985). While explanation leads to increased likelihood judgment for the 
explained event, counterexplanation results in lower likelihood judgments (Hoch, 1984; 
Anderson and Sechler, 1986), it also increases decision-makers' readiness to abandon 
· their initial judgment, and hence, moderate any belief perseverance ( Anderson, 1982). In 
an auditing context, counterexplanation similarly reduces the explanation effect 
(Heiman, 1990: Koonce, 1992), und a recency effect has been observed (Koonce, 1992). 
Another counterexplanation effect observed is the amelioration of confirmation bias 
( Chung and Monroe, 1996; Church, 1991 ). Counterexplanation has also been used to 
de bias the curse of knowledge in an auditing context (Kennedy, 1995). 
Apart from_Tutin ( 1993) and Anderson and Wrig~t (1988), prior studies reported in the 
social psychology literature examined the explanation effect on student participants in 
general knowledge tasks. It is unclear whether experts, working on a domain-specific 
task would demonstrate the same explanation bias. The studies by Tutin and Anderson 
and Wright report that experts are subject to less explanation bias. However, other 
· studies in auditing find the opposite; they find that auditors similarly have an 
explanation bias (e.g., Ahlawat, 1992; Koonce, 1992). In addition, Koonce finds that 
counterexplanation is effective in reducing the explanation bias but only if the auditors 
are required to explain prior to counterexplaining (a recency effect). But her findings 
may have been affected by a confounding, as a significant task difficulty effect is 
observed between the two groups (Koonce, 1992). Auditors considering 
counterexplanations are able to generate more alternative hypotheses to explain the 
findings of analytical procedures (Heiman, 1990). Auditing researchers have only 
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recently begun to examine the effects of explanations and counterexplanations on audit 
judgment. Consequently, the range and depth of these studies are limited and further 
studies would be able to add substantially to our understanding of explanation and 
' counterexplanation in audit judgment. 
Counterexplanation has been observed to work in four ways. First, the explanation bias 
is the result of causal explanationt therefore, any judgment tool must start with an 
examination of causal explanation. As pointed out by Koriat et al. (1980), cm1sal · 
explanations are formed automatically as a by-product of decision-making, so . 
preventing it is nigh impossible (Anderson, 1982). Besides, the question of explanation 
bias is not so much related to causal explanation as it is to our underestimating the ease 
of its (i.e., causal t:f,~pJanations) creation (Anderson and Sechler, 1986; Ross et al., 19,77; 
Ross et al., 1975). Anderson and Sechler (1986) propose that in the face of two 
competing solutions to a problem, the solution where causal relations are easier to 
imagine or recall would be the one adopted. This implies that the explanation bias found 
in the ~pdal)psychology studies is a result of ignoring opposing arguments and is easily · 
;•' 
createii. Prior studies find that merely asking participants to explain the hypothetical 
',\ 
relatio~!) between two variables creates an explanation effect (e.g., Anderson et al., 
,, 
1980). Tl\e provision of an explanation increases the availability of causal relations 
between the information and the explained event, and leads to an explanation effect. 
One way of reducing the explanation effect is to increase the availability of opposing 
arguments. Anderson and Sechler (1986) and Anderson (1982) suggest that the 
technique used to debias belief perseverance, i.e., counterexplanation, may be effective 
in debiasing the explanation effect at both the individual and group levels. In their 
experiments, Anderson and Sechler find that counterexplanation is effective in reducing 
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· the expianation effect, leading them to conclude that the explanation effec't is due to ttie 
· . neglect of opposing arguments. They explain that: 
"'The main error leading to the explanation effect is not in using the 
. availability of plausible causal explanations in judging the probable · 
· · relation between two variables. Rather, the error seems grounded in 
people's inability (or unwillingness) to see that the availability of a 
particular explanation may have been due to factors unrelated to the truth 
of the explanation, and that equally plausible causal explanations could ·. 
be generated for alternative or opposite variable relations" (32). 
. . . . 
Second, another way of correcting the explanation effect in audit judgment is to make 
, opposing evidence more salient. through the use of counterexplanation (Anderson, 
. . . . . . . . 
1982). Anderson's results show that c.ounterexplanation leads to a reduction in belief · 
perseverance and he attributes this to four factors. First, the consideration of 
counterexplanation increases versatility that may result in lower belief perseverance. 
. . . ' .· . . . . . . 
. . 
Second. belief perseverance may be a result of availability, so the\act of considering 
. . . . . . . }i 
. .· .. ',\ . 
counterexplanations makes opposing .· arguments equally. avaUable and belief 
perseverance is reduced. Third, the order by which these arguments are generated does 
not impede the effectiveness of these procedures (though other studies such(f) Koonce 
. . . . . . : _. . . 
[1992] find otherwise). Fourth, counterexplanation causes theory revision. ·However, · 
._.. . . . 
beliefs in social t~eories are quite different from beliefs in self or social event 
occurrence (Anderson and Sechler, · 1986) and are presumably even more different. from · 
. . . . . . : . ' . . . . . . . 
• 1"1 • • • • • • ·:·· • 
. dornain:..specific tasks such as auditing. Beliefs in social theories are relatively stable,·· 
--- e.g~. capital punishment (Lo:rd·et al., 1979) and beliefs in seff or social events' maybe, 
. . . . . . .. . . . . 
. formed ahead of the counterexplanation. Although belief perseveran~e and the 
. . . . ... ~-. . . 
explanation effect ''are dissimilar. phenomena, they . are ·. both results of causal 
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explanations. Therefore, counterexplanation focuses on correcting causal explanations 
as a means of correcting both belief perseverance and the explanation effect. 
_ Third, the findings in the literature of over-confident decision-makers is quite robust but 
_ this is generally confined to general knowledge tasks and other professionals (apart from 
auditors). Hoch (1985) uses theories of availability, confirmation bias and interference 
to explain over-confidence. It is also\.suggested that the explanation effect may be 
caused. by over~confiJ~ti~e (Hoch~ 19~5; Koriat et al., 1980). If a decision maker is 
.' \,, . . . 
confident of _ an explained target event, then s/he would increase the subjective 
likelihood judgment of the target everit occurring. Correcting over-confidence may lead 
--
to a reduced level of the explanation effect. Koriat et al. (1980) first · used 
-_ -_ counterexplanation to improve the calibration 18 of decision-makers. As ·- causal 
explanation (or the generation __ of supporting reasons) is a by-product of decision-
making. over~confidence 19 results when counterexplanations are ignored (Koriat et al., 
1980). Decision7makers such as auditors do not generate counterexplanations 
automatically- and must be specifically instructed to do -so (Koriat et al., l 980). 
Requiring decision-makers to explicitly consider coti.nterexplanations forces them to 
consider disconfirming information and over-confidence is reduced. Accuracy may also 
_be improved by increasing the consideration of opposing evidence (Hoch, 1985), 
Fourth, similar to correcting the curse of knowledge, counterexplanation works by 
( _I • • 
reducing the ~trength of the causal explanation between the information ::md the target 
· 
18 Perfect calibration occurs when a decision-maker'nate of accumtej~d~ments matches 1{isJher rate of 
confidence in those judgments. - --- · -
19 Over-confidence results whe~-: th6' dcci_~,t~n-makeis rate of 'con1,~cnce exceeds· his/her rate of 
accuracy, f( . 
Js· I!., 
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_ event (Kennedy, 1995). By requiring participants to focus -their attention on 
':/11 
- -.• counterexplaining. an experimenter-prescribed outcome prior to making :predictions 
about other participants' estimate of the outcome, Kennedy predicts that this 
111anipulation- would weaken the tendency to construct causal explanations. She finds,,-
inconclusive evidence that counterexplanation ieads;to professional scepticism. 
. . . . . . . . . . 
Apart frmn Heiman {1990) and Koonce 0992), auditing studies do not consider the -
. . .. . : ·.-··. . . . . . . . ..· . . :· . . . . ·_ 
effectiven~~s of tlie resultant judgment. Heiman and KO!)!!C:e• consider the' effect of 
countere~planation -on the_- explanation effect and find that if auditors provide -a 
l,_ . . . . . : . •· . 
. --counterexplanation for ·an inaccurate judgment~ they are 111ore likely to revise their_ -
. . . . . . . . . :- : . . . . . . . . . . .. ·_ . -~. \......:. . . . . 
_ ju~gment. It fqHows that if auditors counterexplain an accurate judgment>·they should 
• \ ', :· • •• - • • • L" "• • • - • 
-- _ be able to distinguish an accurate j~dgment,: fro~ an inaccurat~ · one. So after _ 
,- f< 
t~ounterexplainingian accurate judgment, they should not be persuaded by the opposing 
\. \\ . -
u -- . . - - - - -
arguments· to r~vi~e their judgmep.t. If a~ditors provide a cmmterexplanation for an 
l . . .. 
--_ accurate judgment, and - they revise their judgµient to -a less accurate one, then 
·-- counterexplanation may be counter-beneficial. Therefore, the real strength test -of -
. . ~ . . . 
- -
counterexplanation would be for auditors who make accurate judgments to not revise · 
their judgment in spite of having to counterexplain their initial judgment. , _-
-_1 ~. L 
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CHAPTERJ 
EXPERIMENT ONE -THE EFFECT OF INOCULATION, 
;FRAMING AND AUDIT EXPERIENCE ON THE EVALUATION 
OF INTERNAL CONTROLS 
INTRODUCTION 
· This experiment examines the effect, of inoculation, framing and audit experience on 
internal control evaluations and is motivated by five factors. First, prior studies suggest 
that in making judgments, people generate causal explanations as a bridge between the 
· .. informat~pn t\nd the problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). These causal explanations 
.· once generated cannot be readily changed, and because of their inflexibility. the quality 
of the result~nt judgment is reduced (Hoch, 1984). This shortcoming is further 
exacerbated because people un.derestimate how easily causal explanations are generated 
(Hoch, 1984). Therefore, in searching for ways to improve audit judgments, 
,. 
consideration should be made of whether the technique being considered would regulate 
the premature formation of causal explanations. Consequently, inoculation is chosen in 
this investigation of alternative means of improving audit judgment because of its 
ability to regulate the formation of causal explanation. 
Second, the accounting literature suggests that framing has an effect on the nature of 
judgments elicited (e.g., Sullivan~ 1996; Emby, 1994; McMillan and White, 1993; Kida, 
1984), as well as the manner in which infonnation is processed (e.g., Dunegan, 1996). 
In general, a negatively framed judgment problem results in more comprehensive 
information processing than a positively framed judgment problem (Dunegan, 1996), 
and consequently, the judgment is also affected. Greater understanding of this heuristic 
would lead to the development of more effective training techniques. This study extends 
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prior auditing research by investigating whether framing effects can . be reduced or 
eliminated by the use of inoculation. 
·.))· . 
Third, biased decision makers may be divided into two categories - . perfectible and 
. . -· . . 1-) 
'incorrigible decision makers (Fischhoff, 1982). The former ~efers to decision makers 
whose judgments could be improved by various corrective and edtcational techniques . 
. · . .. . 
The study of this type of decision maker is important because, it helps trainers and 
. :_'i' 
educators understand how their judgments may be improved. There is a trend in the -
current auditing literature that investigates ways of improving audit judgments ,(e.g., 
Koonce, 1992)_. Incorrigible decision makers, on the other hand, are 'decision makers 
who are not responsive to training. Through the use of inoculation, we may understand 
the magnitude, predominance and inflexibility of their biases. 
Fourth, most behavioural research in auditing focuses on experienced auditors, _ and 
consequently, we have limited, knowledge of how auditors' knowledge structures and 
their understanding of audit-related events are developed with experience (Libby and -
Luft, 1993; -Waller and Felix, 1984). In addition to knowledge structures and 
un~erstanding, the literature suggests that novices and experts process information 
differenUy (Schoenfeld and Hermann, 1982). Prior studies h~ve not examined the 
relation-ship between audit experience -- and responsiveness to judgme~t -tools. 
Consequently, little is known of the' nature of this relationship. Whfle a· linear 
. --- ;:~ ( ' 
relat~onship is normally assumed, this study postulates that this relutionshipis ~ctually 
-nonlin'ear -and•·would take on an inverted-U shape. There are policy implications for 
- jl: ' . . ·. 
publi6,,,accounting firm management, as identifying this w~uld allow th~m to. direct, 
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training resources at the most receptive -group of audit staff Using auditors with _ 
different levels of audit experience, this experiment will model the effect of inoculation --
on auditors with different levels of audit experience and identify those auditors who are 
most receptive to training. 
. . . : . . 
·. .·. . . . . ·. . .· -· 
Finally, und~rstanding th/effect ofpresentation order of internal contml proceduresis 
important because prior studies suggest that changing the presentation orde{ of th_ese 
procedures may result in different conclusions about control risk (see Hogarth and 
Einhorn, 199.2). ·Prior studies mar.ipulate the presentation order of information and find 
a recency effect (e.g., Asare, 1992). Koonce (1992), on the other hand, examines the 
order effect of writing supporting and opposing arguments (after the participants had 
examined the infonnati<:m) while holding the presentation order of information constant. 
She finds a recency effect instead of the hypothesised primacy effect and attributes this 
to the participants' perception of task diffic_ulty (Koonce, 1992). In .this study, the 
presentation order of information is similarly held constant. However, participants are 
reg 1.1ired to ' write supporting and opposing . arguments .. prior to viewing : any . c~se .· 
information. Prior psycholo_gy literature suggests that when decision makers are required 
towrite supporting and opposing arguments, a primacy effect results (Hoch,, 1984). 
. . . . 
•.. • . '., . •• ·• • ' . . • • .. .. ·!· • : . 
-· .Jnteraction effects betwe~n le\1els of audit experience. and the inoculation treatment and. 
between framing and inocuhttion are. expected. It is hypothesised that participants 
- expo;~d. to an ino~~lation treatment \V ill make judgments that are significantly different 
. from the judginents of particip~ts in the control group at three levels of audit 
experien~e·. It is also hypothesised that the ord;r by which auditors write supporting and 
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opposing arguments will have an effect on their judgments; To test these hypotheses, an· 
'~' ~xp~riment using an internal control evaluation task was carried out. Participants 
-exposed to an inoculation treatment were required to write supporting and opposing 
arguments before viewing any case materials. They then reviewed the case materials and 
evaluated the intemo.l controls of o.· company in two different_ frames. Half the · 
· •·-- participants evaluated the internal con~ols framed-as stre~gth of internal controls, and 
· • the other half of the participants evaluated the internal controls framed a~ risk of internal 
. . . . . .· . . . . l . 
controls. The control participants did not write'supporting ~d opposing arguments. L 
··. . . . 
·. .. . 
find· a -significant _ interncdon · effect between the _ inoculation _ treatment and audit 
. . . . . . . . . . ,· . 
. . . . .. . 
experience: Consistent with prior psychology literature (e.g., Hoch_ 1984), the.,~esults 
support the hypothesis ofa primacy effect. Howev~r. I do not find an intera~tion effect 
between framing,and inoculation. 
INTERNAL CONTROL EVALUATION 
Various proxies have been used to measure judgment . quality such as accuracy, 
. . . 
consistency of judgment and consensus. Accuracy, although desirable, is -not al ways 
. . .· . . . . . . . . . ·. _. . . . . . ·. . 
. . 
determinable in certain audit tasks until some subsequent event occurs. One such audit 
. . . .. . . .· . . . . . . . 
. . . ·. . . . .. 
· task is the evaluation of internal controls. If the auditor determines internal controls to 
. .· .. ' . . .:: .. .. . . . . . . . _.. . 
-. be effective, the · later· discovery of material weaknesses will invalidate the initial 
judgment. -On the oth~r hand, if no such material weaknesses are discovered, the auditor 
.. assumes that his/her initial evaluation is accurate ~ven though material weaknesses may 
. • h~~e go,neundetected. 
,,·,? - Joyce'{1976)used an internal control task in the accounts :receivable area and required 
: . _- ,t . -·_- '•- ....• ·- . _--_ ... _-_ ....•.. --- ·-- ;•· .•.. · '' . -_ .· 
· -participants to estinfate aµdit time for five classes.of audit procedures. His results show · 
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a lack of agreement among auditors, which was attributed to the nature of the task ... 
Higher agreement is found in tasks involving the rating of internal controls (Ashton, 
1974) than in tasks requiring the estimation of audit work required or audit time (Joyce,. 
1976). Gaumnitz et al. (1982) modified Joyce's task by requiring the participants to 
evaluate the quality of internal controls over accounts receivable instead of estimating 
required audit time20• Their results indicate thL~ agreement is positively related to 
experience. Irotman and Wood (1991) analysed 16 internal control studies using meta-
analysis techniques and conclude that there is agreement among auditors in .. the 
.· .·, . . · · . · Ii. · 
evaluation of internal controls and that 89% of the different results reported in ·the 
. . . ·- . . . . . 
literature is due to sampling error. 21 Sp lhigh level of consensus appears to exist aI11ong 
eiperienced auditors in the evaluation of internal controls. 
~· . . . . . . . 
FRAMING EFFECT 
A framing effect suggests that a judgment could be affe~ted by the wording of the 
. . 
problem. Numerous studies have been conducted in psychology to test this theory, most 
. . 
notable are the Asian-disease experiments carried out by Tversky and Kahneman 
. (1981). In these experiments, the solutions offered by Tversky and Kahneman were 
actuaHy identical except that the solutions were framed differently. One program 
emphasised gains .while the other emphasised losses. Participants' judgments appeared 
to follow a similar pattern, i.e., "choices involving gains were often risk averse and 
choices involving losses were often risk taking" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 453). 
Similarly, Sullivan ( 1996) carried out a series of experiments that required corporate 
20 This is because consensus is higher in the evaluation of internul controls than in estimating audit 
hours. 
21 Sampling error is the difference between the sample statistic and the population parnmeter caused by 
chance sampling fluctuations (Harrison and Tamaschke, 1984 ). 
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financial managers to make investment judgments. The solutions offered to these 
managers were in the same format as Tversky and Kahneman (1981). In making their 
. judgments, managers followed the same pattern as Tversky and Kahneman's 
participants, i.e., the managers acted to avoid risk when the choices involved gains and 
were risk-taking when the choices involved losses. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
proposed prospect theory to explain this perceived anomaly. In a risky situation, rational 
decision-mak~,rs would be risk-averse to maximise their expected utility, and in loss 
=~:· 
situations. decision-makers would be risk-taking to maximise their expected utility. 
Thus, the value function, when graphed, takes on an S~shape. If prospect t~eory holds 
true, then the manner in which judgment problems are framed detennines the natur~ of 
the judgments solicited; SuUivan (1996) demonstrated that the manner by whichan 
" investment proposal is framed, determines whether it · gets the "go-ahead". Similar 
results are obtained by Bazerman (1984). He required participants to make corporate 
down-sizing judgments. When the judgment problem was framed as gains (in number of 
jobs saved), partkipants' choices were more risk-avoiding. Conversely, when the· 
. . . . . _·. 
judgment problem was framed as losses (in number of jobs lost), participants' choices 
were more risk-taking even though the choice alternatives offered were identical.. 
. . 
Prior auditing studies on framing examined the effects of framing on going concern 
evaluation (Kida, 1984; Trotman and Sng, 1989), internal control. evaluation (Emby, 
1994), and the nature of the hypothesis frame (whether error or nonerror frame) 
(McMillan and White, 1993), Kida (1984 ), using a going concern task, divided his 
participants into two groups. One group received a hypothesis fram~ 1d as viability and 
the other group received a hypothesis framed as failure. Participants' were given .20 
' ' 
infonnation items - half of them indicative of failure and the other half viability, and 
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asked to list the information cues that were relevant to their judgment. Participants in 
·. the viability frame were expected to rate the viable items as more relevant than the 
failure items. The opposite was expected of participants who received the failure frame, 
The results, which are in the hypothesised direction, show that framing has an effect on 
the participants' rating of the relevance of information items. 
In an extension to Kida (1984~. Trotman and Sag (1989) examined the effects of 
hypothesis framing, ·cue. diagnosticity and prior expectations on . going concern 
evaluation. It was expected that particip-ants who received. strong ratios. as. prior 
expectations would be affected by framing, while participa_nts who received weak ratios 
. . 
would not. The results show that when the prior information · indicated faHure, the 
. relative number of failure and viable items considered were not affected . by. framing. 
. . . . .. 
. -· . . . . 
However, when the· prior information suggested viability; framing had an effect on the 
numbefof failure and viable items considered by the auditors. · 
. Emby. ( 1994) required participants to make substantive testing . judgments based on 
. . .. . . . . 
internal controls framed as risk and strength. The case materials were presented either .. 
simultaneously or sequentially. The substantive tests prescribed by participants in the. 
risk/sequential condition were significantly different from both the strength conditions 
and marginally sJgnificantly different from the risk/simultaneous condition. In addition, 
participants in the strength/sequential condition prescribed substantive tests that were 
significantly different from both the risk conditions, and marginally significantly 
different from the strength/simultaneous condition. 
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·Instead of having auditors respond to preset frames as did Kida (1984) and Trotman and 
.. Sng (1989), McMillan and White (1993) had thefr participants frame their own 
hypothesis - either nonerror or error- to explain the source of fluctuations in the current 
year's unaudited financial report ratios. The nonerror frame suggested that. 
environmental factors such as the economy, contributed to the fluctuations, while the 
error frame suggested material .. errors in the financial report. Audhors who preferred the. · 
error.. frame consid~red both corifi.I'll'.lirig.-and disconfirming evidence~ whpe tho~e in the . 
n~nerror frame did not. In addition,- McMillan and. White found ·that the auditors' 
. . 
infonnation. search process· is conservative regardless of the frame being ·tested, and · 
· . · confi.rmation· bia~ reduces the effects of crin~ervatism for auditor~ in the nonerror · frame. 
. . 
In _investigating ·whether. framing would affect the preseritatio_n order of infonnation, 
. . . 
Asare ( l 992) carried out an experiment \~hich tested two frames (viability and failure) 
. . ... 
. . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . 
and. two information or.ders (po~o,itive/negative and negrit.ive/positive) in a going concern 
· task. Using the contrast assumption, framing was not expected to be affected_ by the 
. . . .. . . . . 
.·· . pre~eritation . order of infon~ation; . because. the .auditor would·. "rocus on. contrasting . 
. . . . .~ .' . 
. e inforination regardiess of its. p~~sentation· o~der, and his. results s~pport this argument.'' 
.. : . . . . . . ... ,. . . . . ·. . :. . . . . . . . : . 
. . . . 
. ·. Iriternal control evaluation tasks may be framed hi one or"two ways .. (Emby, 1994)~·since 
. ~ .. 
· the _$-shaped. value. function of prospect theory is steeper for losses than for. gains, this 
lea~s decision makers to emphasise losses more than gai~s (B1t1by, 19_94). Translated.to 
)! 
an int~rnai_' control· ev~luatioii task, auditors. who_ evaluate_ internal controls framed as a·· 
· ........ risk eval~ation. task ·would ~Itiphasise the negative aspe~ts whereas those·,;who evaluate . 
. . . . . . . . . . ~ . . 
in~eriiar~ontrols framed as a strength evaluation task w~~l~ ·_not e.mpha:s.ise ~trengths_.-. 
Consequently, significant difference~1between th~iframes_°wciuld b~ observed~ 
·•. . . . . . •. f•. . . . .. . . 
·. ·:: .. ·. . . : ~· . :.: 51 · .-
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ORDER EFFECTS 
The psychology literature suggests that the order in which information is presented 
affects the resultant judgment (Hogru1h and Einhorn, 1992). A primacy effect occurs 
when the information considered first is given more importance in the final judgment22, 
and a recency effect occurs when the information considered last has a greater bearing 
on the final judgment. If the order of the presentation of the information is changed, the 
judgment will also change. There is disagreement in the psychology literature regarding 
which order effect is more dominant. While the psychology literature traditionally finds 
a primacy effect, some studies have found a recency effect (e.g., Nisbett and Ross, 
1980). 
Two treatments of order are observed in the literature. The first manipulates the 
presentation order of information and for most audit tasks, this results in a recency 
effect (e.g., Asare, 1992: Ashton and Ashton, 1990 and 1988). The second holds the 
presentation order constant and manipulates the order of writing supporting and 
opposing arguments (e.g., Koonce, 1992; Hoch, 1984), and mixed results are observed 
(Koonce, 1992; Hoch, 1984 ). In a series of three experiments, Hoch ( 1984) manipulated 
hypothesis-generation tasks such as purchase of a video cassette player, will Britain go 
to war over the Falklands, and will OPEC impose an oil embargo. After viewing the 
information, participants wrote reasons to explain whether these events would (pro) or 
would not (con) occur. Half of the participants explained in the pro/con order and the 
order was reversed for the other half. The results show that writing the first set of 
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reasons interferes with participants' ability to write the second set of reasons. In all three 
experiments, a primacy effect is observed. Koonce similarly manipulated the order in 
which supporting and opposing arguments were written after participants had viewed 
the information, and a primacy effect was hypothesised. Instead, her results show a 
recency effect and she attributes this to task difficulty. As the participants wrote 
supporting/opposing arguments that were experimenter-prescribed, this may have 
affected the results. This is because the participants may have suspected that the 
experimenter was pointing them in the right direction, and therefore, a recency effect 
was observed. 
In sum, merely controlling the presentation' order of information and requiring auditors 
to make judgments based on their evaluation of the information should lead to a recency 
effect. On the other hand, requiring auditors to write supporting and opposing 
arguments in a specific order should lead to a primacy effect because the writing of the 
first set of arguments interferes with the auditors' ability to consider the second set of 
arguments. 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
Framing effects have been observed in both the social psychology and accounting 
literature. Prospect theory. proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) to explain 
framing effects, states that decision makers act in a manner that maximises their 
expected utility. Consequently, decision makers would be risk averse when the 
judgment problem involves gains or is positively framed, and would be risk-taking 
22 However, one would assume the more diagnostic information would be considered important 
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when the judgment problem involves losses or is negatively framed. Significant 
differences in internal control evaluation are expected between internal controls framed 
as risk and strength, as the S-shaped value function of prospect theory is steeper for 
losses than for gains. Participants in the risk frame are expected to emphasise internal 
control weaknesses, whereas participants in the strength frame are not expected to 
emphasise strengths. Inoculation is expected to correct the effects of framing of internal 
controls. Prior to examining· any information, participants are required to consider all 
possible solutions to a problem, including all aspects of an internal control system. 
Consequently, the effect of framing is mitigated because all possible solutions are 
encoded in memory and are equally available. In addition, the real nature of the task 
becomes more salient to the decision maker, and thus reduces the effect of the frame. 
Therefor~. an interaction effect between framing and inoculation is expected. Framing 
effect for the control group and no framing effect for the treatment group will be 
observed, so that the difference between the two frames in the treatment group 1s 
reduced. The interaction hypothesis states that: 
H1 There will be an interaction effect between framing and inoculation on the 
evaluation of internal controls. 
Fischhoff ( 1982) discusses the concept of a perfectible decision maker. S/he is someone 
whose biased judgments could be corrected by relevant training. Fischhoff ( 1982) offers · 
five strategies for restructuring the judgments of perfectible decision makers. First, 
perfectible decision makern may be forced to muke judgments on what 0.1ey "explicitly" 
know rather than what is available "in the head". Second, they should be encouraged to 
look for opposing evidence as opposed to searching for only supporting evidence. Third, 
regardless of the order of its presentations, 
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ways of decomposing a complex task should be offered to decision makers, and fourth, 
they should learn to link the present problem to related situations they have encountered 
in the past. Last, they should consider possible alternative solutions to the present 
problem. Perfectible decision makers should also be educated on developing problem-
solving skills (Fischhoff, 1982). 
Perfectible decision makers' responsiveness to correction is related to their having 
acquired the necessary schemata. -Ashton and Ashton ( 1988) suggest that auditors' 
. ·. 
·.· ·. . 
perceptions, accumulation and interpretation of audit evidence are developed through 
experience and previously acquired knowledge. This indicates that the acquisition of 
knowledge and the development of auditors' memory structures are gradual rather than 
immediate. To explain this, Waller and Felix (1984, 386) developed a framework of 
learning from experience which was premised on the assumption that "learning from 
experience involves the formation and development of cognitive structures, which 
organise declarative and procedural knowledge in long-tenn memory, through 
interaction with new information generated by experiential action and/or observation". 
They called this "schemata". 
Choo and Trotman (1991) make five observations of schemata which distinguish novice 
from experienced auditors. First, schemata enable experienced auditors to group, 
classify and order information, and second, experienced auditors are able to perform this 
in a more comprehensible manner. Third, the schemata determine what information 
should be stored in and accessed from memory. Fourth, the nature of the information 
'retrieved from the schemata influences the judgment outcomes, and fifth, the 
effectiveness of the judgment is related to the amount of information retrieved from 
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memory. This being the case, it is argued that nuditors' responsiveness to a judgment 
technique is dependent upon the availability of these memory structures, and hence, 
upon their experience. Novice auditors may not have developed the memory structures 
to respond adequately. They are perfectible decision makers except they do not have 
developed schemata and are unable to respond to the learning conditions created by the 
technque. Domain-specific knowledge and skills have not been encoded and stored in 
long-term memory so that a search of memory is futile. In addition, they have not 
acquired the knowledge and skills necessary to support their judgments (Gibbins, 1984). 
Consequently, their judgments remain relatively unaffected. However, while they are 
not responsive to judgment tools, they are responsive to education, training and 
experience. Decision makers with some audit experience may not have fully-developed 
schemata, but their schemata are sufficiently developed to enable them, to respond 
favourably to training. However, not all experienced auditors are perfectible. Very 
experienced auditors who have developed sophisticated, effective and stable memory 
structures may not be responsive to training. [n addition, these auditors may have 
developed "specialised heuristics" which appear to serve them well. For example, very 
experienced auditors have developed a ~onservatism heuristic to reduce the substantial 
risks associated with many audit judgments (Smith and Kida, 1991). Because of these 
factors, they may not be receptive to training. 
This study postulates that the relationship between audit experiem:e and responsiveness 
to training is an inverted-U shaped value function. To test this, three levels of audit 
experience are examined ( no audit experience, one to 18 months, and 19 to 60 months). 
The objective of using three groups is to capture the responsiveness of audit experience 
to a judgment tool. Eighteen months audit experience is used as a cutoff because, from 
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personal experience and anecdotal evidence, at this stage, many auditors. are put in 
charge of small audits where they would be required to evaluate internal controls. By 
this time, their schemata (in relation to internal controls) should be more developed. 
Participants with no audit experience are not expected to respond to the inoculation 
treatment a.s they do not have the necessary schemata. Participants with one to 18 
months are expected to be most responsive to the inoculation treatment. While their 
judgments are not yet perfected," they have acquired sufficient knowledge and skills to 
recognise this and, as their schemata are not fully developed, they are expected to 
respond to the judgment tool. The most experienced ( 19 to 60 months) are not expected 
to respond strongly to the treatment; this is because they have well developed schemata 
that are unlikely to be affected by a simple judgment tool such as inoculation. Based on 
this discussion, an interaction effect between inoculation and audit experience on the 
evaluation of internal controls is expected, and the second hypothesis states: 
H2 There will be an interaction effect between inoculation and audit experience on 
the evaluation of h1ternal controls. 
H2a For the participants without audit experience, there will be no significant 
difference in the evaluation of internal controls between participants given the 
inoculation treatment and participants not given the inoculation treatment. 
H2b For the participant with one to 18 months audit experi:;:nce, there will be a 
significant difference in the evaluation of internal controls between participants 
given the inoculation treatment and participants not given the inoculation 
treatment. 
H2c For the participants with 19 to 60 months audit experience, there will be no 
significant difference in the evaluation of intenal controls between participants 
given the inoculation treamtent and participants not given the inoculation 
treatment. 
Prior auditing studies manipulate the order of presentation of information and find a 
recency effect (e.g., Asare,. 1992; Ashton and Ashton, 1988 ). When the experimental 
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treatment of order effect is changed from manipulating presentation order of 
information to requiring participants to write supporting and opposing arguments before 
making a judgment (i.e .• an inoculation treatment), Hoch (1984) predicted a primacy 
effect. Inoculation requires auditors to integrate and generate information from memory 
prior to information search in order to explain both (or all) possible solutions to a 
problem. Hoch ( 1984) proposes that the provision of supporting ( opposing) arguments 
before making a judgment would affect decision makers' likelihood judgments of the 
target event, i.e., an explanation effect is observed. This is because the provision of the 
first set of arguments interferes with decision makers' ability to generate the second (or 
subsequent) set(s) of arguments (Roediger, 1978). Roediger labels this "output 
interference". The; ability to recall is also affected. More items are recalled from the first 
set of arguments than from the second (Roediger, 1978). Hoch (1984) suggests that 
when generating the second set of arguments, the decision maker is unable to forget the 
first set of arguments. His results show that the first set of arguments is also easier to 
produce than the second set. and a primacy effect is observed. Apart from Koonce 
( 1992) who found a recency effect, the findings of Hoch ( 1984) and Roediger ( 1978) are 
as yet untested in an audit setting. Similarly, the inoculation treatment is untested in an 
audit setting. 
Hoch (1984) suggests that another explanation for the finding of primacy when the 
order of writing supporting and opposing arguments is changed, is the theory of 
anchoring and adjustment (reported by Tversky and Kahneman [ 19 81]). People make 
judgments by starting from an initial value and adjustments are made to this value as 
more information is processed. The adjustment continues until a judgment is reached or 
the information has been exhausted. Prior research finds that this adjustment is usually 
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inadequate. When auditors are required to write supporting (opposing) arguments, these 
form their anchor and while they may adjust their anchor when they write the opposing 
(supporting) arguments, this adjustment is nonnally insufficient. When auditors 
subsequently review the data set. they are more aware of the first set of arguments they 
have written and this makes them more receptive to the cues supporting this argument. 
Consequently, they encode more cues supporting this position and a primacy effect is 
observed. In the current task, I expect that auditors who write arguments in the 
positive/negative order to evaluate internal controls as more effective than auditors who 
write arguments in the negative/positive order, as the· order of writing supporting and 
opposing ur0 t1rnents affects the resultant judgment. 
HJ The .:•1-~culation treatment will result in a primacy effect. 
THE EXPERIMENT 
Participants 
The participants· were 139 accountants attending a national training program to prepare 
them for the auditing section of the Institute· of Chartered Accountants'·· (ICA) 
Professional Year examinations in Australia. At the time of testing, all participants had 
completed their first university degree and had work experience with a chartered 
accounting firm in the areas of auditing, business services, or taxation. The mean work 
experience was 31 months (minimum six months and maximum 152 months)23. 
Participants' audit experience ranged from no experience to 60 months of audit 
experience (mean 14 months). For those participants with audit experience, the mean 
2.l Two participants had less than one year work experience (six and eight months). The normal minimum 
work experience required to sit the Professional Year examinations is one year, However, the ICA 
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was ·20 months (sd 11 months). The average age of participants was 23.5 years. 
! .·• 
Participation was on a voluntary basis· and the participants received A$10 for their 
. effort. The experiment was carried out in four groups of 20 to 51 participants. 
permits accountants with less than one year work experience to sit their Professional Year 
examinations provided they have completed on Honours degree. 
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Case Materials and Administration 
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of the experiment. 
F" 'O?ure 31 E . . xuenmenta IP ed roe ures 
Step 1 Read preliminary information 
Inoculation Control 
(at three levels of audit (at three levels of audit 
experience) experience) 
Risk frame Strength frame Risk frame Strength frame 
Step2 Write Write (Do not write (Do not write 
supporting/ supporting/ arguments) arguments) 
opposing opposing 
{opposing/ {opposing/ 
supporting supporting 
arguments) arguments) 
Step 3 Evaluate case Evaluate case Evaluate case Evaluate case 
materials materials materials materials 
Step4 Rate internal Rate internal Rate internal Rate internal 
,. 
controls controls controls controls 
Step5 Complete post- Complete post- Complete post- Complete post-
" test test test test 
questionnaire questionnaire questionnaire . questi~nnaire 
The experiment tested three levels of audit experience (comprising no audit experience, 
one to 18 months of audit experience, and 19 to 60 months of audit experience), two 
frames (risk and strength) and an inoculation treatment group and a control group in a 3 
x 2 x 2 full factorial design (Figure 3.1 ). The case materials were based on the case 
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developed by Emby (1994) and involved the evaluation of internal controls in the· 
inventory area (Appendix A). The only modifications made were to the name of the 
client and other proper names to reflect an Australian context. Each participant was 
given a copy of the experimental materials in a booklet. The cover page contained an 
assurance of the confidentiality of their responses. Some introductory information was 
· given. Participants were told that the purpose of the experiment was to understand how 
auditors formulate judgments when evaluating internal controls, and as part of the study 
participants would be required to evaluate the internal control system. In addition, they 
were told that there is no right or wrong answer and they were to provide their best 
judgments. The first variable manipulated was inoculation. Half of the participants 
received the inoculation treatment (inoculation condition) and the other half acted as 
control (control condition). To capture frnming effects, half the participants received 
internal controls framed as "strength" (strength frame) and the other half received 
internal controls framed as "risk" (risk frame). The "inoculation" participants in the risk 
frame were told that: 
Part of an auditor's task is to evaluate the risk of the internal control 
system in the inventory area. Please write down in the spaces provided 
below, the situations you think may result in low or high risk in the 
internal control system. Write down as many situations as you can think 
of. Phrases and short sentences would be sufficient. 
Situations resulting in a low risk internal control system in the inventory area: 
Situations resulting in a high risk internal control system in the inventory area: 
Half of the "inoculation" participants in the risk frame wrote internal control situations 
in the low/high risk order and the order was switched for the other half. The 
"inoculation" participants in the strength frame were told that: 
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·.,· .:: ... ' 
Part of an auditor's task is to evaluate the strength of the internal control 
system in the inventory area. Please write down in the spaces provided 
below, the situations you think may result in a weak or strong internal 
control system ... 
Situations resulting in a weak internal control system in the inventory area: 
Situations resulting in a strong internal control system in the inventory 
area: 
Half of the "inoculation" participants in the strength frame wrote the situations in the 
weak/strong order, and the other half in the strong/weak order. Participants in the 
control group (both strength and risk frames) did not write supporting or opposing 
arguments. 
Following this, the case materials were provided. The case materials comprised a 
general history and background of the client, a brief description of the inventory system 
and seven internal control attributes comprising both high and low risk features. The 
order of these infonnation items was randomised for each participant to control for 
version effects. After reading the case information, participants evaluated tlle internal 
controls. They then completed a postwtest questionnaire which solicited some personal 
data as well as information on participants' evaluation of various aspects of the task. 
Upon completion, participants were paid and debriefed. 
Dependent Variable 
Since the evaluation of internal controls may be framed in one of two ways, participants 
in the risk frame were asked to assess the risk of the internal controls and they recorded 
their evaluation of the internal controls on a seven-point LikerMype scale anchored by 
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"low" ( l) and "high" (7). Participants in the strength frame recorded their evaluation of 
the internal controls on a seven-point Likert-type scale anchored by "weak" (1) and 
"strong" (7)24• 
Audit Experience 
Consistent with prior studies, the number of months of general audit experience is used 
· as a measure of experience ( e.g .• Ho. 1994; Choo and Trotman. 199 l ). This is especially 
appropriate in the evaluation of internal controls as past experience and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that this task is mostly assigned to less experienced auditors. My study 
divided participants into three groups - Group l (no audit experience). Group 2 (one to 
18 months of audit experience. mean 12 months). and Group 3 (19 to 60 months of 
audit experience, mean 25 months). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Diagnostic Checks 
ANOV A assumes constant variance of all cells. Consequently. Bartlett's Box F tests 
and Cochran's C test are performed for the analyses to test this assumption. In all tests,. 
the homogeneity of variance assumption is not violated. 
Checks on participants in the inoculation condition reveal a significant task difficulty 
effect (F = 8. 27, p = .005 [two-tailed]) (Panel A, Table 3 .1 ). Participants in the 
inoculation condition found the combination of the tasks of writing supporting and 
opposing arguments and evaluating the internal controls significantly more difficult than 
participants in the control condition who merely evaluated the internal controls. Their 
24 These scores were reversed for the data analyses. 
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task difficulty scores are 4.16 (sd 1.70) and 3.20 (sd 1.59) respectively (Panel B, Table 
3.1). 
In addition, audit experience has a significant effect on task difficulty (F = 10.87, p = 
.000 [two-tailed]) (Panel A, Table 3. l). The task difficulty scores on a nine-point Likert-
type scale for the three groups are 4.56 (Group 1), 3.76 (Group 2), and 2.24 (Group 3) 
(Panel B, Table 3.1). Group 1 (no experience) participants found the task significantly 
more difficult than participants in Group 2 (one to 18 months experience) and Group 3 
participants ( 19 tp 60 months experiencef This, of course, is expected because Group 1 
participants did not have the relevant domain-specific knowledge to complete the task, 
whereas the other two groups had. Frame has no significant effect on task difficulty (F = 
< 1, p >. l [two-tailed]) (Panel A, Table 3 .1 ). 
Further analyses show no significant · difference between the evaluation 6f internal· 
controls between all the participants of the current study and Emby' s ( 1994) 
' . "'i participants-· . 
25 The overal I IC score mean of the present study is 3.43 and Emby' s is 3.23. 
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Table 3.1 .. The Effects of Inoculation, Framing and Audit Experience on Task 
---- ·Panel A 
· -Source 
Main effects 
-Inoculation (I) 
Frame (F) 
Audit experience (E) 
2-way interaction --
1 x F 
IxE 
FxE 
3-way interaction 
IxFxE 
Residual 
PanelB-
Inoculation 
Treatment condition (n::::: 64) 
Control condition (n = 72) 
- Audit Experience -
Frame 
No audit experience (n = 41) 
1 to 18 months (n = 38) _ 
19 to,60 months (n = 60) 
· Risk frame 
Strength frame 
Difficulty 
IL-
19.76 1 19.76 - 8.27 - ~005. ···_ -~> 
. ;75 - l ___ - :75_ --- -_- ·;32 ____ -_ns_ .. -
51.92 .· _ -.· ·- 2 _-_ -_ 25.96 / J0.87 .000 
2.77.-- 1 
.35 2 
2.20 2 
5.67 .. 2 
-296.25 ·124 
2.77 .. L16 ns 
.17 . 07 ns 
1.10 .42 -_- _ns.--
2;83 1.19 
- 2.39 
4.~6 (1.70) 
3.20 (1.59) 
- -_ Mean (sd) . 
·. 4.56 (1.91) 
3.76 (1.63) 
2.24 (1.24) 
·. . .. · .. ·. · ... 
3.74 (1.67) . 
--- - 3.57 ( 1. 76) 
ns 
. Task difficulty scores:· I = "not difficult at all", and 9 = "very difficult". 
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Analyses and Discussion of H1 
· An interaction effect between framing and inoc~lation ·. is predicted, . the inoculation ., 
treatment will mitigate the effects of framing. Tht/ mean internal contr9l (IC) scores26 
. . . . 
are 3.41 (sd 1.18) (risk frame) and 3.45 (sd LIO (strength frame) (Table 3.2). ANOV A 
resuHs27 show no significant main framing effect (F < 11 p ~ .J) (T~ble 3.3)28• 
·. Participants in. both frames made similar evaluations of the . internal · controls. A 
. . . . . 
· significant main effect for inoculation is observed (F = 3.76, p = .024) (Table 3.3).-The 
mean IC scores are 3.26 (sd L07) and 3.58 (sd l.19) (Table 3.2). Participants in the 
treat1t1:ent condition evaluated the internal controls a~ significantly less effective than . 
participants in the ·control condition. This supports the stated· purposes of inoculation 
, .. · which are to make the decision maker more aware _of opposing arguments and exercise 
caution in decision-making. Hence, participants in the treatment condition made more 
conservative judgments. No interaction.· effect. between . framing and inoculation • is 
. . . . . . . 
observed(/~nd H1 is not supported. The insignificant result could be caused by, first, 
. . . 
"experience preference" (Frisch 1993). In explaining this, Frisch distinguishes between 
"decision preference" and "experience preference". Decision preference refers to the 
decision maker's choice, i.e., the frame, while experience prefJrence,,refers to the frame 
. ',' . 
. . . . 
· the decision maker actually experienced as preferable during the judgment process. An 
auditor may commence the judgment process in a particular frame, e.g., risk, but in the 
process of making the judgment, the auditor may find the strength frame to be more 
26 The participants in the risk frame recorded their evaluation of the internal controls on a scale anchored 
by low ( 1) and high (7) and the participants ln the strength frame on a scale anchored by weak (I) and 
strong (7). Because of this, the raw scores for these two frames are not compatible. Consequently, the 
scores of the participants in the risk frame are reversed to match those in the strength frame. 
27 
. All tests of significance arc one-tulled unless stated otherwise. 
28 Emby ( 1994) found a fr11ming effect when he asked participants to prescribe substantive tests based on 
their evaluation of internal controls. In this experiment, participants were not asked to prescribe · 
substantive tests because the decision to increase or decrease substantive testing is bused on other. 
·· .. ··.,; 
. . I 
:-· .. · ..... · 
-.. ;. 
relevant, i.e:, experience preference may reduce the ~ffects of framing. Second, while 
the- auditor may commence with a particular frame, during the judgment process, the 
-- framing effect may diminish as the true purpose of the task (that is, the evaluation of 
internal controls regardless of the frame) becomes more dominant in the auditor's ·_ - -
__ working memc,ry, These reasons may account for the lack of framing_ effect, an.cl, hence~ • 
. 1: . _·. . . . . ··. . . ·. . 
- _ the _lack of~ intt!raction effec,t between-_ framing and-inoculation. -
Table 3.2 
_ The Effects of Inoculation and Framing on the Evaluation of Internal Controls -
Mean(sd) 
Treatment 
Inoculation 
Coritrol - · 
Overall 
Risk 
3.29 (1.06) 
>il = 34 
3.51 (1.30) 
n= 36 _ 
3.41 (l.18)' 
n~70 · 
Frame 
Strength 
3.23 (1.10) 
-n: = 33 
3.65 (1.09) -
_ n = 36 
3.45 (l.ll) _ 
n = 69 
· I = weak internal controls (high risk), ;7 = strong internal controls (low risk). 
Overall· 
3.26 (1.07) _-- -
- n=67-
3~58 (1.19) 
n=72 
3.43 (Ll4) 
n= 139 
factors besides the e valuation of in te rna I con tro Is, Conseq uen ti y; the analyses of Ht was based ontl;le 
participants' cv al uati on of internal con tro Is. . , 1 
68 
I 
.. Table3.3 
ANOVA Results: The Effects of Inoculation, Framing and Audit Experience on . 
Evaluation of Internal Controls 
·source ss DF M§ I I! 
- -
Main effects 
Inoculation (I) 5.07 1 5.0T 3.96.· .024 
.· Framing (F) .03 l .03 .02 ns 
Audit experience (E) · 6.89 2 3.44 2.69 · .036. 
2-wa;:: interaction 
IxF, .. 00 · 1 .00 ·.oo .· ns 
IxE 4.95 2 2.48 1.94 .074 
FxE 1.06 ··2. .53 .41 ns 
3-wai interaction 
IxFxE .63 2 .32 .25 ns 
Residual .162.53 127 1.28 
ns = not significant 
Analyses and Discussion of H2 
This second hypothesis predicts that the inoculation treatment would result in 
.·,". .,-·i . . . . 
significant differences in the evaluation of internal controls by participants with audit 
- . . . 
experience and those without · audit experience. Inoculation works by sensitising _ 
. . . . 
decision makers to the presence of opposing arguments (Anderson, 1982). Tt is 
. . . .. 
. . . . 
-·· ·_ expected that participants with one to 18 months audit experience would be most 
affected by the inoculation treatment, whereas the inoculation treatment would not have 
a significant effect on participants without audit experience becat1se they have pot 
developed the necessary schemata or acquired the relevant domain-specific knowledge. 
It is not expected to have an effect onparticipants with 19 to 60 months' experience 
. . .· : . . . '. . . . . 
because their more sophisticated and developed schemata. are iess _susceptible to change. 
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. ___ -- no experience _-
; .. :_·._:.· ........ :·· 
.. ~ .•.. · . 
i-
. -· 
-· -Figure 3.2 shows the interaction effects, and the cell me·ans, are shown in Table 3.4; The · 
. . . . . . . . 
mean internal control scores (IC scores) are 3.78 .(Group 1), 3.3~f(Oroup 2), and 3.2~(., 
:1 ... · . . . ... . . . .. . 
(Gmup 3) (Table 3.4), and ANOV A results indicate that these IC scores are significantly _- -
different across the three experience levels (F = 2.69, p = .036) (Table 3.3). The 
· ·. omnibus F-test reveals a marginally significant.- interaction effect -between audit 
. . . . . . . . . ' . 
experience and inoculation (F = 1.94.p ::: .074) (Table J.2). Planned comparisons are 
. . . : . . . ·. . ... · ; ..... · . . . . . . ·.· . . . 
carried out to test the _ hypothesis. Inoculation had a significant. effect on Group 2 
· participants (t:;;;: l.Q4, p::: .027) and no signifi~ant effect on Gmups 1 and 3 (t ~- J.42, p _ 
. . . . . . . . . 
:: .157 [Group 1]; t ::: ;64, p = .267 [Group 3]). and th~refore, H2 and the alternative · 
" 
hypotheses are supported. 
Table 3.4 
The Effects of Inoculation and Audit Experience on the Evaluation of Internal 
Controls (Mean [sd]) 
Treatment_ Group 1 
Inoculation .- 3.79 (1.13) 
. - n = 19 
Control _ ~.77-(.1.02) 
n=-22 
.. .. 
- 3.78 (l.06) 
n = 41 
LeYel of Audit Experience 
Group 2 Group 3 
2.98 (0.98) _ 3.13 (0.99) 
n= 24 n =24 
3.93 (1.07) 3.33 (L30) 
n ::: 14 ·n =36 
.. 3.33 (LlO) 3.25.(L18) 
n=38 n=60. · 
-1 = weak internal controls (high risk), 7 = strong internal controls (low risk). 
;, .· . ''. . ,. 
Overall 
3.26 (1.07) 
n=67 
3.58 (1.19) 
· n=72 --
-3.43 (1.14) 
n = 139 -
-. -Gr~up I participants' mean IC scores are3.79 (inoculation) a~d 3.77-(control) and these 
are not significantly different: Gi-ve~ that the purp;se of the i~oculati~n treatme~twas to 
· · _ · _-- -.: serisi tise participants to_ the_ existence of opposing -arguments. this -treatment apparently·_ 
... .. . . . .... ·- . . . . "' ·, . 
·l·,_ ... · 
. ·~.1 
• 1 •• ••• 
·.. •· .. -:_·_.. 
-- - · di~ not h~ve .an-:effect on novice auditors. One -explanation• is -that they may_-not have 
. ' .·· . 
. '·: 
' . 
. .. . ' ·,:·.~ 
t"."., . 
. ·., . , .. :· ... ' ·i> , .. ; ·.:~: :- ... 
. :;;_: -~/\~:~\~/.)~;.r.f \}.:.)i}: .. /(/::·.:::~:\1; ·}: •• ': i.:,:;·:·~·:· -.: .. ~·.};,:/}:{J::ic~i/- ... • -I 
developed the schemata necessary to make domain-sp~cific judgments (Libby and Luft 
'.·,: • 1993; Choo and Trotman 1991~ .Waller and Felix 1984). Because of the limitations of 
th;ir memory structures, they we;~ unable t~ respond adequately to this treatm~nt Their 
·, .. ,., 
. . : . : . .·.. . 
.·· . . 
, mean IC scores were significantly Jess conservative compared to the other two groups. 
. . . 
· · as these participants had not acquirt!d the conservatism heuristics common ·· to 
experienced auditors (Smith and Kida, 1991). 
A large difference in the mean IC scores of Group 2 is noted (control -3.93, iriocul~tion . 
. . . 
- 2;98), and this difference is significant. The inoculation treatm~nt had a significant 
effect on these participants. Group 2 participants in the inoculation treatment evaluated 
• • ' I 
the internal control as significantly less effective than participants in the control . 
conditfon. These participants appeared to be -the most responsive to the inoculation 
. . .; 
.. tre~tment. One explanation for this i's that, whiil'! they may have had more developed . 
memory structures compared to Group l participants, these structures still lagged behind. 
.. . .· . -~ . 
the more expi;:ri~nced auditors. However, they had acquired sufficient knowle,dge to 
make them responsive to the learning conditions created by the inoculation treatment. 
Fischhoff ( 1982) refers to them as "perfectible judges". The mean IC scores of the 
. . . 
· treatm~nt · participants were not significantly different from Group 3 participants .. 
. . 
·. Inoculation resulted in more conservative judgments among Group 2 r~iticipants. 
. . . --~-
. . 
The mean' IC scores of Group 3 participants are 3.13 (inoculation) and 3.33 (control), 
,, and th~se are not signif!cantly different. This -i:esult shows that Group 3 participants 
. . 
. 'Were,also not responsive. to the inoculati'on treatment, but their IC scores were 
, iig~U1cantly more cori~ervative than pa~tidpants in Group 1 (t ~ 235, p = .010). These 
,r~i41iSar~ c~nsistent ;ith the-findings reported in Smith and Kida(l99l). They report 
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findings of conservatism in experienced auditors' judg'merits from a. wide range of 
studies; Generally, experienced auditors are less affected by the general heuristics and 
. biases.·.·. reported in the ' psychology literature, as . the nature of audit training and .. 
experience l~ads to the develop'ment of "specialised" heuristic~ "tl~at prove highly 
. . 
.. · ,1· . . ··. . :· . . . .· 
.effective for tasks·within their domain of expertise" (486). As Group 3 participants in 
. . . . : . . . -_1. . . . . - . . _.. ~ F .. 
. 1·· . . . . •. '. .• ... ( . 
· the control· condition would have considered both types· of arguments regardless of 
• . . ... . I, . :· . 
. whether' formally required to do so or not, the inoculation treatment did not result in any ·· 
. . . : .· . . . . 
significant difference. in .their judgments. · In su·m, the above analyses show that, · 
. . . . . 
inoculation was.effective on.Group 2 participants but was. not effecti v~ on. Groups l and 
- . ··- ... , - . / ~-. 
. . . ,, -· . . . . . . . . . . ·1,r'' _·. -.:':. . . . _· .. 
3 participants; The results also show that the relatioil't,etween a·.!'dit experience and 
.· ... ·.. .. . ·.. . ·. ' . . ' .· .. · . . . . . .. ',~ :,\. // . . .· . . 
responsiveness tci inoculation is nonlinear and has,an inverted:t;-~f;aped value furictiori. · 
Analyses and Discus5ion of H3 
In the inoculation treatment, participants were required to. write .. arguIT1ents in· a 
positive/negative order29 or a negafive/positive order30; As a result of tl:is manipulation, 
: . . 
HJ · predicts a primacy effect, that is, participants who wrote.· arguments. in the 
positive/negative orderwoulcl evaluate the internal controls as being more effective th~n 
.. :1 . .· • 
,. 
participants who wrq~e arguments in the' negative/positive order. The results show this 
.· . . - . _- I' ... '' . - . I • • 
to :·:be the case. The" mean IC scores are 3.49 (positive/negative) and 3.03 ·· 
·· (negative/positiye)respectively (Table 3;5), and the differe~ce between these two Orders 
. . . . . .. . . ;•,·· -: . .. .·.·. 
. :· ·. . . . ... • . . . .·· \\ ,· . : ... ·. =. 
is significant (t = LS, p = .038) (Table 3.5). Thus, H3 is supported. The,possibility .that 
. . . .· ·-=-/· :. .. . : . ( ".. ·.. \~~;. .· .· . . . . ~-. '. ·.: . \ . . . ·. 
these results may be caused by task difficulty is ·fllled out. The t-resLilts of th~ effect of 
!• • :, 
L 
';I 
,, 
29 The\bositivc/negative order comprises participant~\wh~ wrote arguments· in th~ low/high order in the .· 
risk frame and the strong/weak order in the strength·frnme. · .. ·· · . . .· ·. · , ·· . • 
30 
. The negative/positive order comprises participants who· wrote arguments in the h1gh/low order in the 
risk frame and the weak/strong order in the strength frame. · · · ' · · · 
•• I • 
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_,·. 
- _order on task difficulty is-not significant-Ct-= .60, µ ~ .ss [two~tailectJ). simii'arty, order -j:,>' j/ 
. =-/;: .. !' 
has no effect on effort ~xpended (t = .54, p_ = .59 [two-tailed])31 , The results sho.w that 1/' 
. .,,~:, 
--- -- _- the order by which auditors write positi~e/negativle arguments results in a prima,~{7 -
- ~ - - ---- 1 - - ~-
- - - ~ --- - - / 
-- -_ effect, -and supports prior psychology stuclies (Hoch 1984; Roediger 197,,Sj', but -
:; . . ~-
-_ contradicts Koonce' s (1992) results . 
. <.\ . : 
__ -,__· ...... 
-Source ofVariation : ., -
: . .:=. 
. . . . . . : . 
_-_ Positive/negative (n = 33) -
Negative/positive {n = 34) __ . _ -
\'· 
-CONCLUSIONS 
•.:· . 
Table 3.5 · Order Effects _ -- _,,, 
Mean (sd) 
'3.49 C .97) 
3.10(1.11) 
-_ 1.80 .038 
The ex~eriment tested the effects of framing, inoculation and audit experience on _ 
_ internal control evaluation. H1 predicts an interaction effect between framing and . 
-_ -inocula1ion. However, 'n~ significant- effect-i·s_ found,- and-H1 __ -_is not•-supported .. The -
participants were not affected by the framing ()f internal controI-ev~luations'as risk ahd 
... II 
. strength. {,, 
·: ,.· . 
' '~ •. 
---__ The second hypoth~sis examined whether audit experience ha~ -an-effect_ on. participants'-•- _ - -- · 
r~.sponsi ven~ss to inoculatio~. To_ test _ this hypothesis, I manipulated truee groups_ cif __ .·. 
t=:-'' 
'·- 'participants, each group having a different level of audit exp~rience, and inoculation, l -
• .• >'. • •••" I, • • • • • • • , • I 
.. _:.:-:~':/. ·. ·. . ·.}" 
' -,.,_· ; .: :~,:} - .;'.-' _- . . .. . '. . . . . . . . •. ; . . . . ... 
31 :_'., AN6v1:/rcsults W.i~~ bsk difficulty us a covuriute a~e s1m1~ariy not signi~cunt (t~ .l,85, p == A 8 __ _ 
-,<·• -'[twcHai!,/~d]): h:: -_- - _-- - ---_ ,. - _-_---_____ - - - --_- __ -.. ----- __ , ____ --
.. ·. r1 ... 
. . g_ 
!, 
ij .·, 
.·•1 
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find suppoithat auditexpedence affects participants' responsiveness to inoculation an~ 
-- ' that the relation betwee~ audit experience and responsiveness to inoculation is-_-
- . :·nonlinear. Auditors with one to 18 months' experience were inost resp~nsive to training - --
· -_ -in internal control evaluation. Therefore, training resources should be targeted at this 
group of audit staff. Unlike participants in Group 2, participants in Group l and Group 3 · 
did n<?t respond to the inoculation treatment. Group 3 participants evaluated the internal _-
. . . . .· . . . . . . 
- controls as significantly less. effective than Group 1 participants, Group 2 participants in 
-the inoculation condition similarly made_ ~ore conservative evaluations of the internal-• 
; . . . :. . ... . . . . . . . . . 
-- 'i', contmts compared to those in the. control condition. This suggests that inoctilatfon is -
most eff~ct1ve with less expe1;ienced auditors as they have yet to develop the skills and 
-•-expertise_ of experienced auditors._ The inoculation _ treatment did not - affect the 
-· . . ;:i,-.<.. . . . . . . . . 
judgments of paitidpants \.\lithout audit experience because they did not hav~. the 
__ ,·, 
. . . . - . 
relevant schemata to react to the treatment-
;_/" ~-
. . ·.. . . : 
Finally, !found that the evaluation of internal control~ was riffectedby -the order in, 
- -
--_- ;hich participants wrote supporting and {}pposing arguments. Participiwts who -wmte--
argume11ts _ i~ the: positive/negative _ -oi~er _ evaluated the _ · inten1al -controls _ as more ; 
... · . . . ·. . . . . . . ·-. 
_. effective than participants -who wrote arguments in _ the negative/positive order. This 
·- . .-
. . . . 
- -
-stU:ctr _shows that req~iring auditors to write supporting and opposing arguments results 
.. .- . .: . . . ·.. . ·. · .. ·. . . ; . /.... . ... 
. in a primacy effect instead of the normally observed recency effect when presentation 
r:: 
order of information is manipulated. 
LIMITATIONS 
There are limitations to the experiments reported here. First, the case materials 
employed iri these experiments comprised relatively less information than what auditors 
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. ·. ·.. . : . .· ·. . . . . . .... ' . 
. · 110r~ally work with. However, it is unclear what effect(s) more detailed c~se matedals 
··~ would have on the judgment techniques examined and what limitations the use of 
· simplified case materials wmtld have on the external validity of the results of this study. 
Second, in trying to secure re1-ponses that the participants could justify, all participants 
in . this·. study were .paid. This procedure does nott however, correspond to the audit 
• • I ' 
environment where auditors would suffer penalties for not providing justifiable 
. ... ' . . 
i·~'sp~:mses. Such penalties include financial losses (in promotion and pay,rises as well as 
.-~< '. \·_. .. . 1 !. . . .. 
litigriti~n costs) and loss of reputation. Third, the parti~ipants in this experiment worked 
. 'i . . . . ·, . ·•. ... -· . 
alone whereas in practice they often work in groups or have th~. opportunity to consult .. 
. . . . ' . : 
. 'with gmup members. It is unclear what effects having partkpants work alone would . 
:·.. ··.· .. . ·.. .. . . .. . . 
have onthe external validity of the results of this study. 
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, _ _ - _ _ _ CHAPTER 4 _ _ _ _ __ _ 
-_- EXPERIMENT TWO· AN INVESTIGATION OF INFORMATION- -
PROCESSING BY AUDIT GROUPS 
INTRQDUCfION 
·,.J 
___ _ :;: Prior judgment , research draws att~ntion to weaknesses in auditor judgment For 
- -example; ~udito~s· going-concern judgment , lacks consensu532 ~ and this is observed __ -- -
. . -=~--' ~---. . . . . .'l . • . . . . 
-_- - : across a range ofexperie':]Ce levels (Ho. 1994): Because of the weaknesses identified, 
-• there is a need for judgment research to not .only identify and explain srd:1c.optiqmri1 
-- - . . \. : _- . - - - - - . - - - - - -· 
--judgmer:tts bl~t to inve~tigate m~an~ of Improving the~33• -One approach to correcting--__ --
sub-optimum judgments is the, use- of-groups; Both accountirigand psychqfogy studies _ 
.T" .-
--_ ---_ report that groups outperform individuals over a wide range of fasks. 
. ·, . - . . . ·a.· -· 
.... ".f-. 
In practice, ?Uditors oft~n work in teams, but audit groups are sometimes used as well. -. · 
However; prior auditing research hJlS largely examined iridividualauditor j~dgrnents to 
- the exclusion of groups and teams. Consequently; aftertwodecades of audit-group . 
studies, we know relatively little of th~ impact of audit gro~~ decision, processes :o~ -· -
audit judg~ents: ?ne< reason. for this is that group . studies require large numbers of 
- pru1icipa~ts, a factor tl1rit often constrains _auditing- researchers._ The constraint ona:ge -
. . . . .. . . .· . .. . . 
numbers of partidpants is also evidenced by the: rese'arch methodology adopted in :prior 
. .· . . . . . I, 
. . . . . 
i _ : studi~s. Such. a r~~earcli methodology may have confou~dt!cl the r~~ults,. as. a Jeiuriing 
. . . . : ;, . . ... : . ,., ..... ·._·._· · ... :· .·· . ·. .. .·. · .. = .·:: , .. _ ... · _· ...... _· .. ·. .-.·· .. 
effect occurs wh~n participants make the sa~~ judg~e~t first, as an individual, and 
second, as a member of a group (lselin, 1991). PrioC group studies that examine 
consensus and accuracy· among· aud,i.t groups· and· individual auditors·. have .adopted .this 
32 That is, different judgments are reached based on the same information. 
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;·,.>·_:· .. >·.'.·:.~ii~~,~·;·,''. . 
,.· 
.•;· 
. . ·.. . . : 
methodology (Trotman et al., 1983; Trotma~ and Yettoh; 1985; Trotman,. 1985). . · ·. 
Because of this, there is a need for further auditing studies that control for 'this, 
confounding. as well as a need to retest prior fi~dings . 
. In this experiment, I compare the going:-concem j~dgment ofigdividual auditors with .· · 
the . going~concern judgments made in ari" interacting 'group settini . Interacting . audit 
.. :, :· . . ,,, . 
groups, instead of hierarchical teams, were used for two reasons. First, even though the . 
formal review procedures of public accounting firms suggest· the use of hierarchkal 
teams, info~al dis~·ussions between auditors (often of equal rank) do occur .. Second, 
·. . n, .. ·. .· 
interacting· audit·' groups encourage mgre uninhibited in.teractiori and discussion · 
..... . .· ~·.·:.~-~-_... . . 
compared to hierarchical teams: This is because the latter are dominated by the most 
·,. . . ·I 
.. . 
experiepced or most senior member, and :hence, the opportunity for learning by novice · . 
. . . . . . 
auditors is reduced. D~ring the group interaction, novice auditors are able to put forward 
their views an4 receive feedback from th.eir peers. This provides them with not only 
. ··. : . .: . 
insight into their own judgments, blit also exposes them to the t~ought proce~se's of 
- .. . ::. . .· .. · ', : ': - .. // 
.. : i.i .. .· ff 
other group members. Such interchange may nor occur in hienu:chical teams. J 
One purpose of this experiment is to compare the judgment processes of interacting 
·· grnups and individuals. One rnethodof improving the effectiveness ofdecision-:-m~ng 
is to decompose the problem into smaller judgments (Messier, 1995). The auditor 
n . 
•i: ', .. · • • • /;,'•/.'· I ,' 
· . performs each sub-judgment separatelY,,. and asstmbles them into a global· judgrne~t 
• ,:_1· 
. (Messier, 1995). 'in a going-coricerri task, the sub-judgments comprise the going-concern 
·. .· . : . . . , -· ·.· . :·' 
problem indicators and the mitigating factors. The audito~ selects .the r~levant. pues, _ 
33 Not nll .attcmpts to achieve judgment consensus result in their statelaim. For example, providing . ·· 
aildhors with non-statistical sampling guldelines lends to less consensus in auditors' recommended 
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(, 
· :assigns i,veights to.them, and forms his/her global j~dgment. The judgment quality is, 
. '! . . 
.• · .••. consequently, dependent. upon the range of the audito(s cue usage, and hls/her c~e . 
. . 
selection and weighting34 (Stocks and Harrell, 1995; Ashton, 1992; Bonner, 1990; 
. . . . . ·.) 
Chewning and Harrell, 1990; Chalos and Pickard, 1985). Prior research suggests that' . 
. . 
·· .. groups can perform these tasks more effectively, and. therefore, the quality of their · 
', judgment can be improved (Stocks and Harrell, 1995; Chalos and Pickard, 1985; Hill, 
1982; Howell et al., 1970). This study tests whether consensus is higher in audit groups' 
. . . 
. . . . . 
going~concern judgments coin pared to individual . auditor judgments. ·.In·. addition, 
. ' , . . . . . . 
information processing Il)~Jhp_ds ::-<comprising self-reported cue usage, selection and 
. . . l,1.. ·., • ._., : : . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
weighting) ·.are coi-.)pared to allow ,,~1\to understand. the cause(s). of the·· differences·· 
• ' • • • L , • • • 
between 'audit g~oups' and individual auditors' performance. 
. . . . . . . ·. . . . . ,. . . . . : . . . ·. . . 
The study found that, in addition to being more conservative; consensus was also higher 
among audit group compared to individual auditor judgments. Groups u~~ a wider range 
of information cues in making. tl!~fr judgments. Differences in cue weighting are. also . 
' h I - • •• • 
obse1·ved; groups assigned higher weights to going~concern problem indicators but both. 
. . : . . . . . . I . . '. • 
· groups and individuals did not0weight mitigating'fac_tors differently. No significant.· 
. . . . . - . . . 
difference in cue selection between g1:oups and in~ividuals is rioted. Audit experience· 
appears to have little impact on these results .. 
.. . . .. . 
. . · sample sizes (Kachcl~eier and Messier, 1990). . · · · . · . · · .· . · .· · · " · · · ·. · 
· .
34 Luse cue usage to describe the volume of cues processed by decision makers in this experiment·. 
(Chewning and Harrell 1990). Cue selection relates to· the pr~dictability/npproprinteness of the. cue of 
the decision on hand (Chalos and Pickard 1985) and cue weighting refers to the relative importance of · · 
·. the cue (Selling and Shank 1989), · · · · · · 
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.GOING-CONCERN ASSESSMENT· 
'Professional pronouncements require auditors·. to ~onsider the appr~pri~teness or' the 
· going-concern assumption for the ·preparation of the client's financial report and 1~0 issue· 
·a going-concern opinion when .the. viability of the client is ·uncertain. Standard-setters 
have increasingly set more stringenf standards concerning going-concern evaluation 
. · (e.g., AUS 708 °[AARF, 1996]; SAS No~ 1 59 [AICPA, 1988]; SAS No. 34 [AICPA, . 
. 19811). While this is a ·much researched topic in auditing, there is, however, limited 
-literature .on· the· effect_ of _auditors' infonnation. prqcessing. on their going-concern · 
· judgments. · 
. · A going-concern evaluation task was used because it is o~e of the most diffkuit'.tasks an 
. . . .. :. . . ,. . . :, ·-: . . . . 
. · audito~ faces·. T~uining ·ror ~uch judg~ents should begin earlyin an auditor's ~~reer 
. ... . .. . . 
(McMiHan, 1994;_. Dombrowski, .1993): Th~ use of practicai case st~dies. is .one.way ~f 
. . . . . \ .. . ,, . . . . -
providint. novice a_uditors with on-the~job _e·xperience · .. (f>ombrows~-~-t . J 993); .. Stich. 
practical . exp~rierice all~ws novice auditors to . apply basic auditirig principles in :_ a 
. . . . . 
practical manner_ a~d results in greater u~derstanding and. learning. I~ also p;~vides .. 
.insight into whether-cue usage; selection_ a~d weighting hav/expedence. effec·t·s. A, 
.•.. difficulty of ni~king going-concern judgments is that: few guidelines ·are. available tci 
auditors. While profossionul standard setters h~ve attempted to identify ·going-~oncern 
. . . 
,! · problem indicators as well as mitigating factors (e.g.t AUS 708 [AA:RF, 1996]), the 
fin~ judgment ultimately ·rests with the auditor after consultation. with ._coll~agues in 
.. · ., -.:·.. . · .. =. 
both. inteh1cting and non"."interacting groups . 
. (· . 
. -·:, . • .
. _. ~ ... _ .. 
·, .. · .,_·./:.·:-:·· .. 
,··· 
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• THEORY DEVELOPMENT -
As explained in Chapter 21 various explanations .have been used in the auditing lherature 
to explain groups~ superior perfonnance over individuals'. These include best member 
· theory and information load theory. Best member theory makes two assumptions. First, 
r··} -
where_ standardised bias occurs, interaction amOrig group members results in the _ 
identificatiori of individual meniber expertise, and second, individual group members, 
. . . . . : . . . 
having diff~rent lev~ls of~xpertise, allow group members to follow their best member 
and use that inember's;cjucJ.gn1ent as a proxy for the group's judgment (Libby et al.,, -
. ~'.·· . 
1987)~ For standardised bias to occur,- the task must be reasonably complex (Einhorn et 
_ al., 1977), so- that the more complex the task, the greater. the ability of groups to --
-- -
outperform ,individuals by identifying their best member: It follows, therefore~ that the 
best member nrllst perform significantly better than the average of group members. If 
the best member is c,mly marginally superior, then the gr01.ip judgment is only m~ginally , 
better than the average of group members' jlidgment(Iselin, 1991). In such a cas~. it · 
may be more economical to simply take the average of group members' judgment rather 
,. than incur th~ a~ded expense ofassembling a group of interacting decision makers. 
. . .· . .. 
Information load theory.proposed by Chalos and Pickard (1985), states that groups can· 
process large amounts of infonnation better than individuals. As individuals have. 
limited information processing capacity, large amounts of information normally cause 
._cognitive strain among them (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992). In the case of groups, several 
individu~Is working together compensate for individual inadequacies~ This increases the 
group's corporate processing capacity and leads to more effective judgments. In 
,.' . . 
. . . . . : . . . . 
addition, information load theory states that group judgments are more consi_ste:nt than 
. . . . : ·,·.>, .. __ .. . . 
-individual judgments because groups are able to select and weigh cue;·'mpre effe~tive!y;<>: 
.• . .. . .· . . 'i .• ·. . . 
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Prior psychology studies find that individuals weigh information cues moderately · 
accurately, but this individual ability is applied rather inconsistently (Brehmer, 1976). 
This results in the inconsistent judgments observed among individual decision makers 
compared to group judgments (Chnlos and Pickard, 1985; Einhorn et al., 1977). This 
theory finds support in the results of Schultz and Reckers (1981) who observed that 
. . . . 
groupjudgments are more consistent and groups also make use of more infonnation in' 
. . . . I\ .- . 
--_ arriving at thei~judgment. 
- Other expl~nations _of why groups outperform individuals include -groups' ab~~ity to -
r~call more information (Stasser, 1992). This ability arises i~, two ways. First, the recall 
-of -information is shared among group -members. Together, group menibers may recall _ 
what an individual may have failed to recall, so that, even though no single men1ber 
•. coull·:recall . all the information~_- the group could recall significantly .more information ; 
. . . 
. than. an iridividuaLSecond, this higher ability of recall is only b~neficial if gr~l~P 
. . . . . . . . . . . . : . . -~ t -~ 
-- me1nbers _ recall· different information items. According to Stasser ( 1992), as gro~p 
. . . . ,·. 
;! 
-· members may potentially recall different information items, the group discussion is 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . 
. en~iche~ and the group's judgment outcome is more effective than individual judgment. 
Frir a group to work effectively, group memb~rs inust be able to pool their processing of 
information cues ,and integrate the cues into a soluiion. The pooling of information· by 
group members ensures that groups have a larger information base to support their 
jpdgment and reduces the uncertainty of the task (Stasser, 1988; Stasser and Titus, 
1985), This normally occurs during ' the group interaction process. During this 
interaction, suggestions and counter-suggestions are put forward by.group members. An 
· effective group should be able to identify a suggestion as its best or optimum solution. 
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When group members are unable to share information processing among themselves, 
· . they become less effective because groups members have unequal information about the 
· · task (Iselin, 1991). The literature suggests that interacting groups are able to integrate 
their information processing to reduce the uncertainty of the task, eliminate redundant 
·.. ' . ' ' • ', ' ·. .· '' ' ' .·' ' ' ' ' ' ,' ': ' ii ' ' 
· information search and improve judgment quality (Howell etaL, 1970). To reap the"" 1!.-, · 
·: . ' . . . ,, 
_i • 
benefits of group interaction. group members must pool the information cues and 
integrate the cues to' form a solution (HHI, 1982). · 
. . . In addition, · group members may bring different anchors to the group process (Sniezek, .·· 
1992). As individual group members have different anchors, the xange of anchors 
. .· . . . 
considered by the group is .increased .. This widens the. perspec.tive of the. group.··• 
. . 1.1. . . .. . ' . . 
Consequently, the infcxmation processing of the group is more encompassing and the 
· resultant judgment more. effective. These. explanations suggest· that groups may be more 
. (:, -
efficient processors of infonnation than individuals and they (i.e., the groups) may also 
combine information more effectively. All these explanations (best member theory, 
information load theory, groups' superior information recall, groups' potential ability to 
pool individual stores of information, and groups' wider range of anchors) imply that 
' ' 
· groups can process infonnation more effectively and efficiently compared to individuals. 
in relatively more complex judgment tasks. 
' ' ' 
· .This experiment examines group judgment in·a going-concern context.·This type of task·. 
. . . . . . ·. . .· . . . . . 
· tests · the assumptions of this experiment that, due to the nature ofaudi t · tasks ·and. audit 
·_. . . . . . . . 
' ~esponsibiHties, more efffoient and effective info~ation processing are explanations of 
' ' 
.· · .. why audit groups outperform individual auditors. Because groups have the advantage of 
', a wider range 'of anchorst it is expected that group' interaction will facilitate the pooling, 
-=. _.- .. -.· : -. .-
" ' 
.•., . . ::S3 
·_. ------~: . .- :·---- .. 
·: ·: ·_ :·. _-.,, _., ' 
._ .. : . _:. 
''..·:·-·.·· 
·:: .... 
recaHandintegration of information cues. This. coupledwith.t~e auditors' experience 
\-vit_h,:'arid acceptance of, grou~ work, Jea~.s to the expectatio~ '.that there wil(be .· . 
. .. . . . . . . ·-· . 
. ,, • significant_dif~erences between the judgments of audit groups and individual auditors. 
_ _- --· : _ -- _ . _- __ . _ -·_ . _- .. : . ___ -._ ·. Tl 
. > Various .auditing· studies compare the:, judgment:' quality of gro11pt an( individual{ •.. 
.. · -Severalfeat~res emerge from these studies. Among these is the;cmiservative nature of· .. ·· ..• · 
·. ! ~;. 
··u·!:_-·. 
·. audit, group Jud~meri~s .• Prior p~ychology. studies find that •decision'.' makers tend J~ .. 
. ..· assume' more risk when they in~v~ from m~king individual judginents t~ making . 
-· . . . . .. . . . .'. . . ·-._.: . 
•. judg~enJs as a mem,ber of a group, that is, a ri~k;_;hiftis observed (J?aese' et a1:~ .1993). · ·. 
Howeve;,· ~ cautiou~-shift is observed· among audit group judgrrients{or material task~ 
(Reckers and'Schultz, l~82~ Barr~lt and O'Malley, 1976t B.r~~~,{1986) explai~s thtf . 
,: ••• • • • • • • • • • •• • :_ • _··. _'I.._, • ·_._ • - • • •• 
. using cultural yalue the<>ry, i.e .•. if the judgment context is risk-faking . (f~r. example; .. 
. . betting onhorses), then the group process will result in dskiefJudgme11ts compared to .. · 
the g~oup members' individtial judgments.' If the judgment context is for caution (for . 
•. example, going-concern evaluation), then more co~servative judg~ents wiU result~ The ·.· 
. . . (~ - . . . . . . 
. _· ·_ ·. . . . . . . . . . . . _· . . . . 
audit environment. demands conservatisin and caution in judging because risky . 
• _: • ••• •• _·· • ••• (_J _. • • • ·_.-. • • ·- • • 
• ._·• jt1dgments are costly; e~peciaiJy in. relation to .going-concern~ Consequently, audit group . 
j9dgrnents are expected to be more. conservative than individual auditor.judgments~ · .•. 
· · Given the. above, description. of the· nature of. the• audit environment, the following . · 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . '· ·.' . . .. 
. . . . . 
. hypoth~sis is formulated: ·.· . . . . 
H1 Audit group judgments will be more conservative than individual auditor 
judgments. 
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-S~hultz and Reckers, 1981 i!}dicate that judgment consensus is .~rgher among audit· 
---groups than individual auditors. Studies by Trotman a~iYeuon (1985) (using a payroll _---
iitterna1 control task), and Trotman et al. (1983) (using an inventory task) show lower 
-- consensus a~ong interacting audit groups compared to staticised .groups or composites. 
· :.The, use qf student surrogates may account for the inability of audit groups to 
. ~--- . . 
• ciritperfoi·m composites in Trotlhan et al. (1983). As discussed in Section 2.2, the nattire --
- . .. ·. . . . . . . . - . 
-- -_ of the tasks. iii Trotman and Yettcm (1985) reduced;,~tandardised bias, and hence,, no - -
>. significant difference in peiformance was observed between composites ~nd interacting 
groups. TrollDan (1985) and Sniezek. and HOflCy (1990; 1989) found that interacting 
• -group judgments are mbre ac~µrate' than indi vidualjudgments. -
·1; 
-A critical aspect of the group process is whether .it reduce.s indiV:idual inconsistency 9f 
. . . . .·. . . . .·. ·_. . . . . .. 
outlier behaviour ~ocFresults in highe/ consensus, as· consensus -is often used -as .a_ proxy 
-- - -- - - .,;,'·--·' - - - - - - - - - - -
-for judgment q'.i.,llity (Schultz and Reck~rs, 1981 ). It is expected that social pressures -
--~ ·, . . . 
--crea!ed by the group process will moderate extreme views held by group ineinbers as 
they work to accommodate each other's views (Fisher and Ellis, 1990f This should 
- __ -_- fesu11 in higher c;onsensus among group judgments compared to inctividua.1 Judg~ents. ----
·-.· . . . . . 
-- Psychology studies, however, observe the opposite to.be true; the group process,.very · 
. ·.' .- .. · . . . . . . . i: . 
-often, results in even more extreme views (e.g., Myers and Bishop [1971) found Uiat 
- - . 
-. _ ·;~roups becam~ iliore. racially-intolerant than the individuals). In domain-sp!;!Cific. tasks 
s\Jch as auditing, such behaviour is neither expected. nor acceptable. Audi tors often work 
in groups and teams and so a.reused to interacting with group members. The importance 
of this ability is made even more significant by the nature of audit tasks and audit 
responsibilities and the time pressure under ¥:hid1,\auditors function. First, because of 
Ii 
'"· I· . 
the complexities of some audits, auditors are aware df the importance of group· WC>rk and 
... 85 
the need to share and integrate expertise (Schultz and Reckers 1981). Second, unlike the·. 
. . .. 
. · .. participants observed in. psychology. studies, auditors work with. extended legal 
.. ·_. ; , ,, . 
. . .. 
·· liabilities and incorrect judgments can iricur severe penalties. This may cause them to 
. . 
. . .. . . 
work more effectively as groups and teams to reduce such eventualities. Third, auditors 
usually work-under tight time constraints, :.o they are aware of the benefits of dividing 
. . 
ttie processing responsibiHties among group members. Holding divergent views would 
he opposed to the majority of the group, and time and social pressures would interact to 
modify such views. Therefore, unlike the participants observed in psychology studies~ 
the audit group process is expected to reduce individual. inconsistencies~ so that 
consensus among audit group judgments is expected to be higher than arriong individual 
auditor judgments. Thus, H5 states: 
H2 Consensus will be ~igher among audit group judgments than among individual 
auditor judgments .. · 
. . 
·. Judgment quality is often ~e,~ermined by agreement among decision makers (consensus) 
and/or agreement over a number of judgments by the same decision ~aker 
(consistency), and both are dependent upon cue usage, cue selection and cue weighting · 
(Stocks and Harrell~· 1995; Ashton, 1992; Bonner, 1990; Chewning and Harrell, 1990; 
Chalos and Pickard, 198535). Judgment quality often suffers when decision makers use 
of information is limited. For example, studies in psychology find that a hypothesis-
confinni ng strategy often leads to erroneous judgments, and a more comprehensive 
information proce¢'iing approach should lead to more effective judgments. Chewning 
3
~ To overcome the uncertainty of a going-concern task, consensus or agreement among auditors is 
often used as a proxy for j udgrnent quality (Wright, 1988; Ashton, 1983; Libby, I 981 ). Whilst 
Einhorn ( 19 7 4) cautions against o vc r-re l ia nc e on consensus, in some audit tasks such as going-
concern evaluation, consensus continues to be used as a measure of judgment quality. In addition, 
Ashton ( 1985) finds significant correlation between consensus and accurncy. 
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arid Harrell. ( 1990) find that increased cue usage leads to increased judgment quality. In· · 
addifion. j~dgmentqual~.ty is dete~inedby cue selection, that is the ability of decis10n 
. ·. . . . . !~ . . '. •. ~ . : . . . ·:· : . 
· .makers to .differentiate the predictability. of the cues processed (Chalos and Pickard, 
· 1985). Aii i~abHity to ide~!ify the salient cues reduces the effectiveness of the judgment. 
Another detenninant of jtidgn_ient quality is cue weighting,_(Stone an.ct Dilla, 1994; 
Bonner, 1991, 1990; Chalos and J>ickard, 1985). As these three factors are establish~d ·_ -
cieterminrin.ts. 'of. judgm~nt quality,·. 'this experiment compares 'conservatism 'and . 
. . · .. - . ·":'.. .. . .· . . . . .. . 
- consensus·among audit group and individual auditor judgments using these -~hree items 
as· explanatory factqrs .. To ex plain the _ hypothesised · differences _ between audit< groliP:S,' . · 
,:( 
and individual auditors' judgments;) examine cue usage, cue sel~ction and ~,de 
·' weighting. Inthis·exper1ment, self-repoding of these·variables is to be used.··· 
!\. . . ·. : . . :, . 
Audit. groups' pooling and recall of information are only possible if group members 
. . . . . . . . 
internet, share proc~~sing responslbilities~ compensate for in.di victual members' inability 
L', 
.· ,\:! j I 
to recall information and are abli;to identify the best or optimum :solution putforward 
.1 , . . . . . . '• -
by group members. Due to the nature of the audit environment where the penalties for . 
· ·. errors may be high, and where tirrie pressure is an integral part of the environment, it is ' _ · 
. -· • ·expected that auditors are able to recognise the importance of these skills. and function 
. : . . . . . . . . . . . 
. more effectively as groups. In addition, tht! higher rate and greater diversity of recall i· 
. . . . . . . . . . . .. 
• .· would cause audit groups t.o attend to more information cues than individual auditors; 
. .· : ·-· . . ·-· . . 
.. Therefore, the following hypoth~sis·states: .. 
Compared to in~ividua1. auditors, audit groups will attend to more information• · .. 
cues .. · .. . . . .. . . . . . . . ·. . ·- . . . . . . . 
87 
. ·_ /{ .·: 
(i . 
:· ~ . .. 
·1· 
. ,'., A further explanation of the expected :.difference( s) between audit group and individual . 
auditor judgments is the difference between their selection of information cues. As . 
. groups are more comprehensive information processors . than individuals, their 
... . .. 
·. judgments can also be explained by their ability to identify the predictive ability of the 
infonnation cues they use (Chalos and Pickard, 1985); this is reflected in their cue 
: • 'I • 
selection;.· Since · audit group. judgments are .· predicted to· be sigIIific,antly niore . 
. . . . . - ,. . ·~ ' 
conse.rvative than indivi~ual auditor judgments, augit · groups are expected to select 
significantly more negative cues and fewer positive cues than individu~~l auditors. 
:{ 
H4 Cou1pared to individual auditors, audit groupli\Wiiisele~t more going-conc~Dl ',; 
problem indicators and less mitigating factors .... , 
Having identified the relevant cues, the next task for decision makeis is to weigh and 
.. . 
· combine these cues to form a judgment. While individuals can usually weigh cues with 
relative accuracy, they do not perform this task consistently (Brehmer, 1976). Groups 
·. · are able· to perform this task with greater consistency because mis weighting by a group 
·member will be corrected by other group members. ,The expected conservatism in audit ·· . 
. . . -· 
•':·.::-.-· 
.·. group judgments compared to individual judgments may also be explained by the nature 
of their cue weighting. The more conservative judgment may be a result of audit groups 
giving more weight to negative information cues (i.e.,· going-concern problem 
indicators) and less weight to positive information cues (i.e., mitigating factors) . 
. . 
compared to individual auditors. 
/.,·_ . 
, , H5 . . Compared t~ individual auditors, audit groups will assi~n more weight to-g6ing~ 
.• concern problem indicators.and less weightto mitigating factors; •'. . . . 
. . . .. . . ·. 
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Tl!E EXPERIMENT.· 
· . Participants. 
The participants were 172 accOuntants attending a national training pr?grain ·· that 
· pre pured them for · the Institute of Chartered Accountants• Professional · Year 
examinations in auditing36• Participants were paid A$ IO for their effort. 
TheTask 
_____ T_a_b_le_4.1 ~ Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics of Participants 
Average age 
Range of audit experience 
Average audit experience 
. Percentage with audit experience 
24 years 
,, 
O to48. 
months . 
11 months 
55% · 
The goin·g-concern task used was the sam,tas that used by Chung and Monroe (1996). 
In addition to general information about the company, eight information cues 
' ' 
(comprising four going-concer11 problem indicators and four mitigatingfactors) wer~ 
provided and these were randomised for each group and individual participant37• 
' ' ' 
Participants were required to make a judgment on whether or not the company was a 
•:i-
going~concern, and to identify and rate the information cues that were most relevantt.o 
their judgment. The four going-concern problem indicators were: 
1. Legal proceedings have been started against the ·company that may result in a .· 
financial judgment that could not be met. .· · . · , ... 
2. The fire department may make roller shutter doors and windows iUegal in · ,, 
residential properties because of the risk they pose in the event of~ fire. · 
36 Table I show.~ the descriptive statistics. .. . . . .· .. ·. . .. 
· r, Cue diagnosticity is not tested as this hus already been performed by Chu.rig and.Monroe·( i 996). 
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- 3. A fire destroyed the warehouse that may be uninsured. 
-4, _ -_Some ofthe companfs fixed~term borrowings are approaching maturityand the 
•company inay not have,realistk prospects of renewal or repayment. · -
.. The four mitigating factors were: 
1: The company may have idle assets which it can sell for cash. 
2. Management may take steps to reduce overhead and administrative expenses. 
3. Associates of the ccmpany may take up a new issue of the company's shares._ 
4. Current shareholders may agree to contribute additional capital. · · 
A complete set of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. 
-Experimental Procedures· · 
The experiment was_ carrie~ out_ during one of the training sessions. The -procedures are 
detailed in Figure 4.1. Participants were randomly assigned . to individual and group 
- -
- -
condi.tions. In all, there were -43 individual participants and 43 groups of three 
p~iciparits38• ln the grotip condition, participants :formed gro~ps of three at the start of 
the experiment. All participants were given the case·· materials in a booklet (Appendix 
B)~ The start of the booklet provid~d introductory. information that explained the 
-_ purpose of the study and provided an assurance of confidentiality. In. the group 
condition, participants were asked to disc~ss the case materials and arrive at a consensus 
,·j. 
on whether or not the company was ·a going-concern. In the individual condition, 
- -
participants read the case materials and made their judgment. Participants in both 
conditions were then required to place the case materials and their judgment into the 
envelope provided; The envelope· contained a message which forbade them from 
removing materials that had been placed in it. The participants in both conditions then· 
38 Tv:,o grou·p~ and one individual did ~ot complete the task,-thiuesulied_i!)- 41' group a~d 4_~ in~ividuaL -_ 
usable re.sj)onses. - -- - . -
- 90 I 
' · wrotei the information cues that they considered were relevant t'o theirjudgrtl~nt39 and . 
. . ,, . . •, ~ . 
· rated the relevance of these information cues to their judgm1;nt. Finally.they compJ_eted a 
. °t,tisHest questionnaire and were debriefed. 
~ . . . . . 
: .-.-_: 
. ; -~· 
- .. / :·· ... 
.,~-;. 
··;-=. 
•:.\ 
j, 
fl 
<i" 
· · • J9 upon· examining the cues listed by participants in both c~nditions. some decision. units <~mh groups 
· . and individuals) wrote cues that could not be traced to the case materials. In these cases •. I made the 
, decision to eliminate these ~ues from the total_ number of information cues Hst~d for the·· particular 
.· grnup or individual. . . . . 
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Figure 4.1 . , . 
E. talP ecf xper1men roe ores .. 
.. 
" 
·- Group· Individual (';_ ,··· 
, . 
.. f,;.. 
·::: ... 
. . 
Read introductory inf om,iation and -Read introductory information and 
. . case materials; . . case materials 
·-
,. , .. 
·• , .. 
Group_ discussion .,. _ (No discussion) .. 
·• 
,_. : : 
:·: 
~-.= 
. . 
_, 
Make goi~g-coilc~fll judgnien't Make going-concernjudgment -
I ~ • 
ii 
;( 
.. 
Write information cues relevant to Write infomiation cues relevant to_ 
--going-concern judgment -going-concern judgment 
Ra~~ relevance of information cues Rate relevance of information cues. 
Complete post-:test questionn~if~
0 
• 
~.-. 
. . 
Complete post-test questionna._ire 
.. 
. ·-_ - . Group Size 
.-·.,· 
·- . . . . . · .. ·. . . . . . ·. . . .· . . ·. ..·_ . 
The independent variable of dedsi<m mode c.ompdsed two levels '.7- individuals and 
-_ · ... _-: . ___ --- . .. . . , ... · • . _- . .. __ -- .. : . i_i- .. · 
-groups. There are different definitions of gl'.oups in the literature; Trotman et al. (1983) 
-- define grot:1ps as COinprising two or more .decision makers, -Whf:fC<lS -the. psycJmlogy ---
.. .. . .· . . : . ft .. //°:. 
literature often defines groups ~s comprising three or more decision. makers (Fisher and . -
Ellis, 1990). Consequently, prior auditing studies used various group si.zes (e.g., 
Trotman and Yet ton [ 1985 J used two-member groups; Trotman et uL · [ 1983], Solomon 
[ 1982], and Uecker [ 198 2 J used three-member groups; and Chalos [ 1985] used four-
member groups). Trotman et al. (1983) found three-member groups to be sup~rior to 
two-member groups. Therefore, three-member groups were used in this study. 
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_ 'Dependent Variables - r/ ii . ,, 
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-The case materials contained a brief description of a client together · with eight 
information cues. Four of these cues were going concern problem indicators and four 
. . : . . 
were mitigating factors. Participants were required to make a going-concern judgment 
on a 9-point Likert-type scale anchored qy "a going~concern" (1) and "not a going-
- -- :\ -
concern" (9~<This is used to test H1 and H2, 
- - -,_ -
· Extant psychology literature examines the processing, encoding and recalling of 
:. . . ·. ··.·. ' ··. ·. 
-_ information :from memory (~ohen, 1981; Snyder and Cantor, 1979; -~nyder and 
- Ur;uiowitz, i978; · Zadney and Gerard, 1974). These studies find that decision makers 
. . . . . . . . . . . .·. . .. . . =~, ... 
rselectively•process,infom,ation duringthe;,encoding stage of the Ju~gment-process and 
selectively;_recall i~fonnation Jrom memory (Zadney and 9erard, 1974). J:hey ten4 to 
- encode into memory and 'retrieve from memory mainly information consistent with their 
hypothesis (Snyder and Cantor, 1979). There~i;ire, the information recalled represents the 
information that is initially processed and encoded into memory (Rothbart et al., 1979). 
When participants are required to write the information cu~s theyCO!}Sider 'relevant to, 
,, -
their judgments; tliey write- those cues that w,-e actually processed ·and encoded in 
. -:··-.-
- memory. To capture this, when the participants in this stu~y ~{d made their going-
... · 
concern judgment, they were required to place the case materials. and their judgment 
. 1't . . 
· into the envelope provided. The next task required participants to write the infonnation 
cues they considered were relevant, to their judgment. The number and· nature. of · 
·(,. 
information cueswritten are tised,to test H3 and H; respectively: 
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After the participants had written the information cues relevant to their judgment, they 
proceeded to the next page. Instructions on"this page required thein to tum back to the. 
previous page and rate the relevance of the listed information cues to their judgment on 
:·, 
• 7:-point Likert-type scale anchored by "slightly relevant" (I) and"highly relevant" (7)4° . 
Two scores were obtained, a negative score comprising the total assigned to going-
concern problem indicators and a positive score comprising the total assigned to 
mitigating factors. These ar~psed to test Hs. 
RESULTS 
Diagnl)stic Checks 
Participants in both conditions were required to record the amount of effort they 
expended on the task as well as their perception of task difficulty on 9-point Likert-type 
scales. The effort scale is anchored by "very little effo_rt" (1) and "a great deal of effort" 
(9). The mean scores are 5.90 (SD ::: 1.00) for the individuals and 5.75 (SD = .84) for 
the groups. _The~e scores are not significantly different (t = .71, p = .48 [two-tailed]) . 
. :;. ;--~ .. 
. . 
This shows that participants in both conditions expended reasonable amounts of effort· · 
,. 
in performing the tasks. The task difficulty scale is anchored by "not at all difficult" ( 1) 
and "very difficult" (9). The mean scores are 4.40 (SD = L 78} for individuals and 4.15 
(SD = 1.12} for groups, and these scores are not significantly different (t = .79, p = .43 
[two-tailed]). This indicates that participants in both conditions found the task to be 
40 In many experimental studies, self-reported data are a major source or evidence for expluining how 
decision makers judge or wish to judge. While there are reservations expressed about the use of such 
data (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971), self-reported data or self-ratings 
continue to be used in judgment research. This is because prior studies !ind that in some 
circumstances, self-ratings cun be useful (e.g., Goldstein and Mitzel, 1992; Reilly and Doherty, 1991 
and 1989; Anderson and Zalinski, 1990; Surber 1985). For example, Surber (1985) find that self-
ratings of cue importance reflect relatively accurately the impact a cue has on the judgment outcome. 
In spite of their limitations (Nisbett and Wilson, I 977; S lovic and Lichtenstein, 1971), self-ratings do 
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somewhat difficult arid that task difficulty and effort expended did not contrib~te to th.e -
- -
- -
-- subsequent ctifference~ notect; --
- To test the success of the group manipulation, participants in the group condition -were 
---___ - ask~tto rate theksatis~actionwith their group's judgment on 'a ?~point Likert-type scale --
- where one indicates dissatisfaction and seven ind~cates satisfaction. The mean score is -
' - -
5.51 (SD= .88). In addifo?n, participants in the group condition were required to rate the 
. . . . '")_ 
amount of interaction in theirgroup olla 9-point scale anchored by "no interaction at -
- -
- -_- all'I (1) and "a::lot of interaction" (9). The mean score is 6.76 (SD~ .89). Both thes; 
. . ": . . . . . 
. - . . . . . . . ·_. . 
· -_ -score~ indicate that the group manipulation was successful. 
·.!"}._ 
Analyses of H1 
- - -
-. H1 predicts that the group judgments willbe more conservative than the individual 
. I.' 
- judgments. Table 4.2 shows the going-concern judgments of groups and individuals41 • A 
perusal of the table reveals that the average score for both groups and individu~ls is -
···; ....• ,-:,/"". 
-greater thah5 (the mid-point). The meanscores are 5.68 (individuals) and 6jQ (~roups). 
T-results show this difference to be significant (t = l.72, p = .044)42, and there is 
support for H1• The group judgments ate significantly more conservative -than the 
-individual judgments. In their review of ~~e ,literature on heuristics and biases, Smith 
·_ and Kida (1991) find "a pervasive, overriding concern by auditors for negative 
-- o~tco~~s (i.e., 'conservatism)" (484) and attribute it to the asymmetrical loss function 
... <>-:>-:-. ' ' . . . . . 
. . · . . 
· -· · that auditors are exp~sed to. The results of this test show that the judgments of groups- -
:·_. . .· . . . .· . . ·. .·. .·. . ' ·.:: . . .· ·, ·.:·.. . 
-__ .• __ -- - - _-_ - -- - -- ' - ' - - - - - - -_ - ' _- - - - -_- - - - - - __ -- - -- __ - - - - - -- - -__ - - - _- ---__ - -_- - -_ - - '' -
pro~ide insight into decision makers' prefere-nces (Gtildslein and Mitzel, 1992; ReHly and Doherty, 
.. ·· 1992 and 1989). :·1 • • • •• .. • • • • • •• • • : ••. • ·. · .• :· .;·. ••• • • /;:.:'·· 
_ 
41 A nine-point Likert-type scale anchored by "a going-concerntt and "noi U, going~oricern!I was iJs,ed. -_ --_ 
------
42
. Aii,tests ofsignificunce are one-tailed unless stated otherwise. , · · · · · · 
.=··.. . !l:'. ;·.::;. 
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take on an ,element of conservatismt while.the judgments. of individual auditors are more· ... · . 
. . '·· . . . . . ' . . . . 
Table 4.2. 
Going-Concern Judgments of Groups and Individuals · 
Going-Concern 
Evaluation* Mean SD. Range 
. . 
Individuals (n!::i 42) 5.68 1.87. 2 to 9 r 
· r :1.12 · 
:-= 
V Cp = .044) . 
. 3to9 i! Gmups (n =:41) . 6.30 1.33 
· * Going-concern evaluation scale: I ::: a going-concern, 9::: not a going-concern.· 
. To identify whether audit experience has an effect on the results, further analyses were 
. . . . . 
carried out Average experience is used as a proxy for the groups' expe,rience43 • The 
. . ,' 
ANCOV A result shows that audit experience does not have an effect on the results44 (F 
. ::: .088, . p ::: .383) (Table 4.3). The main. effect . for groups/individuals remains 
. significant at the .05 level. 
Table 4.3 
The Effects of Groups/Individuals and Audit Experience on Going-Concern 
Judgments 
ANCOV A Results 
ss ~ !!f E I! 
Covariate -
Audit experience .24 .24 I .09 .383• 
Main effect -
Groups/individuals 8.17 8.17. 1 ·3,02 .. 0~3 .. 
. Residual 214 . .05 2;71 79 
\~~-· . 
. . . . . . . . . . . .• . ·. .. .• . . . < .. . . : . . . < • ·•·· ' . : J/: • ·. · .... 
43 Total group experience was not used because it would, cause the group experience to be 0:Y~,rstated. · .. · 
• compared to the individual experience. · . · · · · (-:/, · 
.. 
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Ar.alyses of H2 
1' ,, 
,'! 
r· 
· Given that the case materials examined by participants are · a hypqthetical case 
. /( . ·-
comprising equal nuinbers of going-concern problem indicators and mitigatingJactors, · 
it is not possible to detennine judgment accuracy. Instead, H2 examines iri,tq-participant · 
agreement ( consensus) to detennine judgment quality. :: . ,; '; 
H2 states that consensus will be significantly higher among audit groups than among 
individual auditors. That is, the · group process will reduce differ~nces between 
individuals. The standard deviations are 1.87 (individuals) and 1.33 (groups) (Table 
4.2). This shows that consensus among groups is higher than among individuals. The F-
test shows the standard deviations to be significantly different (F = 6.88, p = .01). These 
results suggest that, compared to individual auditor judgments, audit group judgments 
are subject to fewer fluctuations and inter-group agreementis higher. On the other hand, 
individual judgments are subject to more fluctuations and consensus is lower. This 
_,,:,, 
resu'it supports H2 as well as the findings of prior studies that groups will reduce outlier t: . : .. 
. ii 
be:ha viour among individuals (Schultz and Reckers, 1981 ), · 
· Analyses of HJ 
H3 predicts that audit groups will attend to significantlY. more information cues than 
individual auditors. Self-reported cue usage is examined. The mean numbers of 
information cues listed by individuals are 5.24 (SD = 1.69) and 6.02 (SD 1.85) by 
·groups. Table 4.4 shows the results. Groups attended to significantly more infonnation 
cues than individuals (t = 2.02; p = .023); Stass,er(1992 and 1988) and Stasser and Titus 
.· (1985) suggest that, because of their. collective information processing capabilities 
,.• .. \'.'4. T~re~ult1 ~how difference in audlt experi~nce between groups and individuals;(i·= 2:63, p > .I) . 
D= 
·.·., .. 
. · 97. 
(where the inability of individual members _to reyall infonnation is compensated by 
. other members), groups attend to ~ignificantly more information cues than individuals. 
This finding supports HJ. 
Table4.4 
. The Effect of Groups/Individuals on the Number of Information Items Used (sd) 
· Source .Afil1!! Individual 
Number of infonnation 
._ cues attended to 
groum 
6.02 
(l.85) 
auditors 
5.24 
(1.69) 
t 
2.02 
I! 
.023 
Audit experience does not have an effect on the mean number of cues used (F = . 72; p ·;; · ·. 
. . . 
· .200) (Table 4.5, panel A). The main effect for groups/individuals remains significantat 
·_ the .05 level. 
Table 4.5 
The Effects of Groups/Individuals and Audit Experience on the Number of Cues 
Used 
Panel A · ANCOV A Results 
ss MS DF JI I! 
Covariate -
Audit experience 2.22 2.22 1 .72 .200 
Main Effect -
Groups/individuals 12.51 12.51 · 1 .-.-· 4.04 .· .. 024 
Residual 244.56 3.10· 79 
Analyses of Rt 
As audit group judgments are expected to be more conservative than individual auditor · 
judgments, H4 predicts a significant di~(erence in cue selection between groups and · 
;, 
individuals. Groups are predicted to se1,ct more going~concen1problem indicators and 
,,, ' . . 
• • fewer mitigating .factors than individu;l auditors. To test H4, the 11ature of self-reported_ 
. 9g· 
·I 
. . . 
--_- cue selection -was examined. The number of going-conc~rn. problem indicators ancf -
. . . . . 
-mitigating factors listed by participants were tallied (Table 4.6). Both audit group~ and-__ 
·.--. individual auditors reported significantly more going-~oncern problem indicators than -_ 
-mitigating factors (t = 4.69, p ,= .000 [groups]; t = 5.57, p = .000 [individuals]). H7 is 
. . . . ~ i . . . . . . . . 
,< - · tested b)' comparing the number of going-concern problem indi~ators and mitigating 
-··-~/ .. 
factors between groups and individuals: Audit gr~ups an~ individual auditors listed 2:46 -
- :: Ii - - - ., -
- - -. (sd ·_ L60) _ a~d 2.00 (sd !AO) mitigating factors _respectively. and the -differ~nc~,-. is.-_ 
--- marginally -significant -(t = .- 1.41, · p = - .082) -(Table 4.6). -_ Regarding --goirig.:.concem --
. ·:.· . . . . ·,·. . 
problem indicators, audit groups listed f56 (sd .74) itenis and individuals 3.24, (sd .76) .: - -
. -: . . . . . . . . . . .. ·.- .. 
--__ -_- items,. and these are signi~cantly 'ctifferent (t = L96; p = .027) (Table 4°.6). This is -· 
opposite to the predicted dire¢tion~ Thus, H1 is not supported._- -
Table 4.6 
Cue Selection 
· Panel A : Mean Number of Cue Selected (SD) 
Mitigating factors 
Going~concern problem 
. indicators 
Audit Individual 
groups 
2.46 
(1.60) 
3.56 
(0.74) _ 
auditors 
2.00 
(1.40) 
3.24 
_ (0.76) -
! 
1.41 
1.96 
'-;;.-_· l! 
.os2-· 
- ~027_ 
ANCOVA analysis, (with audit experience as a covariate} shows that audit experience 
does not have an effect on the selection of going-concern problem indicators (F = , 73. p 
= .198) (Table4, 7, panel A), Audit experience similarly does not have an effect on the 
selection of mitigating factors' (F= .08, p = . 38 7) (Table 4.7, panel B }. The main effect 
.:1'··, 
99·. 
' 
. i.•· 
. . . . . . . . . . 
for .groups/individuals remains significant at p < .. 10 (mitigating factors) and .05 (going-
. . . . .· 
... con~erri problem indicators) .. 
Table4.7 
The Effects of Group/Individuals and Audit Experience on Cue Selection 
ANCOV A Results 
(A) Going-concern 
Problem Indicators 
· Covariate -
Audit experience 
Main effect -
Groups/individuals 
Residual· 
(B) Mitigating Factors 
. Covariate -
Audit experience 
Main effect -
Groups/individuals 
Residual 
Analyses of Hi· . 
1.62 
4.22 
176A8 
ss 
.05 
2.20 
45.08 
!,62 
··4.22 
. 2.23 · 
MS 
.05 
2.20 
.57 
. . . 
l 
I 
79 
df 
. 1 
1 
79 
E 
.73 
· I.89 
·.08 
3.85 
. I! .· .. 
.198 
· .. 086 
.387 
.026. 
To investigate the cause(s) of the difference(s) between group and individual responses, 
the nature cif self-reported cue weighting is examined in Hs. Two sums are obtained for 
each group ~nd individual - a positive score comprising the total rating of the mitigating 
factors and a negative score comprising the total rating of the going-concern problem 
indicators; As the number of cues used by groups and individuals was different, average 
weight per cue was calculated by dividing the scores by the number of cues used. The 
average weight assigned to going-concern problem indicators was 5 .26 (sd 1. 73) 
(individuals) and 5.67 (sd 1.24) (groups), and these scores are not significantly different 
(t = L26, p = .164) (Table 4.8). The average weight assigned to positive cues was 5.08 
(sd 2.85) (individuals) and 4.64 (sd 1.24) (groups), These scores are not significantly 
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different (t = .81, p;; .210) (Table 4.8) and Hs is riot supported. These results show that 
' ,,' .. ' . ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' .· ·.' ' .·.. . ' ' ' ' \\ ' ,' ' ' ' ', ' ' 
' ' ' the significantly fucire conservative nature of audit group1~.judgrnents over' individual ', 
'' ' ·.· '' '·.·'' '' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ,: \\ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
. auditor judgments is not due to the ~ifference in cue s~lection\pr cue weighting, rather it 
' ,, \ ' 
· is due to the groups' use of more information. · \ 
\\ 
' •' 
' ,. 
1\ 
Table4.8 
Tlie Effect of Groups/Individuals on Cue Weigl~ting . 
Average weight of going-
concern problem 
indicators 
Average weight of 
· mitigating factors. 
Audit Individual 
Groups -
[Mean (sd)] 
5.67 
( 1.24) 
4.64 
( 1.24) .· · 
Auditors -
[Mean (sd) 
1 
5.26 
. ( 1.73) 
5.08 
(2.85) 
! 
1.26 
.81 
. .i/ . . I!:',: 
' /I' 
i/ 
/F 
.164 
.210 
Additional analyses of the effect of audit experience on cue weighting were carried out 
The average weight assigned to going-concern. pmblem indicators was not significantly . 
. . . .: . 
'' ' 
. . . . . . . 
affected by audit experience (F = .88, p = . 175) (Table 4.9. ·panel A). Audit experience 
' ' 
· similarly did not have an ~ffecf on the average weight assign~d to mitigating_factors (F = ·· .. 
.31, p = .. 291) (Table 4.9, panel B). The main effect of groups/individuals remains· 
.·· . . . ·. ', . . 
'' insig~ificanlatthe . I level for b~th. types ~f cues.' 
:· . . · .. ·. 
Table 4.9 
· The Effects of Groups/Individuals and Audit Experience on Cne Weighting· 
Panel A - AN COVA Results for Going-Concern Problem Indicators· 
Source §.§. MS . M F · · I! 
Covariate -
Audit experience 1.70 1.70 l .88 .175 
Main effect M 
Groups/individuals 2.26 2.26 l · 1.17 .141 
Residual 152.23 l.93 79 
.Panel B · ANCOVA Results for Mitigating Factors 
Source ~ ~ ill: F J! 
Covariate -
Audit experience 1.52 1.52 I .31 .291 
Main effect -
Groups/indi victuals 2.96. 2.96 l .60 .. 221 
Residual 306.95 2J3 79 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
. . 
This experiment investigates the relative performance of interacting audit groups and· 
. ' . 
individual auditors in a going-concern task. The confounding obs~rved in prior studies 
was controlled by using different participants for the group and individual judgments. 
. . . . . . . . 
The · findings support the hypoth,esis that· differences . · in information. processing 
. . . . . 
· contribute to the differences observed between group and individual judgments. These 
. . . 
findings show that the judgments of audh groups are .significantly different from those 
of indi victual auditors. The analyses revealed that audit groups make significantly more . 
. . 
conservative judgments than individual auditors, which is consistent with prior auditing. · 
.research (Reckers and Schultz 1982; Barrett and O'Malley 1976). There is a higher ·• 
degree of agreement among audit groups than there is among individual auditors. The. 
···findings of this experiment suggest that individual inconsistency may be reduced by an, · · 
interacting group process, and support the prior findings of Chalos and Pickard (l 985). 
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-_ lJsing c?nsensus _ as a s~rrogate for jlldgt11ent quality, it ~ay ,.be said• that, t.he group 
-- -process leads to more effective judgments. 
• ••• I • _-
H3 states that audit groups will attend to more information cues than .individual auditors. 
The analysis involves self-reported cue usage, and the result shows that at the overall 
level, groups attend to significantly more infonnation cues than individual auditors. The 
group process increases_ the range of information cues that individual auditors would _ 
--normally attend to45• When self-reported cue selection is compared, there is a marginally 
significant difference between the grnups' and individuals' selection of mitigating -
factors. Contrary to expectation, a~dit- group;- selected more going-concern problem 
indicators than did individual auditors . .This could be attributed to the groups•)general 
. . .. 
· use of more information cues. The analyses of self-reported cue weighting similarly 
· . show no significant difference between the weights assigned by groups and individuals . 
to going-concern problem indicators and mitigating factors. This suggests that the 
ineffectivene!-s of individual auditors' judgment i_s not d~e to the nature of their cue 
s~lection a~d cue weighting, but rather it is due to the limited rangeoftheircue usage. 
(_:_ 
Audit experience does not appear to have a significant effect on the results. It does not 
· resu~t in significantly more conservative judgments. Experienced auditors do not attend 
. to. more cues than individual auditors, While au~it experience does have a significant 
effect on the selection of individual cues, this significant effect is reduced when the 
- . 
. . . . . . .· . . . _· 
going-concern prob,l~m indicators and mitigating factors· are considered -as a . group. 
45 Ntitc that this W~S not a memory test. Participan;s were required lo write down the Information cues . 
that were relevant to their decision. To prevent them from merely copying the information from the 
•- case malerlals, the case materials and iheir prior decision had been placed in an envelope and were not 
available for this task. 
10'.3' 
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·Similarly,· experienced auditors do not weight these two categories of cuess,ign~ficaritly ... 
··. ·. differently from inexperienced auditors1· 
·- . . . 
. .• · ·• ·. These' results indicate that the g~up. process · 1eads to higher c~nsensus. among groups 
generally, and the consideration of a wider range of infonnation cues by individual. 
. ' . . . . . 
. . . . . 
· groups:) While· it is costly to assemble a group of interacting auditors, this experiment 
·: -· . . . . . 
. suggests that the benefits may outweigh the costs. There is evidence to suggest that · 
· ·•· auditor/are able. to work more effectively as groups than other participants studied in 
the psychology literature. 
. . ·1: . 
. . LIMITATIONS 
There are limitations to the experiment reported here. The· first two limitations of 
· Experiment .One as detailed in chapter 3 also apply he~ .. In addition, due to the large. 
numbers of participants that \Vere required for Experiment Two·, I was constrilined to 
. ·. ·. . . . . . . . ... . .· _· ·: 
use auditors who were relativety:inexperienced as well as partidpants without audit 
. . . . . . 
.·.·· experience. It is unclear whether experience.had an effect on the ~esults.•. 
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. CHAPTERS ... 
EXPERIMENT THREE - COUNTEREXPLANATIONAND AUDIT 
GROUPS 
INTRODUCTION· 
. . 
Auditors' ability to detect fraud is generally low (Bernardi, 1994; Pincus, 1991 and 
1990).such rauure may beauributed to many f~cto~, and prfor auditingresearch _ has 
attempted to identify some of these. Bernardi (1994), Johnson et ai. (1993), Reckers and 
. . . (\ . . .. , 
Schultz ( 1993) and Pincus ( 1991; 1990) examined the effects of personality differences 
on fraud detection. rates. The scope of these studies is limited in· that . they merely 
examine the effects of various individual differences and personality traits on fraud 
.t;"• 
· ·detection rates and do not ~xumine the psychology of the judglllent. This expedment 
examines the psychology of thejudgment by considering whether the provision of a 
count~rexplanation improves fraud detection. In counterexplaining, the ·decision-maker 
is required to consider why his/her chosen judgment alternative may be incorrect and/or 
why the rejected alternative(s) muy be correct (Koriat et al., 1980). Prior auditing 
literature suggests that counterexplanation may result in more effective judgments46• 
These studies required auditors 10 counterexplain experimenter-prescribed hypotheses 
(e.g., Koonce, 1992; Kenri.~dy, 1995). Another treatment of this technique in the 
psychology literature (e.g .• Koriat et al .• 1980) required participants to cotinterexpfain 
their own hypotheses, and found that it reduces over-confidence. Using Koriat et al. 's 
treatment of explanation/counterexplanation, this experiment will provide evidence on 
. .: _. 
counterexplaining by audit groups and individual auditors and serves two purposes; 
46 For ex~mple, Koonce ( 199~) found that it reduces cxpl~nation bias. 
. . \ . . 
'· 
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First, Koriat et al. ( 1980) used counterexplanation to reduce over.;confidence, but as 
auditors are generally under~confident, there may be occasions where 
counterexplanation may result in counter-productive belief revision. There is evidence 
in the literature of the increasing use of counterexplanation in practice. For example. 
Libby and Trotman (1993) found that audit reviewers pay greater attention to evidence 
inconsistent,with the conclusions reached by their audit subordinates in analytical 
procedures. Before this practice of re9uiring a counterexplanation becomes widespread. 
there is a need to "investigate whether there is(are) any ;negative effect(s) of 
counterexplanation. The effectiveness of counterexplanation as a judgment tool should 
be more rigorously tested, that is, researchers should question whether there are 
· conditions under which requiring an auditor to counterexplain would be coun,ter-
productive. qne such question this study asks is: Will counterexplaining accurate 
judgments lead to less accuratejudgments? If the answer to this question is yes, then 
counterexplanation should be used with caution. 
Second, given the possible negative aspect(s) of counterexplanation, its effect on audit 
groups is also examined. The motivation for this is three-fold. First, group accuracy and 
calibration are compared to individual accuracy and calibration. The purpose of this 
comparison is to determine which is the more effective judgment unit. Second, I 
consider whether audit groups enhance the positive aspects of counterexplanation and 
lead to higher fraud detection rates. Third, I consider whether any potential negative 
aspects of counterexplanation can be mitigated through the use of audit groups. 
· A modified version of the case materials used by Pincus ( 1991), which contains material 
management fraud, was used i.n this experiment. Both individual and groups of auditors 
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evaluated the case materials and made a judgment· 'on' whether or not the inve~tory 
balance is fairly stated. They also recorded their confidence in their judgment After 
which half the participants provided an explanation for their judgment, while the other 
half provided a counterexplanation. They then made a final judgment of the fair 
statement of the inventory balance and rated their confidence a final time. The results 
.found that not only were audit groups more accurate and more confident, they were also. 
: better calibrated than individual auditors. Counterexplanation led to higher belief 
revision than explanation. While counterex'plaining inaccurate judgments Jed to 
1_·\ 
marginally higher accuracy than explaining inaccurate judgments, counterexplaining 
i: 
accurate judgments resulted in significantly lower accuracy than explaining a~curate 
judgments. Counterexplaining also led to lower confidence while explaining led to 
. higher confidence, and there was also an interaction effect between explanation mode 
(explanation and counterexplanation) and groups/individuals on confidence revision. 
Finally, causal explanations caused higher interference for those who counterexplained 
as well as for individual auditors, and groups counterexplained more efficiently than 
individuals. 
EXPLANATION EFFECT 
When making judgments, decision makers such as auditors are often required to explain 
why particular conclusions are reached. Explanation is the provision··of reasons that 
either speak for, or provide evidence for, the chosen alternative, or the provision of · .
. reasons that speaf5.. against, or point against, the ~'ternative rejected (Koriat et al., 1980). 
The need to provide explanations is required by the professional standards. For 
example, AUS 502 - Audit Evidence (AARF, 1996) requires auditors to obtain 
sufficient appropriate. audit evidence to be ·able to draw r.easonable conclusions on 
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which to base the audit opinion, and AUS 208 - Documentation (AARF. 1996) requires 
auditors to document matters which are important in providing evidence to support the 
audit opinion, as well as evidence that the audit was carried out in accordance \Vith 
Australian Auditing Standards. 
A review of the social psychology literature suggests that the provision of an 
' 
explanation may affect the subsequent judgm~nt of the decision maker. For example, 
having explained the possibility of the target event occurring, the decision maker is 
likely to judge an explained event as more likely to occur than an unexplained event. 
This is referred to as an explanation effect. Explanation also results in belief 
per:se'verance. After explaining a causal.· relation between the information anq: the 
J .'·· 
impression, such an impression is surprisingl,; · 1permeable to change, even after the 
• • - •• I 
causal relation between ,the infonn.ation and the impression is subsequently discredited 
\",. 
,·(Ross et al., 1975). Explanation effect and belief perseverance are both explanation 
consequences, but they are dissimilar 'phenomena. Both will be discussed in this section 
as they are consequences of causal explanations ... 
·' 
Ross, Lepper and their colleagues carried out a series of experiments . to test belief 
perseverance (Ross et al., 1975; Ross et al., 1977: Anderson et al., 1980). In Ross et al. 
(1975), two experiments were carried out. In the first experiment, student participants 
were required to perforrri a task for which they received feedback indicating their 
performance in relation to an average student. After a time delay, students were told of 
the fictitious nature of the feedback they had receiwd, and that the feedback had no 
relation to their actual perfonnance. Participants subsequently completed a 
questionnaire which solicited their perception of their own perfonnance. The purpose 
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was to determine the extent to which the initial fictitious feedback had·:sµrvived the 
· debriefing process. As expected, .. above-average" participants r~ted their past and future 
performances significantly higher than "average" and "below-average" participants, 
even tho~gh all of them were debriefed on the fictitious nature of the feedback. The 
- -
results show a perseverance effect which survived the debriefing procedures. The 
second experiment_ followed similar procedures with:-three exceptions. First, a control 
group (no-debriefing condition) was added. In addition, a discussion of the perseverance 
. . • ; .-.= . . 
_ process and its effects was added to the standard debriefing for. half the debriefing 
participants (process debriefing condition). ~bile the remainder received the standard ' 
debriefing (standard debriefing condition). Participants ,in the process-debriefing 
·= . 
condition were told of the fictitious nature of the experiment plus the purpose of the 
study. Second, participants in each condition were divided into two groups - actors (who 
- - .-- -- - ,, - - - - - -
took part in a dummy physfological experiment) and observers. Each actor was paired 
with an observer. Third, instead of providing feedback, partidpants rated their own 
performance. The task required;participants to predict a person's suicidal tendency from __ 
a note. At the end of the experiment. the actors completed a questionnaire identical to_ 
the qne used in Experiment One and the observers were required to rate the performance 
-_ and abilities of the actor they observed. The results showed that the perseverance effect 
_ survived the debriefing procedures especially for participants who performed above- or 
below-average for both actors and observers. Participants in the process-debriefing 
condition were of interest, as actors in this group demonstrated belief perseverance, but 
at a reduced level,. while observers continued to show distinct belief perseverance. 
While causal explanation is implied in Ross et al. (197 5), Ross et al. (1977) tested 
explicitly for it. Belief perseverance may be due in part to the need of decision makers 
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to explairi · the relation between the information ·and· the· impression (judgment) and · 
· consequently. the impression persists even after the information has been thoroughly 
discredited (Ross et al.. 1975). The first experiment of Ross et al. ( 1977) was designed 
to test for this phenomenon. Ross et al. (1977) required student participants to explain 
the later behavioural patterns of two clinical patients based on the case histories 
..• participants had previously read. In the control group, participants read one of two case 
histories with "attention to information about the patient's background, formative 
experiences arid symptomatic problems . that might help · pred~ct later events in the 
. . . . ' . . . 
patient's Hfe" (819). They then were required to rate the likelihood of occurrence of five 
. . 
possible events - suicid~. financial contribution to the Pea~e Corps, participation in a· 
. . . i• . 
dangerous medical experiment, alcoholism and volunteer work in a political campaign. 
In the manipulation group, participants also read one' of the two case histories except 
they were asked to take the role of a, clinical psychologi~t who had just obtained 
information ~bout a subseq~ent event in the patient's life. Half of the participants were 
told that the subsequent event was ~uicide and the other half financial contributions to·. · 
the Peace Corps. Participants then wrote the reasons that would explain the action of the 
patient. Afterw~fds, they summarised the 'inain reasons for the:' patient's -action, without ·. 
consulting the notes. They were then debriefed and tcild that "no information is available 
. . 
about whether he (she) committed suicide, made financial contributions to the Peace 
Corps, or followed any other particular course of behaviour0 (820). Participants finally 
rated the likelihood of the explained event occurring. The results showed that the 
perseverance effect was caused in part by the explanation given, that is, after explaining 
a·patient' s later behaviour based on the case history, pruticipants. rated that behaviour as 
a more likely consequence even after being debriefed. 
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In Experiment 'J'.wb, half the participants received the sam~ instructions -as=those in the 
,'i 
. . . . . . 
manipulation group in--_ Experiment _-One; -The other :half ''of _ the participants - were 
· inforined right from the start that the event to be explained was fictitious_ and that the_ 
experimenter had no information of its occurrence or non-occurrence. The rest of the 
• procedures were identical to Experiment One. As the observations in Experiment One 
may h~ve been a result of the participants overlooking the debriefing message in the 
-_ case materials, this possibility was negated by placing the debriefing message up-front. 
-· . :. 
In -general, the results of Experiment Two supported the findings of Experiment One. 
;· __ J 
-_Experiment !hree followed similar procedures as the previous two except the explained 
events were divided into critical (hit.;.and-run driver) a~d non-critical -( contribution to 
-Amnesty International) events; The results de~onstrated a bellef perseverari~e; .but orily 
- -
-_ for the critical event: 
i -i· 
:_,·· 
,_ 
Anderson et al. ( 1980) carried_ out two exP,eriments to test the effect of e~planation on 
- - -
the partici{!ants' judgments. Student participants were required to explain the relation _ 
that existed between success in the occupation of firefighter ai1d risk-taking propensity 
. . . . . . . 
before being told that such a relation is entirely fictitious. The first experiment was a 2 x 
- - - ; -
2 f!-!H factorii1l design where half the participants explained a posfrive (negative)· reiation ; • 
between risk-taking propensity and success as a firefighter and half the participants were 
-- (were not) debriefed on this fictitious relationship. Analysis of the no-debriefing 
participants' responses showed overwhelmingly that those who explained a positive 
(ne&ative} relationship saw risk-taking (non-risk-taking) propensity as indicative of later 
success as a firefighter. What was surprising was that participants who explained the 
···positive (negative) relation in the debriefing group also reached. the same conclusions. 
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This experiment showed a belief perseverance among participants (even· though their· 
·.. : .. ·· . ·:· ,' :' . 
initial beliefs were based on very minim~l data). 
' In the second experiment, instead of randomly assigning participants to positive or 
'negative relation groups, participants ' were asked to. discover the 'relation (whether 
positive. or negative) for themselves. One half of the participants explained> the .. 
disc~~ered relation and the other half did not. The fictitious nature of the relation was .· 
later told to half ·.the ·.participants, and the remainder acted as a control group. As 
.. ·p~edicted, the contml group· participants saw risk-taking propensity as indicative of 
future success, while those who explained the negative relation· believed the opposite to 
· . be true. Such beliefs ·~ndured even after participants had been thoroughly debriefed in 
both the debriefing-explanation and the debriefing-no-explanation. participants. But 
. . . . . 
among the no-explanation participants, those who were debriefed showed significantly 
less belief perseverance than those who were not debriefed. The results show. that 
explanation leads to belief perseverance. This belief may survive even after the 
participants have been thoroughly debriefed of the (fictitious nature; of- the relation 
· ·explained, and debriefing does not adequately reduce belief persev~rance .. 
··.· ·· 'IJese findings are not confinecf to ·Ross, Lepper and their colleagues. Other researchers 
.. · .. 
. have found similar results (e.g., Sherman et al., 1981; Sherman et al., 1983; Tutin, 
.. . . . . ,. . 
1993). Sherman ~t al. (1981) sought to replicate Ross et al. ( 1977) with two extensions. 
First,· th~• studies. by Ross,· Lepper and their colleagues required participants to ex~lain 
hypothetical future events concerning people unknown . to them. Sherman et al. ( 1981) 
required· participants·. to explain ·their own hY,pothetical future performance. This 
extension was based on the premise that people's perceptions ofth~mselves are ordered:· 
112 · 
.· I 
I 
and stable, and therefore.· their explanations of hypothetical events do . not . have · a · 
. significant impact on their probability estimates of those events. Second. the Ross et al. · 
. studies provided participants with detailed clinical ca~es. thereby increasing the · 
perceived subjective likelihood of the event explained. Sherman et al. (1981), on the 
other hand, requir~d participants to perform an anagram task. At the start of the 
experiment, participants completed a personality checklist. They were subsequently · 
' 
divided into three groups. Prior to perfonning the task, participarits in two of the groups 
were required to imagine that they:had already participated in the anagram task and h3:d ·.· · 
either passed or failed the test. They were then required. to explain their hyp~thetical 
success or. failure in the task .. They. were also told that,.the experimenters had no 
knowle~ge of how well or poorly they ~ould perform, so they were aware that what. 
they were explaining was purely hypothetical. The third gro~p 3:cted as a control group. 
. . . ·. . . . . . . 
AU participants then perf?rmed' the anagram task which required them to rate whether 
12 traits and 11 moods .applied to them. The results of the anagram task were used· as the 
. . . . . 
· dependent measures. The results showed that participants who explained a hypothetical 
success rated their chances of success in the anagram task higher, while those who 
explained failure rated their chances of success lower. In addition, those who explained 
. . . . . 
success actually outperformed those who explained failure. These findings confirm 
those of Ross, Lepper and their colleagues as well as extending the findings to ·include 
actual performance. 
In the above experiment, the same type of task was used for the hypothetical explanar,ion 
( the hypothetical task) and the actual explanation (the actual task). Shennan et al. ( 1981) 
proposed that belief perseverance should survive even when different tasks are usedfor 
the hypothetical and actual tasks. In their second experiment, they required participants 
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to first explain the hypothetical outcome of an anagram task before performing a word 
generation task. The results showed that participants who explained their success in the 
_ anagram task, expected to perform similarly in other word tasks. Actual perfonnance 
was similarly affected. Those who explained perfonning well in the anagram task, 
performed equally well in the word generation task. 
Instead of belief perseverance, Sherman et al. ( 1983) examined the explanation effect. 
- -
. . . . . . 
They proposed that explaining-a: hypothetical future event causes decision makers to 
judge the event more likely to occur. In a 2 x 2 full factorial experiment, Sherman et al. 
required half the p~rticipants to read detailed information about an upcoming gridiron 
- -
game (betweeri Team A and Team B) with a view to recalling the information later on. 
_ The othe~ half of the participants were told to read the infonnation in order to form an 
. . . . 
impression on the game. One half of the participants were told that they would 
subsequently be required to explain the hypothetical victory of one of the teams. The 
other half were not told of the explanation requirement. After reading the information, 
all the participants explained in detaii the hypothetical victory of one of the teams. 
Finally, they judged which team was more likely to win the game. The results showed 
that participants who explained the victory of Team A judged Team A more likely to 
r-
win~ while those who explained the victory,_pf Team B judged Team B more likely to 
win. This was observed for all the groups except for the group which was told to form 
an impression and not told of the need to provide an explanation. Because this group of 
participants was to fonn an impression, the infonnation was not encoded in the 
individuals' memory. When asked to make a final judgment on the outcome of the 
gridiron game, their judgment was not affected by the explanation. The second 
experiment added a recall variable to the first experiment. Participants were required to 
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recall the information either right before or right after their\ final judgment. The findings 
of the first experiment were replicated in the second experiment. In addition. the 
explanation of the hypothetical event significantly affected what specific infonnation 
was recalled. 
As an extension of Sherman et al.'s (1983) study, Hirt and Sherman's {1985) study used 
both knowledgeable and naive participants in a gridiron task. In Experiment One, 
students were tested to detennine their knowledge of gridiron before being assigned to 
knowledgeable and naive groups. Half the participants were told of the requirements to 
explain the hypothetical victory of a particular team in a forthcoming gridiron game, 
prior to reading the information (before-group). The other half of the participants were 
not told of the explanation requirement until they had read the information (after-group). 
Half of the after-group participants were told to read the information with a view to 
recalling the information afterwards (after-recall-group), and the other half of the 
participants were told to read the information with a view to forming an impression 
(after-impression-group). All the participants then wrote explanations on the 
hypothetical victory of one of the teams. Finally, they made a likelihood judgment on 
which team would win and completed a free recall task (which was either taken right 
before or right after the judgments). As expet:ted, an explanation effect was observed for 
all participants except for the knowledgeable participants in the rifter-impression 
condition. It was, however, possible that participants' judgments were based on prior 
information about the teams rather than on the experimental information. Nevertheless, 
the results indicateG., a ~~fference between the judgment of knowledgeable and naive 
participants. Only knowledgeable participants took part in Experiment Two. Unlike 
Experiment One, where\he gridiron game involved teams familiar to the participants;in 
:; '· 
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Experiment Two participants were required to explain the hypothetical victory of a 
game involving teams they were unfamiliar with. The experimental procedures were 
identical to those in ExJ?i:-riment One. The results showed an explanation effect. The 
reason for this difference was that participants in Experiment One were not only 
knowledgeable, but were familiar with the information (the teams). In Experiment Two, 
while participants were knowledgeable, they were unfamiliar with the information. 
The provision of an explanation has other effects besides affecting the decision maker's 
likelihood judgmenls. Hoch (1984) proposed that the provision of an explanation for a 
target event may interfere with the decision maker's ability to consider other 
perspectives which will. in turn, affect his/her likelihood judgments of the target event. 
Three experiments were carried out to test this proposition. In Experiment One, 
participants were required to write reasons supporting and opposing a hypothetical 
future event. They then made likelihood judgments of the occurrence on the future 
event. Each participant explained three events - purchase of a video cassette recorder, 
will Britain and Argentina go to war over the Falklands, and will OPEC impose an oil 
embargo. The results provided limited suppo1t that interference (the provision of 
reasons for and against a future event) affected participants' likelihood judgments. 
However, the results could also be affected by other factors. At the time of the 
experiment, the possible Falklands War and the OPEC oil embargo were emotive issues. 
In this experiment, Hoch used the number of reasons generated as a covariate to test for 
interference, and found that generating supporting reasons causes interference. In 
Experiment Two, he proposed that interference should make it more difficult for 
participants to generate the second set of reasons, therefore, ease of generation would be 
a more suitable measure of the effects of interference. Time taken was used as a proxy 
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for ease of generation. In this experi111:ent,. only the video purchase and OPEC cases 
were used. At least three reasons for and against the cases were to be generated and each 
time a new reason was generated, participants pressed a key. Finally, they made 
likelihood judgments of the events occurring. The results, with time taken as a 
covariate, showed that longer times taken to generate supporting reasons led to lower 
likelihood judgments and shorter times taken led to higher likelihood judgments. This 
supports the proposition that interference (in the form of reasons for and against the 
cases) affects pa1ticipants' likelihood judgments. The third experiment aimed to test 
whether time delay would remove the effects of interference. The results show that time 
delay may reduce the effects of interference, and confinn that interference affects 
likelihood judgments. 
All the studies cited above made use of student participants in general knowledge tasks. 
It is important to examine whether such findings extend to experts performing domain-
specific tasks. Tutin (1993) made use of both student and clinical psychologists. The 
task required participants to anticipate a future event in a patient's life - either suicide or 
involvement in a social cause, and was discussed in chapter 2. Analyses of students' 
results for both tasks confirmed the prior findings of Ross, Lepper and their associates 
and Sherman and his associates of an explanation effect. The expert judges showed an 
explanation effect on the social cause case. Their results on the suicide case also showed 
an explanation effect, but at a reduced level compared to the students, and partially 
support the p1·oposition that expertise mitigates the explanation effect. The difference 
between the two groups was not as large as expected. There were two explanations for 
this. First, there was a significant judgment difference between the psychologists who 
explained the suicide cr.se first and those who explained it second. This difference was 
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observed across all three groups. Physiological reasons could have confounded the 
results as clinical psychologists are nonnally very busy {Tutin, 1993). Second, because 
psychologists frequently encounter suicide cases, they may not be motivated to carry out 
the experiment (Tutin, 1993). 
In sum, the provision of an explanation leads to belief perseverance, and such belief 
perseveres even after the information that formed them initially has been discredited 
(Ross et al., 1975). The basis of such belief may be very little data (Anderson et al., 
1980). Explanation also leads to an explanation effect. Explaining a future event biases 
decision makers' likelihood judgment in favour of that event occurring (Ross et al., 
1977). Additionally, participants who explained their future success on a particular task, 
have higher expectations of success, and indeed, do perform better on the task compared 
to participants who explatned their future failure (Sherman et al., 198 I). The 
explanation effect persists, regardless of whether the need to provide an explanation is 
introduced to participants before or after they read the information, but does not occur 
when participants read the information with a view to fo1ming un impression (Sherman 
et al., 1983 ). The effects are reduced when participants are both knowledgeable and 
familiar with the information, but are equally persistent when knowledgeable 
participants are unfamiliar with the information (Hirt et al., 1985). Besides affecting 
likelihood judgments, the provision of an explanation also interferes with participants' 
ability and time taken to generate counterexplanations (Hoch, 1984). There is limited 
evidence to show that experts may be less subject to the explanation effect than novices 
(Tutin, 1993). Even though her results were only partially significant, Tutin proposes 
that experience should mitigate the explanation effect. 
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As a follow-on to Tutin's study, the next task is to examine the explanation effect on 
auditors perfonning domain-specific tasks. Professional pronouncements require 
auditors to develop an explanation for reaching a particular conclusion. The explanation 
may affect auditors' subsequent behaviour in two ways. First, explanation effect may 
cause auditors to subjectively increase the likelihood of the explained event occurring. 
Such a bias may impair the effectiveness of the audit, and consequently, the audit 
opinion i.,sued. Second, the explanation may also lead to belief perseverance among 
auditors. Church ( 1990) proposed that the netd to maintain cognitive consistency is high 
among auditors as, very often, a consistent auditor is viewed as a competent auditor. 
The need to maintain cognitive consistency may exacerbate belief perseverance. Belief 
perseverance is, however, untested in auditing. 
Anderson and Wright ( 1988) used experienced auditors (mean audit experience 3.23 
years) and novices (one undergraduate course in auditing) in an internal control 
evaluation task. The control group was asked to judge the likelihood of material 
misstatement in an account balance. There were two treatment groups. In one group, 
participants were told of the discovery of material misstatement (misstatement 
condition). and the other group was told that no fraud was discovered (no-misstatement 
condition) prior to making the likelihood judgment. All participants then explained how 
the material misstatement of an account balance could have occurred, after which they 
wrote the procedures that would have prevented the misstatement. The dependent 
measures were the ratings of the internal control system's strength and risk. The results 
indicated an explanation effect among the students (but this was caused more by the 
recall-availability process rather than the process of causal construction), and more 
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importantly, experience mitigated the explanation effect as no explanation effect was 
observed among the experienced auditors. 
Other auditing studies have found an explanation effect even among experienced 
auditors (Church, 1991; Koonce, 1992). Church (1991) proposed that auditors who are 
committed to their hypothesis would resort to a hypothesis-confirming strategy. Auditor 
participants (mean audit experience 2.5 years) were divided into two groups · high 
commitment and control. In the task, analytical procedures highlighted a material 
misstatement and the cause of the misstatement could be in either the sales or purchases 
cycles. The high commitment participants had to provide a written explanation to justify 
why they selected a particular cycle. They were also required to provide their name and 
address in case they were required to discuss their judgments. Participants in the control 
group did not explain or provide their name and address. The results showed that the 
high commitment participants preferred confirming to disconfirming infonnation, 
whereas participants in the control group did not. Chung and Monroe (1996) required 
auditing students to explain inherited and seJf.generated hypotheses and found that 
explanation leads to a confirmatory behaviour. The participants were required to rate the 
importance of confirming and disconfirming information cues. Consistent with prior 
literature, participants who inherited their hypothesis were hypothesis·confirming 
whereas those who generated their own hypothesis were not. This was because their 
participants were novices. 
Other studies similarly found an explanation effect among experienced auditors (e.g., 
Koonce, 1992). Koonce divided auditor participants (mean audit experience 2.8 years) 
into two groups - a control group and an explanation group. Her case study was divided 
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into three parts. Part A contained financial and non-financial information about the 
client and the clienes industry. Part B contained detailed discussions with the client 
identifying the change in sales mix as the cause of fluctuations detected by the analytical 
procedures, and Part C contained the debriefing questionnaire. After reading Parts A and 
B, participants performed a familiarising task (Part C). The explanation participants 
explained why the detected fluctuations could be caused by the change in sales mix. The 
control participants did not explain. Subsequently, all participants assessed the 
likelihood that the fluctuations were caused by the change in sales mix. Using both 
between- and within-subjects t-tests, Koonce found that the provision of an explanation 
leads to higher likelihood judgments. This finding is consistent with prior psychology 
studies and Church's (1991) study, but is contrary to Anderson et al. (1988) and Tutin 
(1993 ). The manipulation group's explanation was in the direction of the case materials, 
and this may have resulted in a confounding effect. The explanation effect subsequently 
observed may not be an explanation effect, but may simply have occurred because 
participants knew what the right answer was. On the other hand, if participants 
explained a(n) different (incorrect) cause of the detected fluctuations, and an 
explanation effect was observed, the results would be more conclusive. 
In audit decision-making, auditing standards require auditors to provide explanations for 
reaching a particular judgment or concJusion. Even if the explanation is not specifically 
required, explanations or causal reasoning are generated as a by-product of decision-
making (Koriat et al., 1980). Various psychology and accounting studies suggest that the 
provision of an explanation leads to an explanation effect (Koonce, 1992; Church, 1991; 
Anderson and Wright, 1988; Anderson and Sechler, 1986). But explanations do not just 
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affect·. the likelihood judgments of auditors, they may affect their ability to consider 
· ~lternative explanations for an error-cause (Church and Schneider, 1993). 
Auditing research generally indicates that an explanation effect is observed among 
experienced auditors. There are several conditions under which it is observedt and these 
include requiring participants to recall information after an explanation has been 
provided (Anderson and Wright, 1988), heightening commitment by requiring 
participants to provide their names and addresses (for a possible post-test interview) 
after they have provided an explanation (Church, 1991), and providing an inherited 
hypothesis prior to the explanation requirement (Koonce, 1992). 
Many theories have been suggested for the explanation effect phenomenon. The central 
theme of these theories is that of causal attribution. Tversky and Kahneman ( 1973) 
suggest the availability. heuristic as a rationalisation for the explanation effect. In 
. . 
decision-making, people construct causal relations between the information and the 
target event. Such causal reasoning goes on whether it is formally required or not. By 
explaining the target event, the causal relation between the infonnation and the target · 
event becomes imprinted in long-term memory and is readily available (Carroll, 1978; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). "A person is said to employ the availability heuristic . 
whenever s/he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or 
associations could be brought to mind" (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 208). These 
instances or associations are essentially self-generated and are integrated into a single 
predictive judgment (Hoch, 1984). Because the information is available in memory and 
. easily recalled, it may explain why the provision of an explanation for a target event 
increases the subjective likelihood of the target event occurring (an explanation effect) . 
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. As a causal explanation is automatically developed when the initial judgment is made, 
the requirement to provide an explanation is merely a reinforcement of what is already 
available in memory. Repetitive recall may strengthen the association between the 
information and the judgment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). That is partly why 
people react quickly to routine questions or tasks. Answers or solutions to nonroutine 
questions and tasks are not so easily accessible and do not come readily to mind. A 
search of memory is futile because the relevant information has not been imprinted in 
· ·memory. (Hoch, 1984). However, the availability heuristic is not only affected by 
frequency of recall. For example, it may be affected by the memorability of a particular 
· event. As a result, the use of availability heuristic may lead to systematic biases 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). Ineffective judgments may result as decision makers . 
construct scenarios that link the present audit situation to memorable or . unusual 
previous events. On the one hand, if the construction of such scenarios is relatively easy, 
decision makers will consider the occurrence of the present situation to be as likely as 
the past event. On the other hand, if such scenarios cannot be easily constructed, 
decision makers will judge the occurrence of- the present situation to be lower. Ot,her 
factors that affect the availability heuristic include saliency, inadequate memory search, 
concrete versus abstract contexts,· and irnaginability to name a few (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). This heuristic, irrespective of its cause(s), results in an explanation 
effect (Ross et al., 1977; Anderson and Wright, 1988; Church, 1991; Koonce, 1992; 
Tu tin, 1993) and belief perseverance (Ross et al., 197 5; Anderson et al., 1980). 
Other theories have been suggested to explain the explanation effect. First is the 
· "simulation heuristic" which is similar but not identical to the availability heuristic. 
When decision makers are required to explain a future event, the information and their 
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relation to the explained event become readily available and accessible in their memory .. 
· . Kahneman and Tversky ( l 982) call this "simulation heuristic". This heuristic suggests 
that decision makers will build a series of steps that c0unect the information (evidence) 
to the judgment. This cognitive heuristic is premised on the assumption that "downhill 
events" (a tem1 borrowed from cross~country skiing). that is, events that are easier to 
construct, are deemed more likely to occur than uuphill events", that is, events that are 
less easy to construct (Kahneman et al., 1982). There is a need to distinguish between 
two types of causal explanations: explanations in the form of a restatement of facts, and 
explanations involving the provision of a causal account to explain the information 
(Anderson et al., 1980). In the former, the information is not encoded in long-term 
memory and should not result in an explanation effect. In the latter, the infonnat~on is 
encoded in long-term memory, making it more readily available to the decision maker. 
and results in an explanation effect. 
Second. decision makers selectively review the information available and encode only 
those cues that are consistent w,ith the outcome explained (Shennan et al., 1983). Snyder 
and his associates (Snyder and Campbell, 1980; Snyder and Cantor, 1970; Snyder and 
Swarm, 1978) found that people generally prefer infonnation that confirms their 
impressions to information that disconfirms them. Consequently, people selectively 
review the information set for confirming information and ignore disconfinning 
infonnation. The fonner may be more readily available in either the information set 
and/or in memory. This -increases the availability of confirming information to the 
decision maker and may result in an explanation effect (Church, 1991). Human decision 
processes are designed to, and people do as a rule, avoid disconfirming information 
(Snyder and Campbe11, 1980). Consequently, during the decision-making process, 
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people may not have encoded this type of information into memory or if they have, may . 
-- --have difficulty retrieving it (Hoch, 1985), and this ·results in an explanation effect. 
Third, the explanation effect may also be explained by what Hoch (1984) refers to as 
_ "interference". According to him, when a decision maker generates a set of reasons for 
-(against) the occurrence of an r_yent, this act interferes with his/her ability to generate 
reasons against (for) the occurrence of the event. The alternative explained first 
becomes encoded in long-term memory, whereas the enco~ing ~p. long-term memory of 
the latter-explained alternative may be less prominent. This is because the initially-
explained alternative interferes with the decision maker's ability t_o consider alternative 
,· 
explanations. Consequently, the -alternative initially~explainecl becomes more readily 
available to the decision maker and influences his/her likelihood judgments. Two 
factors support this interpretati(?n of the explanation effect Firs~. research has found that 
the mere act of imagining or explaining a hypothetical future event results in an 
explanation effect (Sherman et al., 1983; Ross et al.. 1977). Second, based on Hoch's 
proposition, if a participant explains before counterexplaining an event's occurrence, 
then an expl~nation effect should result. Conversely, if s/he counterexplains before 
, explaining, then an explanation effect should not result. Hoch' s ( 1984) findings confirm 
this47• Changing the order of the explanation/counterexplanation manipulation does not 
improve calibration, the participants remain over-confident (Koriat et al., 1980). 
-_ •In the _above discussion, four hypothe~es are offered for the explanation effect. °These' 
include _ the availability heuristic, simulation heuristic,. confirmation_ bias and 
.. ·. ::)' ·.· 
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inforference theory. It should be understood that the psychology literature does not 
consider these as mutually exclusive theories. There is reason to believe that these 
theories operate together. For example, Hoch (1985) explained that decision makers are 
generally over-confident because they tend to generate more confirming than 
' disconfirming information. and this imbalance in information generation may be 
·.· explained by three theories. First, confirming infonnation is more available in memory 
· than disconfirming information because feedback is more likely to be confirming rather 
than disconfirming, and the ease of remembering confirming infonnation is higher. · 
Second, the generation of one set of reasons may interfere with· the generation of a . 
second set of reasons. As people are more likely to generate confim1ing information · 
first, this interferes with the· generation of disconfinning information; Third is the 
question of control: decision makers find information. about controllable situations 
.. easier to generate than information about situutions they do not control and this leads to. 
higher· confidence. Nisbett and Ross (1980. 182) attribute belief perseverance to two 
. . . 
theories - confirmation bias and availability. Hoch's (1985) and Nisbett and Ross's 
(1980) explanations show that these theories do not operate in isolation of_eai::h other. 
So it is reasonable to expect the theories discussed .~bove to operate jointly to create the 
. . . 
explanation bias. 
V ari~us conclusions can be drawn from prior studies on t~~ effect of explaining. First, · 
expianations are a by-product of decision-making. that is; explanations are .generated 
i:c automatically in the judgment process (Koriat et al .• 1980). Second. the provision of an 
explanation leads to an explanation bias. The event explained is subjectively judged. 
. . . . ., ... , .... 
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· However, Koonce (using explanation before counterexplanation) _did not find a primn~y e:ffe~t. 
instead she found a recency effect. · · 
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. tnore likely to OCCUf as the explanation increases the saliency Of the CUl1Sal . relations· . 
.. between the information and the explained event and increases its availability. Third, 
not all social theories are subject to the same explanation effect (Anderson and Sechler, . 
1986). It appears that an explanation effect is weaker for judgments that require extreme 
initial beliefs such as views on television violence. Also, the explanation effect is Jess 
pronounced if the generation of opposing arguments is relatively easy (Sherman et al., 
1985). When opposing arguments are easy to generate, the availability of supporting 
arguments is either reduced or the opposing arguments become equally available~ 
·.i 
· Fourth, the provision of an explanation also leads to belief perseverance as has been 
observed in the various psychology studies quoted above. ·.;. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The first part of Experiment Three examines the group process in relation· to a~cU:racy~. · 
· confidence and calibration. The second part of this experiment examines explanation 
and counterexplanation by groups and individuals. 
· The theories that support the hypothesis that groups will outperform individuals were 
discussed in chapler·4. In a complex task (such as the one manipulated in. this study),. 
. . 
where the standardised bias is large,interacting audit groups are expected to outperform 
individual auditors. This study manipulates a consensus group where group members 
. interact unrestrained in a face to face discussion to arrive at a· single consensus 
judgment Prior studies find that this type of group outperfonns an average individual 
(Sniezek and Henry, 1989~ Einhorn et al., 1977). This discussion leads to the following · 
. . ~ 
.· hypothesis: 
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H1., Audit group judgments are more accurate than individual auditor judgments. 
· According to the revision and weighting model postulated by Sniezek and Henry ( 1990; 
1989); consensus group judgments are reached in a two-stage process. At the revision 
stage, individually-held judgments are voluntarily revised in the light of views and 
infonnation presented during group interaction. This revision continues until new ideas 
. are exhausted or time has run out. At thi~ stage, if group members' individually-held 
judgments are still divergent, some means of combining these divergent judgments has 
to be adopted. Regardless of the approach adopted (e.g., average members' judgment, 
select the most common judgment or randomly select a member's judgment as proxy for 
the group's), some form of weighting of members' views occurs. While the revision 
· process is mostly private, the weighting process is public as group members negotiate 
their indtvidual judgments. to form a single group judgment. Confidence, in a group 
process, ,is important because . confidence detennines when the · judgment process 
terminates and the judgment is madeJPincus, 1991 ). Sniezek ( 1989) proposed that in 
"group interaction it is confidence that is important because confidence, and not 
··accuracy~ can be made explicit at the time the Uudgments) are made" ( 172). 
When a group member revises hls/her individu~l judgment, it impiies that s/he has 
. ·.. .;· . .. . . 
·· higher confidence·in the revised one (Sniezek and Henry, 1990). However, a revision in 
·.. confidence may not involve a corresponding revision in judgment. For example, a group 
' . . . . . . 
. . . . 
. member may have lost confidence in his/her own judgment. In the group weighting 
Jprocess, when ,group members adopt another's judgment as a proxy for the group 
judgment, it implies that they (the group members) have higher confidence in that 
,, 
·:, : 
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person's judgmentthan in their own (Sniezek and Henry, 1990). Group members with 
lower expertise and lower confidence should give way to members who have more 
expertise and higher confidence (Sniezek, 1989). Sniezek and Henry ( 1990; 1989) found 
that the group process leads to higher group confidence compm·ed to the members' 
confidence in their pre-group judgment. During the weighting process, when the group 
negotiation is conducted publicly, there may be social pressures on group members to 
verbalise higher confidence as lower confidence is inconsistent with the group's choice 
of a particular judgment and may undermine group cohesiveness. Consequently, it is 
expected that group confidence will be higher than individual confidence. Therefore, the 
next hypothesis states: 
H2 Audit groups will have higher judgment confidence compared to individual 
auditors. 
While the social psychology literature resonates with examples of over-confident 
decision makers (e.g., Butterworth, 1988; Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead, 1981; 
Fischhoff et al. 1977; Oskamp, 1965), auditing studies suggest that auditors may be 
under-confident (e.g., Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994; Pincus, 1991). Reasons offered to 
explain this finding include the conservative nature of auditor training, prior negative 
experience with inaccurate judgments, and most importantly, the extended riature of 
auditors' legal liability. While this is not as dangerous as being over-confident, there 
are, nevertheless, implications for the accounting profession. Under-confident auditors 
may take more time and/or accumulate more evidence than is necessary to reach a 
judgment. Auditors might not be as efficient as they should. be, and this inefficiency 
could be passed on to clients in the form of higher fees. 
129 I 
Decision makers generally have difficulty quantifying their confidence level so that their 
confidence rating alone is not an adequate measure of confidence (Gibbins, 1984) . 
.. 'Matching accuracy level to confidence rating is a more appropriate measure of 
confidence (Lichtenstein et al., 1982). High confidence is only desirable if it is 
accompanied by high accuracy. Groups are expected to be better calibrated than 
individuals because, first, groups have the· advantage of a broader information base to 
support their judgment through their ability to recall more information and the pooling 
of their individual store of infom1ation; and second, when group mem hers weigh and 
revise their judgment during the group interaction process, they also adjust their 
confidence level. The end result of this process is better calibration. Therefore, audit 
groups should have more appropriate confidence levels compared to individual auditors 
who do not have these advantages. This discussion leads to the foHowing hypothesis: 
H3 Audit groups are better calibrated than individual auditors. 
Auditing standards require auditors to document explanations for audit findings (e.g., 
AARF, 1996; AICPA, 1982). As mentioned before, documenting explanations 
reinforces causal explanations already generated by the auditor. When the auditor 
considers that sufficient causal explanations have been generated and his/her confidence 
level is sufficient, the judgment process ceases, sometimes prematurely. Koonce ( 1992) 
required auditors to explain an inherited hypothesis, whereas auditors often exphtln a 
self-generated hypothesis. Different results may have been observed if Koonce's 
participants had explained their own hypothesis, as an auditor's commitment to a 
hypothesis is dependent upon its source (Churcht 1990). 
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Explanation bias is the result of causal explanations, therefore, any corrective technique 
must start with an examination of causal explanations. Anderson and Sechler (1986) 
proposed that in the face of two competing solutions to a problem, the solution where 
causal relations are easier to imagine or recall would be the one adopted. One way of 
countering the effect of causal explanations in decision-making is to make opposing 
evidence more salient through the use of counterexplanation (Anderson, 1982). 
Counterexplanation leads to a reduction of the explanation effect because, first, 
consideration of counterexplanation increases the versatility of a decision maker's 
judgment processes, and this should result in lower explanation bias. Second, 
explanation bias may be a result of availability, so the act of considering 
counterexplanutions makes opposing arguments equally available, ,.md the explanation 
bias is reduced. Third, counterexplanation causes belief revision. Therefore, it is 
expected that belief revision of auditors who counterexplained will be higher than belief 
revision of auditors who explained. 
H4 Belief revision of auditors who counterexplained wil1 be higher than belief 
revision of auditors who explained. 
Koriat et al. ( 1980) first used counterexplanation to improve the calibration of decision 
makers. As causal explanation (or the generation of supporting reasons) is a by-product 
of decision-making, over-confidence results when counterexplanations are ignored 
(Koriat et al., 1980). Decision makers such as auditors do not generate 
counterexplanations automatically and must be specificaily instructed to do so (Koriat et 
al., 1980). Requiring decision makers to explicitly consider counterexplanations forces 
them to consider disconfirming information and over-confidence is reduced. Similarly, 
accuracy may also be improved by increasing the consideration of opposing evidence 
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(Hoch, 1985). Confirmation bias results when decision makers ignore disconfirming 
information and encode only infonnation consistent with their hypothesis. 
Counterexplanation requires decision makers to consider disconfirming information, 
i.e., information that has been ignored initially. Therefore, decision makers who make 
inaccurate judgments are forced to examine information supportive of an accurate 
judgment. This should prime them of the inaccuracy of their judgment and should result 
in more accurate judgments. 
In testing the effect of counterexplanation, unlike Koonce (:992), this study required 
participants to explain or counterexplain their own hypothesis (Hoch, 1985; Koriat et 
al., 1980). Consistent with practice in prior psychology literature (e.g., Koriat et al., 
1980), no explanation was required prior to counterexplaining48• As counterexplaining 
makes opposing arguments more salient to the auditor, those who have 
counterexplained will re-examine the data set for opposing arguments. Consequently, 
auditors who have counterexplained inaccurate judgments should switch to more 
accurate judgments. They should also be more accurate than those who have explained 
inaccurate judgments. Consequently, the following hypothesis states: 
H, Auditors who counterexplained inaccurate judgments will be more accurate than 
auditors who explained inaccurate judgments. 
Revising a judgment after providing a counterexplanation is only desirable when the 
switch is from an inaccurate judgment to an accurate one. Auditors who have made 
accurate judgments should not revise them when they are required to counterexplain. 
48 This is because causal explanations are generated as n nuturnl process of decision-making 
(Hoch, 1985; Kori at et al., 1980). 
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Koriat et al. (1980) and Hoch (l 985) show that counterexplaining results in reduced 
confidence among over-confident participants. Auditors, on the other hand, are under-
confident for reasons previously discussed (see also Mladenovic and Simnett; 1994; 
Solomon et al., l 982~ Tomassini et al., I 982). Therefore, caution should be exercised in 
applying any judgment tool on auditors in case it reduces their confidence further. This 
could result in such uncertainty that counter-productive belief revisions result, i.e., when 
accurate judgments are substituted for less accurate ones. Consequently, auditors who 
counterexplained accurate judgments may be less accurate than auditors who explained 
accurate judgments. Explaining reinforces causal explanations, removes uncertainty, 
and should not result in negative belief revision. On the other hand, counterexplaining 
creates uncertainty, and may result in negative belief revision. The following hypothesis 
indicates that the use of counterexplanation on auditors may be counter-productive. 
H6 Auditors who counterexplained accurate judgments will be less accurate than 
auditors who explained accurate judgments. 
Given that audit groups have the advantage over individual auditors of a larger 
information base to support their judgments due to their increased ability to recall and 
process information. an interaction effect between groups/individuals and explanation 
mode is expected. In arriving at their initial judgment, it is likely that audit groups will 
have considered arguments which both support and oppose their judgment and will 
decide in favour of the supporting arguments. Individual auditors will pay greater 
attention to mainly supporting arguments, and may not have processed the opposing 
arguments. Therefore, counterexplaining an accurate judgment will have a more 
negative effect on individual auditors than on audit groups, as it will cause individual 
auditors to re-examine the data set and to process infonnation that has not been 
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processed previously. This additional infonnation - whether relevant or irrelevant -
creates uncertainty. Explaining accurate judgments will have a more positive effect on 
audit groups than on individual auditors. This is because the explanation reaffirms the 
groups' higher amount of causal explanations. Additionally, groups may have already 
processed both supporting and opposing arguments, and are therefore less likely to be 
affected by the counterexplr.nation. The interaction effect hypothesis is stated as: 
H1 There will be an interaction effect between groups/individuals and auditors who 
explained/counterexplained accurate judgment on judgment accuracy. 
As discussed above, causal explanations are generated automatically between the 
information and the target event (Hoch 1985; Koriat et al. 1980). On the one hand, 
requiring a decision maker to subsequently explain a judgment reinforces these causal 
explanations and serves to increase the decision maker's confidence. 
Counterexplanation, on the other hand, requires the consideration of opposing 
arguments. This essentially forces the decision maker to consider arguments that may 
not have been considered previously. Contrasting or conflicting information causes 
cognitive strain and, as Koriat et al. discovered, leads to a lowering of confidence. It is 
expected that auditors who provide an explanation will increase their confidence while 
auditors who provide a counterexplanation will decrease their confidence. 
Hs Provision of an explanation will increase confidence whereas provision of a 
counterexplanation will decrease confidence. 
There should be an interaction effect between explanation mode {whether explanation or 
counterexplanation) and groups/individuals on confidence revision as audit groups and 
individual auditors do not react in the same way to explanation and counterexplanation. 
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Audit groups, being more efficient processors of information (Chalos and Pickard, 
1985) and more confident, will increase their confidence more than individual auditors 
when required to explain. On the other hand, counterexplaining by audit groups will 
result in larger negative confidence revision compared to individual auditors because (as 
discussed earlier) audit groups are less over-confident than individual auditors. 
Individual auditors, who are over-confident, will be expected to have higher confidence 
than individual auditors when required to counterexplain. Therefore, the interaction 
hypothesis is stated as: 
H9 There will be an interaction effect between explanation mode and 
groups/individuals on confidence revision. 
Very often in decision-making, opposing arguments are neglected for many reasons. 
Interference theory suggests that the provision of the first set of reasons reduces the 
ability of decision makers to generate the second set of reasons (Hoch 1984). That is. 
the first set of reasons is easier to generate than the second. As people automatically 
ascribe causal relations between the information and their judgment, when they are 
subsequently required to explain, they are able to do so with relative ease. However. 
generating counterexplanations requires more effort for many reasons. First, people do 
not normally counterexplain when they make judgments, therefore counterexplanations 
are not readily available from memory. If decision makers are required to produce 
counterexplanations, they would have to deconstruct the causal attributions already 
formed in their memory and reconstruct opposing arguments such that these opposing 
arguments become imprinted in memory, and therefore, available for performing the 
task. Second, disconfirming information causes cognitive strain (Snyder and Swann 
1978) as decision makers do not, as a rulet consider disconfinning information. Human 
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cognitive processes are designed to avoid cognitive strain. In addition; the consideration 
of· disconfirming information may lead to the need to change one's initial judgment. 
Very often, changing one's judgment in an audit environment is viewed as being 
inconsistent and incompetent (Church 1990). Third, causal relations for "downhill" 
events are relatively easier to construct than "uphill" events (Kahneman and Tversky 
1982). Downhill events in the fonn of causal explanations are already constructed as 
· part of decision-making. Fourth, interference makes it relatively more difficult for 
decision makers to consider opposing arguments. Therefore, it is predicted that . 
' 
counterexplanations are more difficult to provide than explanations, and auditors who 
explained will provide significantly more explanations while those · who 
counterexplained will provide significantly fewer counterexplanations. This discussion 
leads to the following hypotheses: 
H10 Auditors who counterexplained will rate the task as more difficult than auditors 
who explained. 
Hi 1 The number of explanations provided by auditors who explained will be more. 
than the number of counterexplanations provided by auditors who 
counterexplain. 
Audit groups should, however, be able to provide explanations and counterexplanations 
relatively easier than individual auditors can. As groups are able to process more 
information and because of their corporate efforts in recalling and pooling information, 
they wiH have considered both supporting and opposing arguments in their decision-
making process. Through their sharing of infonnation processing and their interaction, 
alternative solutions to the problem will have been discussed and considered. 
Consequently, individual auditors are able to explain and counterexplain with more 
difficulty than audit groups. The fonner can ·also provide fewer explanations and 
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counterexplanations than the latter. Based on this discussion, the following hypothesis is 
fo1mulated: 
H12. Individual auditors will rate the task as more difficult compared to audit groups. 
H13 Individual· auditors will provide fewer explanations/count~rexplanations than· 
audit groups. 
THE EXPERIMENT 
Case Materials 
'l f I 
I 
Inventory is often the most elaborate and time-consuming section of the audit for 
several reasons (Arens et al., 1992, 654). First, inventory is often a material item on the 
balance sheet, and very often, it makes up .. the largest , current asset. Second, the 
. . . 
difficulty of an inventory count is compounded when the client's inventory is spread 
over a large geographical area. Third, the wide range ()f inventory items also creates 
counting and valuing problems for the auditor. To overcome this~ auditors may require 
the assistance of experts. Fourth,' the difficulty of valuing inventory is complicated by 
the different methods available, and the need to detennine obsolescence. Consequently, 
the audit of inventory is not always as effective as it should be. In a study that compared 
55 accounts receivable audits with 26 inventory audits performed by a large public 
accounting firm, substantially more errors were found in the inventory audits than in the 
accounts receivable audits and the error rates were higher for the larger accounts and for 
accounts with the larger line items (Johnson et al., 1981). The errors in inventory audits 
include both over- and under-statement of balances, material misstatements, and the 
failure of the auditors to detect fraud (Johnson et al., 1981 ). For the reasons cited above, 
the audit of inventory often involves a group of auditors. 
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The inventory audit task used was a modified version of the task used by Pincus (19~ 1). -
This task contained a material misstatement of the inventory balance -by management. -
The modifications made include the conversion of weights and measurements to metric, 
the use of current dates and food items and proper names to reflect an Australian 
environment. Forty-eight information items out of the original 70 were used and the 
information for the latest three years were given49• The doIJar values were not changed 
as such changes were not considered necessary because the type of restaurant had been 
changed from a Mexican restaurant to a fast-food restaurant. The final version of the 
. . .. 
case was examined by two experts in the hospitality and restaurant industry for realism; 
Both experts -were of the opinion that the Ct~se was re!alistic and reflective of current 
- - - - - _-, - ·':-,_/!; - - -- _- -
Australian restaurant prac~ice. Even though the case had been simplified, it contained 
. / ·. . . . . : 
_ sufficient information to successfuJly test the variables manipulated in this study. 
. . . . . . . . .· . 
The case provided information on the backgromid of the company as weJl as current 
year's and prior years' invenioryand other financial data. The information provided _ -
_ included both positive and· negative indicators of the fair statement of the inventory 
. . . . . . . : ... 
balance so the judgment was not clear cut. The results of- the current year's,, audit 
. -· .. . . ·. 
- _ procedures for inventory were also available together with selected· client record~; The _ 
. . . . . . . 
" -fraud was committed by management by overstating ending inventory quantities and - · 
values. This can be detected via the various risk indicators such as excessive ending 
inventory, inventory count procedures, management control, over-ride of internal 
control procedures by management, and inconsistent opening and closing }tventory 
4
~ The. items deleted were not relevant to the participants' decisions nnd were deleted in the i.ntcrest of 
time. 
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amounts for the year being audited. A complete set of the case materials for the 
group/counterex.planation condition is found in Appendix C .. 
:1. 
Participants 
Participants were 271 accountants attending a national training program that prepared 
them for the Institute of Chartered Accountants' Professional Year examination in 
,, 
. auditing. The average age of the participants was 24 years (sd 2.4 months) and the 
average · working experience was 34 months (sd 27 months). Sixty-one percent of 
participants had audit experience, which ranged from one to 72 months. The average 
audit experience for those with audit experience was 11.25 months, and the overall level. 
. . . . . 
·. . ·. :· . .· . .· 
of· audit experience was 10.15 · months. The, average number· of inventory audits 
. performed· was three. AlL the. part~cipants had completed at least 40. hours of audit 
training, which included a four-hour session on auditing, inventory together with 
. . 
practical exercises. Therefore, the non-auditors also· had some training in this area. 
· Participants were paid A$20 each for their efforts. 
· Expe1·imental Procedures 
. . . . . . 
. . . 
. . . . ·. 
The experiment was carried out during one of the. training sessions. The 2 x 2 full 
'II·, • 
factorial experiment tests two explanation modes - explanation and counterexplanation, 
and interacting groups' and individuals' judgment process. Table 5.1 shows the 
experimental design and Figure 5.1 shows the experimental procedures. In the group · 
condition, participants formed groups of three at the start of the experiment while those 
.. · in the individual condition worked alone. All participants received the case materials in 
a booklet. The front of the booklet provided introductory information which explained 
the purpose of the experiment and provided an assurance of confidentiality. In both : . • 
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· group and individual conditions, participants were asked to familiarise themselves with 
. . . : . . 
· the case materials. They read the initial information· of t~e · case materials which · 
· contained a general description of the operations of a chain of fast-food restaurants. The 
instructions to all participants read: 
Instructions 
· In order for you to perform an audit of Tucker House's inventory balance; 
the following information items are available. You should onJy evaluate 
those information items you consider are necessary for forming an opinion 
on whether or not the inventory balance is fairly stated. · 
Groups/individuals 
Audit groups 
Individual auditors 
Total· 
*Numbers indicate cell size. 
Table 5.1 · Experimental Design 
Exelanation Mode* 
Explana- Counter-
tion explanation 
34 31 
39 39 
73 70 · 
Total 
65 
78 
143 
The instructions were followed by the content pages, which showed the types . of 
. . . . .· . 
information available, followed by the 48 .·· information . items. After acquainting .. 
themselves· with the information, participants in the group condition were instructed to· 
. . . . . .· . . . . . . . . 
_assume that they had been assigned'as a member of an audit group for the audit of the·. 
. .i r .. '._:~ :-..::.:;. . • . . 1· • • •• • • • •• • 
:/J .. >.~~-- . . . . 
· inveritory balance of a client They were also told to discuss the case with the other 
··. group members. A large envelope was provided and participants were requfred to insert 
. . . . :. . . . .. · . _ ... 
. each completed task into the envelope before proceeding to the next task." A messag~ on 
. . . . . 
· · the . envelope stated "Do not . remove . materials that have · been . i~serted ·. irito the 
envelope'\ Each task was stapled separately and arranged in sequence. All pages of each . 
.. '. '. . . .. .. . . . 
·· 140 .· I 
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s~t of case 11u1terials bore a unique identifying number. individual auditors received the 
· .. ' ·. s~e instructions except they worked alone. 
I'. 
,,_. 
·)· 
· 1, 
-r - ~-
J. 1·· 
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.. :,.,1·. 
/ .. 
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··_. Step 1 
~tep 2 
_,;·J···-
-~.·n. r .- _.- •. 
; ~. 
-, .·) _ Figure 5.1 
.. Exnerimental Procedures · 
React b~ckground infCJ~mation ,,, · .
·;, _.. 
·:-
Read case information . . 
. . =-~ J_ • .-
. . 
.. 
---+----------------,------"----.. --------
Step3 
Individuals 
-Make initial judgment (J 1) 
{likelihood and confidence 
judgments) 
,, _ .. __ Groups, .-; :' L. .-~·.: 
.Make initial judgment as a group (Jl) -· 
(likelihood anci confiderice' . . '' 
•,' judgments) . .' .:· .. '~ 
(( )J ·; 
---+-------T----....;....---1-----' 
Step4 
Step 5 
Step6 
Step? 
_· (A) 
Wdte · explanation 
. Make final 
judgments (12) 
(likelihood and 
confidence 
judgments) 
(B) 
.. Write counter-
explanation · 
Make final 
judgments (J2) 
(likelihood and 
confidence 
judgments) 
Assess difficulty of generating 
explanation/counterexplanation 
(C) (D) 
Write explanation Write counter-· 
as a group explanation ~~ a 
Make final 
judgments as a 
group (J2) 
(likelihood and 
confidence 
judgments) 
group \ 
\\ 
Make final 
·· -- judgments as a 
group (12) 
(likelihood and 
confidence 
judgments) 
Assess difficulty of generating_ 
explanation/counterexpl:Ination as a 
group 
Complete post-test questionnaire 
For the groups, the first task required participants to discuss and work on the case as a 
group to arrive at a consensus on whether or not the inventory balance was fairly stated, 
after which they rated their confidence. The procedures for individual auditors were 
similar except they perfonned the tasks on their own. The results from this part of the 
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experiment were used to test Ha, H2, and H3, which address differences between groups 
and individuals on accuracy, con~dence and calibration. 
,,In the second task, the explanation mode, was manipulated. Half the participants in the 
· group and individual conditions were randomly assigned to the explanation condition 
while-the other half were assigned to the counterexplanation condition. Participants.in 
the explanation condition were required to consider the reasons why their answer in task 
'.->;: ohe may have been correct, and/orwhy thealternative they rejected may have been 
;1 
incorrl!ct. Participants in the counterexplanation condition considered the reasons w~y_ · 
their answer fo task one may haye been incorrect, and/or:why the alternative they reject 
. . . . . . ! ' 
may have been correct. Participants in both conditions then record_ed iheir explanations : 
or counterexplanations in the space provided as part of task three. The number of. 
explanations or counterexplanations recorded was used as the dependent variable to test 
H11 and H13• The groups recorded these after discussion among group members. 
In task four, all participants were required to make a final judgment on whether or not 
. .: ... 
the inventory balance was fairly stated. The groups made a consensus judgment while 
the individuals made the judgment on their own. This was used to test 1-4. Hs, H6, and· 
H1. whichaddressed group and individual belief -:.evision. They recorded their judgment 
and confidence on similar scales as those reported in task one. The difference between 
· the· two confidence scores was used to test Hs and 89 which addressed confidence 
' ! . . 
. . l: . . ', 
revision. In ricldition, participants in the explanation condition were required to indicate 
. the ease/di(ficiulty of generating explanations. Participants in the counterexplanation 
condition rated tlie ease/diffi~ulty of generating counterexplanations on a similar scale. 
These ct'iftic~·lty _scores were ~sed to t~st H10 and H12, In the pos~-test questionnairetall 
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· · participants provided various demographic as weU as·. some diagnostic infonnation. · . 
· · }'hey were then paid. In all, the participants took between 40 to 60 minutes to complete · 
. the experiment. 
Independent Variables 
Exp{anati01i and Counterexplanation .. 
_Consistent with" Koriat et al. (1980), P,articipant~ explained (explanation participants)· . 
. and. counterexpluined. (count~rexplanation participants} their own . hypothesis. The.· . 
. · counterexplanation participants were. not. required to provide an explanation prior to· 
. . · · .. counterex plaining .. .T~e· instructions to participants read: · .. 
. ..,. . .·. . .... · . . . ; 
. There are many ways by whichpeople can check the appropriateness of 
· tµeir decision. One of these is to require you to consider why your decision ·. • 
in Task I may· be correct (incorrect). , · . ··,·::, 
Please consider the reasons whyyour'previou.s'·answer may be ·corr~ct 
(incorrect) and/or why the alternative you rejected may be . incorrect · 
(correct). ' ' 
Groups/Individuals 
. · ... The independent vuriable of groups/individuals comprised two levels :- individuals and .· . 
. ' . :. . . ~- . 
. groups'. . There are diffe.rent definitions. of groups· in. the Bterature. Trotman ~t al. ( 1983) .. ·. · .•. 
d~fine gmups a~· comprising two' or more decision makers, wherea~' the psychology . ' 
.·· · Hterature ?ften defines gro~ps as comprising thn:e o~ nmre decision mal{ers .(Fisher and •. ·.· . 
};:llis, .,1990). Consequently, prior auditing studi~s used various group sizes. (e.g:a, 
. . . . . . • . . . • . I'. 
· .... : • ·• ··Trotma~and Yetton._[19~5] hsed twq-~ember, groups; Trotman et.al.;:[19831; Solotilon •• ·· 
·•·· .. · :.[1982]; and' Uecker.[1982] •·used · ttiree~~ember groups;. and. Cha.los ,[1985] · used ·four.:. .. · ·· 
.,, 
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-- member groups). Trotman et al. (1983) found three-:rnember groups .to be superior.to -
< two-member groups. Therefore, three-member groups were usedin this study. 
Dependent Variables 
Accuracy· 
The case materials contained a material misstatement of inventory-hymanagement, and -
_- ··- consequently,. the.-1nventory -balance --\Vas: not fai~ly stated. Participants were required to -
-make judgments on whether this balance was fairly stated. Two scales were used; The -
first was a 9-point Likert-iype scale anchored by "fairly stated".(!) and "not fairly 
stated" (9), Belief revision was represented by the absolute difference between the two; -
1. .: ·. . \e . . : .. 
. accuracy scores. The ~iecond measure was a dichotomous scale, .. where participants 
.. . : .1.. .. .. ·. 
: '; 
. 1- . . .· :" .. 
·-· indicated their judgment by chec19ng either "the inventory. balance is fairly stated" or 
"the inventory balance is not fairly stated". They made these judgments twice. - initial -
and fhlal judgments. 
Confidence 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Mladenovic and Sliluiett; 1994; Pincus, 1991), a 
- self-reported confidence measure was used in this experiment. After each individual· 
· auditor or audit group had made a judgment, they were required to rate their confidence 
on a 101-point Likert-type scale which was anchored by "not confident at all" (0%) and 
. . 
.. : : ··. 
"completely- confident" (100%). f\.s participants made accuracy judgments twice, 
cQnfidence rates were· also measured twice .,. once for the continuolls judgment an~. 
. . ' 
an.other for the dichotomous judgment. Confidence revision was ob~ai~ed by _taking 'th~ " . 
relative:difference between.the initial' andfinat· confidence rates, __ 
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· Number of Explanatio11s or Counterexpla11ations 
After making the initial judgment, participants were required to consider why their 
. judgment may have been correct (incorrect). In the next task, they were required to write 
down these explanations (counterexplanations), and the number of explanations 
.. (counterexplanations) provided were tallied. Explanations (counterexplanations) 
provided by participants thatwe~e not contained in the case materials were eliminated 
from the tally. 
Difficulty of Providing Exp/a,iations and Counterexpla11ations 
After making the fin.al judgment, participants were required to record· th~-. difficulty of 
. providing explanations (counterexplanations), and they recorded these on 9-point 
··. Likert-type scale anchored by '~very easy"O) arid "verydifficult'' (9) (difficulty score). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Diag,iostic Cl,ecks 
ANOV A assumes that the variance across all cells are equal. Consequently, Bartlett's 
. . ' . . . 
Box F tests and Cochran's C test were performed in each analysis to test this 
. assumption. In· all . cases ( except _ fo the . analyses of confidence revision), the 
· homogeneity of variance assumption was not violated. In exa.~ining the confidence 
· revision assessment,· the homogeneity of variance, assumption was violated (Bartlett Box 
· ·•· F: p < .07. and Cochran's C: p < .01); As the design involved· the manipulation of 
confidence revision with two independent variables, to partly compensate for the 
violation of this assumption, twOone-way ANOVAs were performed. The results of 
these Al'lOV As are consistent with those ofthe originaltwo-way ANOV A analysis.··•· 
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All participants were required to record the amount of effort they expended on the task 
. and their perception of task difficulty on nine-point Likert-type scales50• The effort scale 
was anchored by 0 very little effort" ( 1) and "a great deal of effort" (9 ). The mean scores 
for effort expended were 5.98 (groups) and 5.82 (individuals). These scores are not 
significantly different (F = .54, p = .46 [two-tailed]) and show that participants in both 
group and individual conditions expended similar and reasonable amounts of effort. 
Explanation mode did not have a significant effect on effort expended. Individual 
. ·audito,rs fourid the task to be marginally more difficult than audit groups did (individuals 
- mean 5.79, sd 1.39; groups - mean 5.35, sd L32) (F = 2.75, p = .10 [two-tailed]). This 
is to be expected given the nature of the task, rind the fact that the individuals worked . 
. . . 
alone. Explanation mode did not have a significant effect on task difficulty (F = 2.19, p 
= .14 [two-tailed]). 
To test the success of the group manipulation, participants in the group condition were 
required to rate their satisfaction with their group's judgments on a seven-point Likert-. 
type scale where one indicat~d dissatisfaction · and seven i~dicated satisfaction. The 
.·I . 
. mean satisfaction score was 5.48 (sd - 1.14). In addition, participants in the group 
· .· .. condition were also required to rate the amount of interaction among the members of 
their group on a nine-point Likert-type scale anchored by ''no interaction at all'' (1) and 
"a lot of interaction" (9). The mean score was 6.50 (sd 1.26). Both these scores show 
that the group manipulation was successful. Group interaction and discussion did not 
I.,' 
have an effect on the accuracy of the groups (t = -.33, p = .744 and t = .45, · p = .658 
respectively). . · 
511 
. The group scores comprise the average score of group members. 
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·. The mean audit experience for the audit groups was 1; 14 (sd .58) and for the individual 
auditors it w~ .72 (sd ,85). T-test shows this difference to be significant (t = 3.38._p = . 
. 001 [two-tailed]). To control for this, ANCOVA analyses with audit experience as a· 
· .· covariate were carried out. 
·. Group Versus Individual Performance51 
H1 predicts that audit groups will be more accurate than individual auditors. As the case 
. . ' . 
materials contained material misstatements by management, the inventory balance was 
· not. fairly stated. Since participants recorded their initial evaluation of the inventory 
. balance ~n a scale anchored by "fairly stated" (l) and "not fairly stated" (9), the high~r 
score represents the more accurate participant(s). The mean accuracy scores were 5.54 · · 
(sd 2.07) for groups and 4.26 (sd l.97) forindividuals. Because audit groups were more 
: . ... . ·. . . . .· . . . . · ... _.... . 
. Ii · · . . .. . . ·- . . . . . · : . 
· ·. e,xperienced compared to individual auditors, the analyses are carried out with audit 
_1.: . . . • 
. . . . . . 
,, :c experience52, task difficulty and effort expended as covariates. The results ind~cate that · 
.·...-
· the difference between the accuracy scores· is significant (F = .13.28, p < .00 I) 53 . (Table · 
. .. . . . ·. . . 
5.2), and H1 is supported. ANCOV Aresults show that audit experience had a 
·· marginally significant. effect.on accuracy ·(F = 2.52,· p = ·:053) .·(Table: 2).· This resu.it is. 
• • • J • 
. · expected as ~ud~t experience.is an integral parfofthe audit environment .. Accuracy.was.·. 
• ,. . . . . . I . ' . . . . ... 
. . . . . ... 
. . . . 
.. · not affected bytask difficulty and effort expended .. 
SI . O~e individual did not complete this section of the task, so Hi, H2 and H3 ar~ annly~~d With 65 groups. 
and 77 individunls. · · · · · 
52 
· A vcrage audit experience is used as a measure of group experience. . .• · 
53 All tests of significance ore one-tniled unless stated otherwise .. 
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TableS.2 
. . 
•-The Effect of Groups/Individuals on Accuracy 
ss 
-- . Covariaies: 
Audit experience . 10.i? 
Task difficulty -5.87 
Effort expended _ i.64 -_ -
. Main effect: 
Groups/individuals 53.59 
-Residual ·s44.9s 
MS df 
10.17 l, 
5.87 1 
2.64 1 - . 
53.59" L 
4.04 137 
F, 
2.52 _-
-_ L46, -
-- .. 65 -
·- . 
13.28 .. 
. IL 
· - .053 ·: _ 
- .125 .- -
210,----
. ,· 
._-.000. ·. 
. . .. _· . .. . : ·,. _.· . _· .. _· . . . . · .. · .. 
. . . 
_ Similar results were reflected by' the dichotomous judgments. Thii"ty~seven out of_ 65 
-_ (57%) groups made accurat~ judgments, whereas only 19 out of77 (25%) individuals 
made accuratejudgments. The difference between -these is significant_ (z = 3.90, p -- =. 
. . . 
. 000 I), These results are not directly· comparable to Pincus' (1991) re-suits due to the 
_ modifications made to -the case -materials. -However, the -results do show that -audit 
groups outperform hidividuaI auditors -very signitkantly. 
TableS.3 
Groups/Individuals Dichotomous Accuracy Judgment -
· ·_ · Fairly stated 
'Not fairly stated 
Groups Individuals 
28 58 
37 19 
H2 predicts that audit groups will be more confident than individual auditors. 
Participants recorded their confidence on a 10 I-point Likert-type scale anchored by "not 
confidenl at all" (0), and "completely confident" ( 100), The mean confidence scores for 
the ini tiaJ continuous judgment were 7 4.5 % ( sd 15 .3) for groups and 67 .5% (sd 15. 3) for 
individuals. The analyses are carried out with audit experience, task difficultyand effort 
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expended as covariates. The results indicate that whether auditors are working as groups 
or individuals have a significant effect on confidence (F = 5.21. p = .004) (Table 5.4). 
Audit groups are significantly more accurate and more confident than individual 
auditors. Therefore, H2 is supported. Further analyses using the confidence scores 
associated with the dichotomous judgment was carried out. The mean confidence scores ·· 
were 68.22 (sd 14.27) for groups and 65.77 (sd 16.45) for individuals. The difference 
between these two scores is not significantly different (t = .94, p = .174). Thus, when 
participants are required to make dichotomous judgments, audit groups are not more 
confident than indi victual auditors, and there is no support for H2. AN COVA results 
show that audit experience has a significant effect on confidence (F = 5.21, p = .012) 
(Table 5.4). This result is expected given that audit experience is an important part of 
the audit environment. Task difficulty and effort expended did not significantly affect 
confidence. The effect of groups/individuals on confidence remains significant at the p 
< .01 level. 
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Table 5.4 
The Effects of Groups/Individuals on Confidence* 
~ M§ df E 2 
Covariate: 
Audit experience 745.06 745.06 1 5.21 .012 
Task difficulty 141.44 141.44 1 .62 .216 
Effort expended 358.14 358.14 l 1.56 .106 
Main effect: 
Groups/individuals 1194.18 1194.18 1 5.21 .004 
Residual 34563.33 245,13 137 
*This represents the initial confidence of participants expressed in relation to their judgments on the 9-
point Likert-type accurucy scale. · 
High confidence is desirable only if it is accompanied by high accuracy. Consequently, 
calibration was examined. Calibration measures the correlation between accuracy and 
confidence so that a perfectly calibrated decision maker is as accurate as s/he is 
confident. To determine calibration, correlation analyses between accuracy and 
confidence scores were carried out54• The correlation coefficients are shown in Table 
5.5. Groups are marginally well calibrated, that is, an increase in accuracy is 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in confidence. A marginally significant 
inverse correlation between accuracy and confidence indicates that individual auditors 
are miscalibrated. Thus, H3 is supported. 
54 Prior calibration studies ( e.g., Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994: Dill a et al., 1991 ; Yates, 1991) use 
either the Brier model (Brier, 1950, cited in Yates, 1991, 38-45) or the Osknmp model (Oskamp, 
1962, ci tcd in Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994, 188- I 89) to derive the calibration score. These models 
assume that each individual participant performs many repetitions of the task. In Mladenovic and 
Si mnett (1994) and Dilla et al. ( 1991 ), the participants performed 48 and 40 going concern 
predictions respectively. When used in a single task situation, however, the results are unstable 
(Yates, 1991, 38-40). To overcome this problem, Oskamp (1965) and Pincus (1991) analysed the 
significance of and the direction of the difference between the individual's accuracy and confidence 
scores. As the participants in this study performed only one task, this latter model is considered more 
suitable. 
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Table S.S 
The Correlation Between Accuracy and Confidence 
Using the Continuous Accuracy Scale 
Audit groups 
(n = 64) 
Individual auditors 
(n = 75) 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
.20 
-.15 
p 
.055 
.100 
Calibration between accuracy and confidence was also examined for the dichotomous. 
judgment. The mean confidence scores are shown in Table 5.6. Consistent with Pincus , 
(1991), Mes ts were used to compare the confidence between cells. The results show that 
accurate audit groups are marginally more confident than inaccurate audit groups (t = 
1.53, p ;; .066), and the former are also marginally more confident than accurate 
individual auditors. However, accurate individual auditors are not more confident than 
inaccurate individual auditors as well as inaccurate audit groups. These results also 
support H3. 
:! 
Table 5.6 
The Relation Between Accuracy and Confidence 
Using the Dichotomous Scale 
Groups Individuals 
Inaccurate 65.14 66.34 
Accurate 
(15.28) (15.99) 
70.54 
(13.14) 
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64.32 
(18.48) 
I 
Effects of Counterexplanation 
H4 states that belief revision for auditors who counterexplained will be higher than for 
auditors who explained. To test this hypothesis, belief revision is calculated by taking 
the absolute difference between initial and final accuracy judgments that were measured 
using the 9-point scale. The average belief revision for counterexplanation was higher 
than belief revision for explanation (.73 [sd .98] [counterexplanation] and .49 [sd .78] 
[explanation]) (panel A, Table 5.7). ANOVA analyses reveal the difference to be 
marginally significant (F = 2.59, p = .055)55• There is no significant main effect for 
groups/individuals and no significant interaction effect. 
5
~ One group and three individuals did not complete this section of the experiment, so the rest of the 
hypotheses are analysed with 64 groups and 75 individuals. 
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Table 5.7 
The Effects of Explanation Mode and Groups/Individuals on Belief Revision* 
Panel A • Mean (SD) Explanation Mode 
Explanation Counter- I!!!!! 
Groups/individuals 
Audit groups 
Individual auditors 
Total 
Panel B · ANOVA Results 
Main effects: 
Groups/individuals (A) 
Explanation mode (B) 
Interaction effect: 
AxB 
Residual 
~ 
.23 
2.02 
.84 
3.09 
.62 
(.81) 
n= 34 
.38 
(.75) 
n = 37 
.49 
(.78) 
n = 71 
MS 
.23 
2.02 
.84 
1.03 
explanation 
.69 .65 
(.91) (.85) 
n:;:; 30 n=64 
.76 .61 
(1.04) (.92) 
n = 38 n=75 
.73 .57 
(.98) (.89) 
n == 68 n = 139 
df F I! 
I .29 .274 
1 2.59 .055 
1 1.32 .151 
135 
*Belief revision is measured as the absolute difference between first and last accuracy judgments using the 
9-point Likert-type scnle. 
ANCOVA analyses show that audit experience, effort expended and task difficulty 
(used as covariates) did not have a significant effect on belief revision (Table 5.8). Tas~ 
difficulty and effort expended similarly did not have an effect on belief revision. The 
main effect for explanation mode remains significant at the p < .1 level. and f4 is 
supported. 
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Table 5.8 
AN COVA Analyses of Belief Revision* 
~ ~ df E l! 
Covariate: 
Audit experience .20 .20 1 .26 .307 
Effort expended .49 .49 1 .62 .217 
Task difficulty .23 .23 1 .29 .296 
Main effects: 
Groups/individuals (A) .26 .26 1 .32 .286 
Explanation mode (B) 1.88 1.88 1 2.37 .063 
Interaction effect: 
AxB .72 .72 .90 .174 
Residual 104.10 .80 132 
*Belief revision is measured us the absolute difference between first and last accuracy judgments using the 
9-point Likcrt-type scale. 
To test the robustness of counterexplanation, H5, H6 and H7 are tested. H5 states that 
auditors who counterexplained inaccurate judgments are more accurate than auditors 
who explained inaccurate judgments. To test this hypothesis, I consider the final 
judgments of only those auditors who made inaccurate judgments by dichotomising the 
data into two groups (accurate participants and inaccurate participants) using the mean 
accuracy score (4.85)56• The mean of the final accuracy score of the inaccurate 
participants who explained was 2.97 (sd 1.32) (initial judgment is 2.77 [sd .85]), and the 
mean of the final accuracy scores of the inaccurate participants who counterexplained 
was 3.84 (sd 1.45) (initial judgment is 3.19 [sd .64]) (panel A, Table 5.9). ANCOVA 
analyses with the initial accuracy score as a covariate were carried out. The results show 
th<it explanation mode had a marginally significant effect on the accuracy of auditors (F 
= 2.52, p = .064) (panel B, Table 5.9). Inaccurate participants who explained are 
marginally less accurate than inaccurate participants who counterexplained; 
56 Dichotomising 0lhe dntu set using the median (4) yields similar results. This is because no participants 
have uccuro.cy scores of between 4 and 4.95. Diagnostic check reveals no significant difference in 
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counterexplaining inaccurate judgments leads to more accurate judgments, and there is 
weak support for H5. No significant main effect for groups/individuals and no 
significant interaction effect were observed. 
TableS.9 
The Effects of Explanation Mode and Groups/Individuals on Inaccurate 
Judgments* 
Mean (SD) Ex(!lanation Mode 
ExJ!lanation Counter• Total 
Grouns/Individuals ex12;lanation 
Audit groups 3.08 3.82 3.42 
(1.64) ( 1.54) ( 1.61) 
n= 13 n = 12 n =24 
Individual auditors 2.29 3.85 3.37 
(Ll4) ( 1.44) ( 1.37) 
n = 24 n =23 n=47 
Total 2.97 3.84 3.39 
(1.32) ( 1.45) (1.44) 
n=37 n= 36 n = 71 
Panel B · ANCOV A Results 
~ MS df f J! 
Covariate: 
Initial judgment 48.0 48.0 1 34.05 .000 
Main effects: 
Groups/individuals .5 .5 I .53 .235 
(A) 
Explanation moJe 3.6 .36 l 2.52 .064. 
(B) 
Interaction effect: 
AxB .1 . l I .06 .400 
Residual 93.0 .14 66 
*Belief revision is mi;asured as the ubsolute difference between first and last accuracy judgments using the 
9-point Likert-typc scale. 
Additional analyses were carried out with audit experience, effort expended and task 
difficulty as covariates. These three variables did not have a significant effect on the · 
initial accurucy between those who explained and those who countercxpluined (cxpla,nation = 4.8. 
counterexplanation = 4.9) (t = .32, p = .75 [two-tailed]). 
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judgments of inaccurate part.icipants (Table 5.10). The main effect f~r explanat~onmode 
remains significant at the p < .10 level. 
Table 5.10 
The Effects of Explanation Mode, Groups/Individuals and Audit Experience on _ 
Inaccurate Judgments* · 
ANCOV A Analyses of Accurac1: 
§§ MS !If E I! 
Covariates: 
Initial judgment 35.22 35.22 1 23.70 .000 
Audit experience .00 . .00 1 .00 .487 
Effort expended .4( .41 1 .28 .300 
Task difficulty .03 .03 1 .02 - .445 
Main effects: 
Groups/incti,,iduals (A) .28 :2s I .19 .333 
Explanation mode {B) 3.95 3.95 1 2.66 - .054 
Interaction effect: 
AxB .24 .· .24 .. ,1 .16· .346 
Residual 92.13 .49 --62 -
*Belief revision ls measured as the absolute difference bet ween first and 1u;;(accuracy judgments using the _ 
-9-point Likt:rt-type scale. 
In testihg judgment techniques, it is important to consider both their potential negative . 
effects as well as their .positive_ effects. To examine the potential negative effect(s) of 
_ counterexplanation,. H6 examines whether counterexplaining accurate judgments will·-
lead t~ a reduction in accuracy. To test this hypothesis, I consider oriJy the accurate -- -
participants who explained with those who counterexplained. The mean accuracy scores 
of participants after explaining and counterexplainiilg are· 7.21 (.89) and 6.41 (1.34) -
· ·· re~pecti vely (panel A, Table 5 .11 ). ANCO VA a11alyses, using 'the initial accuracy score 
as a covariate show.this difference :to be significant (F = 7.49, p = .004)57 (panel B, 
~- . . 
Table 5.11): Counterexplaining~·it~cur~te judg~ent~ l~ads to a significant dow~ward -----
,.-
revision in accuracy so thar participants who counterexplained are signi'ficantly less 
. . ' . . i \ . . .. 
I'-\\ 
accurate than participants who explained, and H6 is supported. 
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TableS.11 
The Effects of Explanation Mode and Groups/Individuals on Accurate 
J udgrnents* 
Panel A · Mean {SD} ExI!lanation Mode 
Explanation Counter- ' '.!!!!!!I ' .~;~ .. 
Groues/individuals exe,lanation 
Audit groups 7.44 6.67 7.08, ,, 
( .77) (1.29) (1.11) . 
n=21 n = 19 n=40 
Individual auditors 6.85 6.07 · ·6.43 
( .99} (1.37) · .;· (1.25) 
n= 13 :n = 15 n=28 
Total• 7.21 6.41 6.81 
1·!· ( .89) . (1.34) (1.20). 
n =34 n=34. n =68 · 
Panel B · ANCOVA Results 
.~ 
MS !!f ' ' F I! 
Covariate: 
Initial judgment 46.8 . 46.8 1 68.56 .000. 
Main effects: 
Explanation mode 5.1 5.1 7.49 ,004. 
(A) 
Groups/individuals · .5 .5 ;73 .197, 
(B) 
Iri teraction. effect: 
··.AxB 1.6 1.6 l 2.29 .067 
Residual · 43.0 .7 63 
*B~lief revision is measured as the absolute difference between first and last accuracy judgments using the .· 
9-pointLikcrt~lypescale~ •. ·.· .. ·· . . ',. · · .-, ··. ', · ', · . 
Hi pr~dicts thai counterexplanation· will have a more negative effect on individual 
. . . .. 
a~dito~s who make accurate j~dgment~ than on audit' gro~ps, whp make accurate 
. . .. " . . . . . . . . . . . . it .. ·. . . 
I_[. 
judgments, so that au4itgroups which explai~~d wm be moie accurate than individual 
auditors wh? explained. Nb significant ~,~n effect for groups/individ~als is observed (F 
· = .73, p = ; 197) (panet B, Table 5J l )~ A marginally signifi,cant.- interacUori effect 
' ' .......... - ' ,.,J! .··.·· .·. ' ····· ,,' ... ··· ',' ' : ,· ', ' ' .. · ... · ,· ; ' ' 
bet.ween groups/individuals and explanation mode· is observedJF = 2.29, p = ;067) · 
... ,.,.. 
57 
·. Dich~iomising tne data set using the median (4) yields similar resulL'>, 
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,, 
. \\ .. 
· (pariel B, Ta°Lle 5.11). The interacti~n effect is shown on Figure 5.2. Planned · 
' . ~i . ;, :- .. 
·. . 
·_ comparison~ ' show . a .. marginally significant . . difference between . the . 
. . . group/counte;explanationcondition anci the individual/counterexplanation condition (t~ . 
1.32, p = .097k and a significant difference betwe~n the group/explanation and 
fr1dividual/~xpl~n.ation conditions (t = 1.96, p :;; .029) .. 'l'herefore, audit groups that 
·. explaine.d. are.· -significantly . more accurate·. compared to. individual auditors who. 
· explai~ed, a~d audit groups that counterexplai11ed are marginally more. accurate than 
. .· . . . . . , . . . . ' 
. ·- . 
. . . individual· audi toi·s Who coun terexplained. Thus,. H1 is SU pported .. . ·. 
. . . .· ·_ : ·. _· ·: : . .. 
·.- .~ . 
\, 
·. Additionai analyses with audit experience, effort expended and task difficulty as · 
. .. .· .. ·, . . . . 
. covariates are also car;ied out. The audit experience and task difficulty effects are not 
. . . :.· . . . . . . .· .:· . ·.. .. . . .· .. ··. ·. . . . ,,- .· . 1· .. · · .... · . . '.· . 
significant at the p < .1 level (Table 5.12): Effort expendeg had a signifiCant effebt on -;_, -
' . . . . . . . . 
the _final judgment for these paiticipants. Greater effort should lead to higheraccuracy .. · 
. . . . .. /' . . 
.·- The main effect for explanatio~ mode and the interaction effecrremairi significant at the -· 
·-p<.05. 
.. :···,.. 
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Table 5.12 
The Effects of Explanation Mode, Groups/Individuals and Audit Experience on 
Accurate Judgments* 
. ANCOV A Analfses of Accuraq 
ss ~-. gf !!: 'I! 
Covariates: 
Initial judgment 30.71 30.71 1 45.42 .000 
Audit experience ·.06. .06 1 .. 10 .378 · 
Effort expended 2.01 2.01 1 2.98 ;044 
Task difficulty .47 .47 l .•.. 69 .205 
· Main effects: 
.. 
Explanation mode (A) · .. 19 .19 1 . 28 .300 
Groups/indi viduals(B) 2.07 ·.· 2.07 1 .3.07 .042 
Interaction effect: 
:! 
AxB -1.88 1.88 l 2.78 .050 
· Residual 40.57 .68 60 
*Belier revision is measured as the absolute difference between first and last accuracy judgment using the 
-9-point Likert-type scnle. · · · 
. ·. Analyses of belief re~ision measured on the dichotomous scales are. also carried out. 
When audit groups were required t_o explain, two inaccurate groups became more 
· accurate (Table 5;13), and this change is marginally significant (z = .:1,41, p = .073). · 
. The accurate groups did not alter their judgment. Four inaccurate audit groups which · 
. . . . : . . . 
. ·. . . . . 
·. COUnterexpluined [!lUde accurate final judgment While the ac_curate groups did not alter . 
. .·'. !•· . . . . 
their final judgment after counterexplaining (z = ~l.73; p = .041). Individual auditors'.· 
· .. who. were required_ to explain. their judgmen~. did. not alter:. them:· \vhen ·1nctivictuai .. 
. · . . ;,;) . .·. .· ' '" 
,auditors pounterexplained their judgment, only one individual changed his/bet 
· . .judgment, and this is from an inaccurate judgm~~t toan accurate one, (z = -1.oo,' p = .. · . 
. . 1ss)·. These results :show that bpth explanation and counterexpranatian are. mo~e ·. 
effective on audit groups than on individual- auditors. These results support Hs but do 
~ot provide support for ~6· There is. partial support for H1 as only groups made .. 
· significant positive revision when required to explain for counterexplain .. · 
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Table 5.13 
Belief Revision Using the Dichotomous Scale 
Type of Initial Final 
Source Judgment Judgment Judgment z I! 
(n) (n) 
" Group/ · Inaccurate 15 13 
· explanation ;.r;41 ·._ . 073 
Accurate 19 21 . · .. ~;~·-
,···._ 
. ; ,,• 
Group/ · .· Inaccurate· · 
,. 
13 9 
counterexplanation -1.73 · .041 
-Accurate 18 21 
IndividJaJ/ Inaccurate 26 26 
explanation . 
.000 ·- -_ 1.00 -
.. 
- Accurate 12 12 
Individual/ · Inaccurate 
- counterexplanation 
32 
7 
31 
8 
-1.00 - .158 _- ·. 
Accurate 
Confidence Revision 
__ Hs states that explanation mode has ~p effect on confidence revision~ so thatparti_cipants -
\Vho explained will . revise their confidenc~· upwards whereas . those . who 
-_-- counterexplained will revise their _confidence downwards. ·•To test Hs, confidence _ -_ 
· . . . . . . 11\ _J . , . . - . . .... 
revision is calculated by taking the percentage change (r~lative difference)between the 
• 1t . 1."! 
final confidence and the initial confidence so that a negative score indicates a decrease 
. . . . 
in co~fidence and a positive score indicates an increase in confidence. i11e co11fictence _-
scores used for this analyses represent the confidence expressed by· participants in 
relation to their judgment on the. 9-point Likert-type accuracy scales .. The average 
·· confidence revision score for participants who explained was 1.19 (sd.11.90) and ~4,70 
',;: ·:·'. ~·--: =:-. .-: . 
.-.. ···;·:. ·.·.·.-
. ~ . . .• ·, _. .- . . .. 
. · ···. '.'·, ... '. '~~-=~--.t.\:\.-;<_;_··.·,~·: .. 
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_ (sd 12.63)58 (panel A, Table 5.14)59 for those who c:ounterexplained, and this difference ._-
-)is _significant (F = 9.64, p = .001) (panel B, Table 5.14). Those who explained revised 
· -.. -·. their confidence upwards, and the opposite was true for those who counterexplained, -
i. 
and Ha.is supported. Thi_s result supports prior findings of Hoch (1985) and Koriat et al. 
' 'i--:. ,.;- . 
·. -._ (198,0); -
.. ,:.,, 
J 
•.. 1 
,, 
',, 
_11 
• • r ~I 
. . ·. 
·- ' 8 · .· There is a significant difference between inltial und final confidence for all participants (F = 8.18, p = _--
.005 [two-tailed]). - · _ __ 
Diagnotic check reveals no significant difference in initial confidence between those who explained, 
and those who counterexplalned (71.6% [explanation]; 69,Wi [counterexplanation]) (t = );s, .P > 
JO); 
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Table 5.14 
The Effects of Explanation Mode and Groups/Individuals on Confidence 
Revision* 
Panel A - Mean {SDJ Exl!lanation Mode 
Grou~s/lndividuals Explanation Counter- I.«!t!! 
ex(!lanation 
Audit groups 5.38 -5.83 .13 
(14.17) (14.81) (15.45) 
n:: 34 n::;; 30 n =64 
Individual auditors -2.46 -3.82 -3.14 
(8.05) (10.70) (9.43) 
n:: 37 n:: 38 n= 75 
Total 1.19 -4.70 -1.67 
(l l.90) ( 12.63) (12.67) 
n:: 71 n::: 78 n = 139 
Panel B · ANOV A Results 
ss M§ df F )! 
Main effects: 
Explanation mode 1386.7 1386.7 I 9.64 .001 
(A) 
Groups/individuals 298.2 298.2 1 2.07 .076 
(B) 
Interaction effect: 
AxB 852.0 852.0 I 5.92 .008 
Residual 19853.6 143.9 135 
*Confidence revision is the percentage change (relative difference) between initial confidence und final 
confidence or pnrticipunts expressed in relution to their judgments on the 9-point LikerHype accuracy 
scales. 
An interaction effect between groups/individuals and explanation mode on confidence 
revision is predicted in H9• Individual auditors, being less confidentt will react 
differently to explaining and counterexplaining compared to audit groups. Audit groups 
who explained will become more confident than individual auditors who explained, 
whereas audit groups who counterexplained will become less confident than individual 
auditors who counterexplained. The latter is because counterexplaining would result in 
groups processing more opposing arguments than counterexplaining by individual 
auditors. There is a marginally significant main effect of groups and individuals on 
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confidence revision (F = 2.07, p = .076) (panel B, Table 5.14 ). The interaction effect is 
significant (F = 5.92, p = .008) (panel B, Table 5.14). Figure 5.3 shows the interaction 
.t." 
effect. Planned comparisons indicate that when required to counterexplain, the mean 
confidence revision of audit groups is -5.83 (sd 14.87) and -3.82 (sd 10.70) for 
individual auditors, but the difference is not significant (t = .51, p = .305). When 
required to explain, the mean confidence revision of audit groups was 5.38 (sd 14.17) 
and ~2.46 (sd 8.05) (panel A, Table 5.11) for individual auditors and this difference is 
significant (t = 2.92, p = .002). Audit groups increased their confidence whereas 
individual auditors decreased their confidence when required to explain, and H9 is 
partially supported. 
Additional ANCOVA analyses show that audit experience did not have an effect on 
confidence revision (F = .34, p = .282) (Table 5.15). Effort expended similarly did not 
have a significant effect on confidence revision. However, task difficulty had a 
significant effect on confidence revision. Those who found the task more difficult made 
a larger negative revision to their confidence rating compared to those who found the 
task less difficult. The former were probably less certain of their judgment compared to 
the latter. The main effect for explanation mode and the interaction effect on confidence 
revision remains significant at the p < .01 and .05 levels respectively. 
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Figure 5.3 
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TableS.15 
The Effects of Explanation Mode, Groups/Individuals and Audit Experience on 
Confidence Revision* 
ANCOV A Analxses of Confidence Revision 
~ ~ !!! E B 
Covariate: 
Audit experience 48.02 48.02 1 .34 .282 
Effort expended · 43.68 43.68 1 .31 .291 
Task difficulty 420.30 420.30 1 2.93 .044 
Main effects: 
Groups/individual (A) 128.06 128.06 1 .89 .173 
Explanation mode (B) 1180.92 l 180.92 1 8.23 .002 
Interaction effect: 
AxB 927.33 927.33 1 6.47 .006 
Residual 19220.76 143.44 134 
*Confidence revision is the percentage change (relative difference) between initial confidence and final 
confidence of participants expressed in relation to thdr judgments on the 9-point Likcrt-t,pe accuracy 
scales. 
Interference 
H10 predicts that interference created by causal explanations would cause auditors to rate 
the task of counterexplaining as significantly more difficult than the task of explaining. 
The mean (sd) difficulty scores are 5.12 (l.81) (explanation) and 5.74 (1.88) 
(counterexplanation) (panel A, Table 5.16). ANOV A analyses show that the difference 
between the two difficulty scores is significant (F = 3. 91, p = .025) (panel B, Table 
5.16). The task of counterexplaining was perceived as significantly more difficult than 
the task of explaining, and H10 is supported. 
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Table 5.16 
The Effects of Explanation Mode and Groups/Individuals on Difficulty of 
Explaining/Counterexplaining 
Panel B - Mean (SD) Explanation Counter- Total 
Group 
Individuals 
5.15 
(l.89) 
n == 34 
S.62 
(1.27) 
n=37 
Total 5.12 
( 1.81) 
n=71 
Panel B - ANOV A Results for Difficulty Score 
Main effects: 
Groups/individuu.ls (A) 
Explanation mode (B) 
Interaction effect: 
AxB 
Residual 
~ MS 
18.51 
12.90 
.59 
445.91 
18.51 
12.90 
.59 
3.30 
exl!lanation 
5.55 5.00 
( 1.43) (1.94) 
n=30 n=64 
5.96 5.76 
(1.49) (1.73) 
n = 38 n=75 
5.74 5.42 
(1.88) (I.86) 
n=68 n= 139 
df E I! 
1 5.60 .019 
1 3.91 .025 
1 .18 .336 
135 
H11 indicates that auditors who explained will generate more e;xplanations than auditors 
who counterexplained. The explanation participants generated 4.86 explanations (sd 
2.64), while those who counterexplained generated fewer counterexplanations (mean 
4.00, sd 1.69) (panel A, Table 5.17). ANOV A analyses show the difference between 
these two scores to be significant (F = 5.65, p = .009) (panel B, Table 5.17), and there is 
support fcir H11, 
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Table 5.17 
The Effects of Explanation Mode and Groups/Individuals on the Number of 
Explanations and CounterexpJanations Generated 
Panel A · Mean (SD) Explanation Counter- Total 
exJ?lanation 
Groups 5.91 6.07 5.05 
( 1.29) (1.55) (2.35) 
n==34 n::30 n=64 
Individuals 5.85 5.79 3.95 
(1.29) (1.22) (2.98) 
n = 37 n = 38 n =75 
Total 4.86 4.00 4.44 
(2.64) ( 1.69) (2.26) 
n = 71 n = 68 n= 139 
Panel B · ANOVA Results for Number of Reasons 
ss' MS df E l! 
Main effects: 
Groups/individuals (A) 39.28 39.28 l 8.33 .002 
Explanation mode (B) 26.61 26.61 1 5.65 .009 
Interaction effect: 
AxB 5.89 5.89 1 1.25 .133 
Residual 650.37 4.71 135 
H12 and H13 compare the effects of groups and individuals on interference. H12 predicts 
that individuals will have higher difficulty scores than groups. The mean (sd) difficulty 
score for individuals was 5.76 (l.73), and the score for groups was 5.00 (1.94) (panel A, 
Table 5.16), and these two scores are significantly different (F = 5.60, p = .019) (panel 
B, Table 5.16), and H12 is supported. In H13, indiv.idual auditors are predicted to 
generate fewer explanations or counterexplanations than audit groups. Individual 
auditors generated an average of 3.95 (2.98) explanations or counterexplanations while 
audit groups generated an average of 5.05 (2.35) explanations or counterexplanations 
(panel A, Table 16). The difference between these two scores is significant (F = 8.33, p 
= .002), and there is support for H13. The results for H10, H11, H12 and H13 support 
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Hoch's (1984) proposition that causal explanation creates interference, and makes it 
more difficult for decision makers to consider alternative explanations. 
Additional analyses with audit experience, and effort expended as covariates are carried 
out with the difficulty score as the dependent variable. ANCOVA analyses show that 
these two variables had no significant effect on the difficulty score (panel A, Table 
5 .18 ). The main effects of explanation mode and groups/individuals remain significant 
at the p < .05. level (panel A, Table 5.18). 
Additional ANCOV A analyses (with audit experience, task difficulty und effort 
expended as covariates) with the number of explanations and counterexplanations as the 
dependent variables were carried out. Audit experience did not have a significant effect 
on the number of items generated (panel B, Table 5.18). Effort expended and task 
difficulty did. An increase in the number of items generated caused participants to rate 
the perception of effort expended higher. Task difficulty and the number of explanations 
and counterexplanations generated were positively related. When the number of items 
generated increased, the perception of task difficulty also increased. The main effects of 
groups/individuals and explanation mode on the number of items generated remain 
significant at the p < .05 level. 
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Table 5.18 . . . 
·. Difficulty of Explaining/Counterexplaining and Number of Explanations ~r-. 
. . . 
Counterexplanations Generated 
.. Panel A - ANCOVA Analyses for Difficulty Score 
ss ~ 
Covariate:· 
A,udit experience 
Et fort expended 
Main effects: 
Groups/individuals (A) 
Explanation mode (B), 
Interaction effect: 
AxB 
Residual 
.00 
4.98 
13.44 
· 1s.21 
.34 
431.99 
.00 
5.98 
13.44 
15.27 
.34 
3.32 
1 . 
L . 
I 
1 
l 
133 
F 
1:-
.· .... .I! 
.· .75 .489.· 
·. 
L45· .112 ·.· 
' .. 
4.05 ,,. .023''. 
4.60 .. 017 
.10 .325 · 
Panel B - ANCOV A Analfses for Number of ExQlanations or CounterexE;lanations .· 
ss MS df f .I! 
Covariate: · 
Audit experience · l.63 I:63 .· 1 .39 .276 
Effott exµended 23.74 23.74 1 5.65 .009 
Task difficulty 72.70· 72.70 1 17.29 .000 
Main effects: 
" '·· 
.. 011 -:~-:· Groups/individuals (A) 22.46 22.46 1 5.34 
Explanation mode (B) 17.95 17.95 1 · 4.27 · .. 020 .. 
Interaction effect: · 
AxB . 6.39 6.39 .. l L52 .no 
Residual 554.92 4.20 132 
CONCLUSIONS. 
This experiment exainines the effects of audit groups and counterexplanation on fraud,. 
. . detection rates. The purpose of such an examination is to determine whether audit fraud 
.!: . . = . . 
· detec~ion rates can be improved. An e;~eriment-that manipulut~d groups/individuals 
and . two explanation "'in.odes was C'1n'ied out Participa~ts were required to evaluate . 
• 1. . 1 i .. · : .. . 1_ I ~ . . 1 ·. · · . • · · · • . • - · • · 
.. inventory ca.se m~teriais ~hich contained mriteri~lmisstatements by rrianag(?m~nt. The 
.· judgment was made twicewith u(n) in·t~rvening explanation or counterexplanation . 
·• 
. The first,section· of the ~xpe;iment tests ·the ·relative performance 9f ;~dit grotips'c:-and .. 
'iri.dividLial auditors. This expe'rime~t hypothesises Jhat audit group judgments are more 
. . . r: ' .·. -
·i•,· 
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accurate than .individual auditor judgments. and that groups ru:e not onlym~re confident, 
·. ·. but they are also better calibrated, In sum, the analyses addressing accuracy found that 
. . . . . . . . . 
. · · ..• audit groups are significantly more accurate than individual auditors. Translated to fraud. 
· ·• .· .. • .·· detection, groups are more effective in detecting fraud than individuals. This result 
/; 
. . 
. .· . .. .. . . 
> contradicts prior auditing literature which found that audit groups do not outperform 
. . . . 
. . . . . 
: indivkiual auditors, e.g., Tmtman and Yetton (1985) and Trotman et al. (1983) and . 
. ·. supports Trotman (1985), Gfven the. confounding in Trotman (1985), . this result 
provides·bet'ter support for the superiority of audit groups over individual auditors in the 
. . . ·.. .·~···· . . .. 
. ·. de!ectfon of fraud. Wh\I~ i~teracti11g a~dit · groups are·· costly. to ass~mble, . the results·. 
sugge~t that, in some ua~~s. the benefits may· outweigh the costs. The benefits of .· 
• •• ., •,A ·.c·· •• ·. • • : • • :• -
·. requiring entry level Uudi_tors to work in groups are two-fold: first, theirjudgments are: . 
. . ' 
. . .. ,.. . 
madeJnore effective by the group process; and second, suctiaudit groups are relatively 
·10~ cost. The results,,also show that audit experience has a positive effect on the 
· . accuracy and confidence of the participants. 
if 
· ..• Audit gr~ups in this:-_experiment · are more conficlent than individual auditors. As. high.·· .. 
.. .. .)_."! . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . • • 
· · · confidence ·is·, only ·.desirable' whe~ · it is. accompanied by similarly··. high . accuracy, 
. . -·. . ·- . . . . . . .. .. . . . 
calibmtion is examined. The results provide evid~nce that audit groups" are marginally · 
. . . -i . . . . ., ~ . • . . . 
,r 
. better calib-rate<l · than inctivict~a1 auctitors:' Among audit grnups, high confidence . is • 
'' ~.itched With. high ?CCUracy, whereas. individual auditors ~re ·miscalibrateq. .. The' least ... 
. . .. .. . . I· . ~ , . 
accurnte.• are .·more · cdrifident while .. _the·· ri10re accurate are less confident.·· Confide~ce·· .. ··, 
.I' · .. !\. ·::,;(}" . . . .· . . 
... :.-1· 
detennines subsequent action {Nonnuri, 1975), so that a confident auditor.acts on his/her 
•. . . .. . .. .• :. . i·· . . .... · . . .. ·. : .. ·:· . . .... . :. ·.. .· ... 
:: , · j uctgrnent · arid a. les:(c6n ficient, auditor ctoes not. w11en confiden~e arictaccuracy rates are:.··· • · · · 
. ' . . . ..... . . ' . ' ·,.. .· ..... 
mismatched a~ was the case fofindividuul auditors, those wh~ decid~d the invent8ry · 
·. . ~ ·~ .• ... 
. ·bal~nce, was fairly stated v,,ould take subsequent actions· consistent with t.h~irihigh level.: . 
... . . .. ··' ... ,, . : .. .- (. . . . . . . . . . .··.· .. 
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,'' ofconfidencet when~as those who concluded that the inventory balance was'not fairly 
. . . . . ·. . . . . . . . 
. · .. · ;. stated; would continue to evaluate the data set because of their low co~fidence. Both · 
actions are undesirable, the former leads to ineffective, and very often, costlyjudgments 
' ' ' '' '' (!' ' ' ' ' 
while the latter is inefficient~ This study shows that the}alibration of auditors may be. 
. . . .· . 
improved through the use of atidit groups. 
. '. . . . . . . ', ... · .' . 
· ·.· Counterexplanation inakesopposing arguments more salient to the auditor,.·and ·should· · · 
result in higher belier revision than exp1a11ation. In th~ case· or a~ditors. the n~ect ta 
maintain cognitive 'consistency·is esseritiarbecause 'incon'sistency may be··interpreted •. by'' 
·. superiors as incompet.erice (Church; 1990); Ho.wever, if a counterexplanation is required 
. . as part of the formal eviden~e accumulation process, is documented and is known. to ,the 
superior; such a need to maintain cognitive consistency is diffused. These results show 
··• that counterexplanation results in higher belief revision compared to explanation. Used 
. . . . ( . . . 
. . . . : . . . . 
on audito_rs who make inaccurate judgments, counterexplanation might:C:ause auditors to 
. . . . 
· switch· from less accurate judgments to more accurate ories. The results show. this to be 
. . . . . . .. . ' . .•. .· .. . . 
the: case, auditors who counterexplained inaccuratejudgments were more accurate than 
· auditors . who ex.plained.· inaccurate judgments. Causal explanations are·.· generate-cl as a 
. ' . . . i . . 
. ·. . . . . . ,. . . 
·. · . by'."product of decision~nmking1 and therefore, requiring auditors to explain a judgment 
serves onlyto r.e~nforce what i~ already available in memory. This is evidenced by the 
. ·.. ,,,·r' . . ' 
higher confide~ce at auditors ~ho were required toexplain. Counterexplanation forces 
· auditors to consider opposing argume~ts that may have been overlooked iri the initial 
. . . . . . .. - . . , . . . 1\ . 
judgment pro?.ess, · hence· those auditors ~ho: countt:rexplained recorded ·. lower 
' confidehce·than auditors who explained. ' 
. . .·, .. 
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Counterexplanation has been.found to be an effective technique in social psychology for •. 
correcting over-confidence (Koriat et al., 1980) as most participants observed in social 
.. . ,. .,, . 
. ·... . . 
·. psychology are over-confident. Prior auditing literature found auditors to be under-
confident (Mladenovic and Simnett, 1994: Tomassini et al., 1982). Counterexplanation 
.. is only desirable if it .does not reduce the confidence of auditors further, that is, the. 
-· . . . . . : . -: 
. uncertainty created by counterexplaining should not lead auditors to substitute their 
accuratejudgme0nt Jor a less accura~e one, This study found significant difference in 
.· accuracy between explaining and counterexplairl_iQg .accurate judgments. The former 
. . . . . s \ "\.., . ..-( ~ ' 
. . _. __ :·-·./'_t·. ',\, (J . 
;leads to significantly higher accuracy than the latter\vhereas the latter le_adfto lower 
accuracy. The negative effe~t of counterexplanationi~ higher for individual auditors. 
than· audit groups with the difference approaching significance .. care should be 
·.. . . . . . . . . . . 
. . exercised in requiring a counterexphination. While it is effective on those who make 
. inaccurate judgments, it is counter-productive on· those who make accurate judgments, 
" and in particular, individual auditors. At the time the counterexplanation is required, the . 
audit superior cannot teII···whether the audit ··subordinate's judgment is accurate· or 
inaccurate, so counterexpfanation should be sparingly prescribed.·. 
. . . 
. · Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Hoch, 1985; 'Koriat et al., 1980), counterexplanation, 
. . . 
• :: • • • I • • "• 
results in a decrease in confidence whereas ~xplrination leads to increased confidence. · 
.· . Audit group confidence is more affected by explanation/counterexplanation than 
indi;idual auditor c~nfidence, th~formetdecreascd confidence rriore than the latter 
when .asked .. to counterexplain (but this difference is nqt significant) and .in"creased 
. ·:· ·.· \· ". . . . . . . ,, . . .. , ·.. . . 
confiden~e significantly more tqan individual auditors wh~n asked ti:> ~xplain. Ho.c.h 
. .· . 
( 198 5) found that causal ·.explanations cause interference, making it "torn diffic.ul t for · .• 
.. partidpants to subs~qilently ~ounterexplain .. Similar res·Jfrs are repbrt~d in this'·~t~d; . 
. . ··.·. .· . : .·.·. . . . . . . . . .... 
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---- Participants who explained~ generated more explanations while participants who 
·• counterexplained generated fewer counterexplanations. Similarly, the task of explaining 
was significantly less difficult to perform than the task of counterexplaining. Audit 
-· groups, on the other hand~ could perform both tasks significa9tly more efficiently than 
. : . . . 
iridbtiduai auditors; they found the task of explaining/counterexplaining less difficult -
. . . . . . .· . . . 
-_- than individual auditors, andthey generated more explanations a11d cmmterexplanations --
. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . 
-than indiv~dual audite?,rs; This suggests that ··the negative -aspects otcounterexplanation •- -
-- -_ may be mitigmed by the group process. Additforial analyses show that auditex.perience 
. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . -· . 
- ( except irithe case of belief revision) does not have a significanteffect on the results. -
- LIMITATIONS 
_· . . .. · ·. . . . . . .- .... ·· . :· ·.. . . .· · .. _·. 
. . . . .· . . .· . . . . : .... · 
The limitations from Experiments One and Two apply to this experiment as welL Due -
. : -· . . . .. . . 
• -.:- • • • 1 ____ ;= . .. . . . _ . _ . _ j· · . ; : _. ··. _ · 
tou the large• numbers of participants that are requii-ed for· this exp:erimei1t, I _was 
-constrained to use aud~tors -who were relatively inexperienced. While the -results.~how 
that couriterexplanation is an effective judgment tool ori auditors, -it is -unclear whether 
. ·. . . ·- . . ..... ·. ··. . . . . . . . ·- . . _. . . . . ·_ 
. . . . . . . . . 
-- . the positive and negative aspects of comiJerexplanation could be -replicated- with more 
,.-
. . . . . 
··_r -experi~nced auq~tors: Finally, while the results of this experi~~nt show· that : midit -__ -
- gi'oups m;e -more -ac~urate -and , 1nore co~fiderit than individual auditors, it does • not ·- · 
. . . . . . -· . . . . . . 
explain the cause(s) of theseditiererices in performance. - ,)". 
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CHAPTER6 --_. 
--.. CONCLUSIONS 
--•--. This chapter p'rese·ntsarf o~erview of the stuciy anct. a g~nerar summary ofthe resear~h -
. findings. The specific conclusions: and: 9iscussions of !?e individual hypotheses are -
(.,. 
. . . 
detailed undet)heir respective chapters.· -· 
. " OVERVIEW_ 
. -,,, 
The objectives of this sti.tdy are to examine three methods of improving m.iditjudgment 
arid to investigate factors -that . may affec(their use on auditors ... Experiment One 
. . . . , . 
_ • examined :the ~ffect o'r irioculation and- audit exp~rience on the: framing of intemaf 
'.r , 
controls. Auditors were asked to assess ttie internalcontrols in the inventory area in a 
- between~subjects e~periment which manipulated i inoculation - as well as audit 
:. I! ... ." . ." : . -~-:---~., . ,-. :·· . . ··. '. . 
experience. ANOVA was adopted to an~lyse·:tt1e re~.ults. One htindred and thiity-:nine 
.. ,' J - - .. -
participants took part in the experiment. _ 
- -
-- Experiment Two examined the difforences .. between/ audit group judgme~ts and·. 
individual' auditor judgments and ~nalysed these differences based 'on groups' and 
individ~als/ self.:report.ed cue usage, cue seiection and cue weighting. Ai.iditors were -_ 
- asked to-assess ·whether'a hypothetical client was a going-concern. A between-subjects. 
. . . .. -· 
experiment that. manipulated audit groups arid individuahmditors was carried out. The 
. ":JI° . ''.i".'.: .· 
results were analysed using Hests. In all, the experimen_pnvolved 172 padicipaitts.: 
' ,The third experiment examined. audit gr~ups.: and individti~I auditors' effectiveness in 
. . . . . . . . ' ' 
fraud detection. iri additio~. the eff~ctiveness o(cbunterexplanation \Vas also exa~m~d. 
· .. ··. • ··- .· ..... ·. . .· :· . . ·r ·.· ':.··: . ._. -_1.,.... ··:·. . . : ·.,. ...·. .. .. ·. ·r-,- · .. 
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-- -- Auditors were asked to assess whether a client's inventory balance was fairly stated. 
· Two decision modes - audit groups and individual auditors, and two explanation modes 
- · ~xplanation and counterexplanation were manipulated. ANOV A, and t-tests were 
. . . . . 
---- ._ -- employed to analyse the results. Two hundred and seventy-one participants took pmt in 
the experiment. 
- _ -. This -study -hypothesises -that •-inoculation _would_-_- have -ah effect on 'framing and _-audit 
••• • • ; : ••• • • • • : •• _·_. •i_ •• • ·:·, • • .·_-,·. • • •••• ·.- • 
. experience .. rhe inoculation treatment is . expected ·,t';) . reduce . the. -effect~ . of .. framing; . 
• • ' • • .· • • ·, ' .. : • • •.. I • t .·. • • • .: • '. • • • •" •• • • • • •" •• "I ,· 
_ --_. _ Particip~11ts with different _l~vels of au~it e~perieQce :ate expected to react_ differently to -_- -
_ ·. _ . . _ . -· _. _ . __ . -·:· '--' __ - _ ·. .· . - . _- . _, - ·.. . -·:, . _ --_- _ ' __ . . . - _ '. (/'·'-"-~C;::·.:c.~c:c:.:;\ -. 
the inoculatiori treatment; An inverted~U~shaped relation between audit experienci\and 
. ·. .. . . . .. _- . .-- . . . . •.. - ,'_, . _- ,. . . _- -~> -_ . _- _-_.. • ',\ . 
-- resporisiven~ss to the inoculatkm treatment is expected: Those without audi~.experie11ce · 
_-_and those with 19 to 60. moriths audit experience are not expected to be affected· by the -
inoculation treatment, whereas those with one to 18 ~onths audit experie~ce arei The --
. . . . . . ,:. :·· . 
. . 
. results showed no framing effect,. and . consequently, no. interaction effect between 
. . . ' 
framing and 1rioculatfon was ob~~rved. Consistent with the hypbthesist auditors.,with •--
•• -OI~e to • 18 -I110llths audit ·e?(.perience - were _ the most responsive ·to -the;'_;in{j~~~~tion_ • -
·. . . . . . -·.· . . .. :.,.' . . . . . .. . . _.r,. . - _. . . . . 
:;;; treat~.ent The other two groups were no~ .• The order by which audito1·s wrote positi~.e - --
and negative arguments affected their evaluation ofth~ intenial controls; arid a primacy •. 
effect was observed. 
It ·is. hypothesised •. that audit group. judgments are ··more superior ··to .individual .. auditor 
judgments. ·oroup judgments are expected to be more conservative ·than individual 
1 judgments. In addition, consensus, accuracy and calibration are also tested. The results 
showed .that, not only were audit groups more accurate in their judgments, but the\group. 
process. was also able to suppress. outlier behaviour. among individual. auditors S() that 
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. consen.sus was higher among audit. groups than indi~idual auditors. Audit gmups were 
. als·o more confident than individual auditors. -As confidence alone should not be taken· 
. . . . . . ! .'·. 
·. as a measure of judgment quality. caub;ation was examined.· ~uctit groups were better 
.calibrated than individual auditors . 
. To account for audit groups' superior judgments. self-reported cue usage, cue selection 
· · and cue weighting are examined. The results showed that audit groups outperformed 
individual auditors because audit groups made use of a larger number of information 
cues than individual auditors. Audit groups selected more going-concern problem 
indicators as 'Yell as-mitigating factors compared to individual audHo~s. However, both 
~ ' . . 
groups and individuals were equally proficient at weighting the selected cues ... 
. . I , 
This study hypothesises that counterexplanation will lea1 to higher belief revision. To: 
test the effecti'~eness of counterexplariation, it is hypothesised that counterexplainirig 
inaccurate judgments win lead to higher accuracy and counterexplaining accurate 
· judg.ments will result in lower accuracy. The results showed that compared to 
explanation, ·counterexplanation led to higher. belief revision. More importaritly, ·they .. 
·. _· :: . . .·· . . . : .... 
· showed that counterexplaining inaccurate judgments led to higher accuracy arid 
• • • • I • • • 
·• · counterexplaining accurate judgments led to lower. accuracy .. · Support for {~e latter 
hypothesis showed that the use of counterexplanation may be counter-productive. 
Consistent with prior psychology studies (Hoch, 1985; Koriat - et al., 1980), 
counterexpla~ation decreased confidence whereas explanation increased confidence (the 
latter was observed m:nong audit groups only). Causal explanation caused interference 
making it· more difficult for individual auditors t9 subsequently counterexplain. 
·. - ' 
Individual auditors who counterexplained wrote less ·counterexplanations while 
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individual auditors :who· explah;1ed wrote more eX:planatfons; Audit groups perfoI'Illed •·. 
. .'· . ·.::·, . . .: . .. .. . -· ' 
both these task; with rel~tive ease. 
Mixect ·results are . reported . on . the interaction effect between audit experience anct 
.. . , - .. ! -· . ( - ~I . . . . 
responsiveness to inoculation. Experiment One reports that auditors with different levels 
•. of audit exper~ence did .not respond in.,the same way to inoculation. This experiment . 
. . . 
. . . . . 
· .. ·. which made use of an internal control evaluation task. reports that the relation between 
· inoculation and audit experience takes 6n an invert~d-U shaped function. In the second 
' . . . ' . . . . .·· .. · .· . . . . . !.\ . . . .. ··... . . . · .. ' . • ... ,./ . ·. . ' . 
experin1ent, a going-concern assessment task was used, and additional analyses show 
. . . . . 
ii . 
that audit experience does notleacl tosi1periorjudgments. Because theparticipantswere . 
. . . . . . . . . 
· .. novices; most of them wouid probably not have performed going-concern evaluations • 
. . . . . .· . . . .: . . 
before;·. and consequently. going-concern judgment quality did not improve with. a~dit 
. . . . . . 
· .. experience. In· more familiar. tasks such as the one. used. fo Experiment Three. (which •.. · 
involved the audit of inventory); accuracy and confidence. i~creased with audit 
. . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . 
experience. In the case· of explanation/counterexplanation, audit<. experience led to.··.·. 
improved accuracy and confidence. 
LIMITATIONS .. · .. ·· .... ·.· .. ·· ... · ... ·· •. ·····.· .... ·.·.·. 
There are limitations · to . the experiments reported here. First, the case materials 
. . 
. . . 
employed in these' experiments comprised relatively less information than what auditors 
. - . . . . 
.... · . normally work with~ However, it is unclear what effoct(s) more detailed case materials 
;"I 
would have on the judgment techniques e~~minedand what limitations the use 0~ 
. '.·. simplified cas~'materials would have onthe.extemal validity of the results ofthi~ study.· .•.... 
. , ... ' ·.· . . . ,:· ... ::: ·; ·. .·. . . . . •' . ' .'. . .. 
.;i''1 
.· .· ... Seco~d. in trying to secure. re~ponses that the partldpants could justify, all participctnts, · , 
. . :·.· ' :·.: . . ,." . . . :::. __ -' ' . . . : . ~ . ' . . . . . . . . . . . ·.. . ' '' '', .. - . . . ·, ·:' ' . : . . ' . . ·.=. . ' . . ... 
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· in this study were paid. This procedure did not, however, cqrrespond to the audit . 
· · envimnment where auditors would suffe~ penalties for not providing justifiable 
·. responses. Such penalties include financial losses (in promotion and pay rises as well as 
··. litigation costs) and loss of reputation. Third, due to the large numbers of participants 
that were· required for Experiments Two and Three, I was constrained to use auditors · · . 
. . .·. . .. ·. . . ·. . ·. ··.· . . : . . . . . . 
· .. :who were relatively inexperienced. It is unclear whether experience has an effect on the 
. . . . . . ·} ·.· . 
. · .··. resuhs.Finally, while the results.of.ExperimentThreeshow that audit groups are more···.·. 
· accurate and more confident than individual auditors; it does not explain the cause(s) of · 
. . . . . . . ,. . . ·. ·. ' . 
. . . ' . . . 
. . . 
these differences in performance. 
FUTURE RESEARCH. 
Future research with respect to this study may take two avenues. First, this study adds to 
the· limited pool· of judgment techniques. available .for. fhe use of auditors. Obviously,. · ... 
. . . . . .. 
there is a need to explore other ways and _ means of improving auditor judgme11ts 
. (Messier, 1995). 
·· Second, further examination of the techniques identified in this study is necessary. As 
.. this is the first study that examines inoculationin an auditing context, our knowledge of .. 
it -is very limited. Similarly, the counter-productive aspect of counterexplanation 
requires· further testing. An interesting extension to this study would be to examine -
. count~rexplanation in relation to .auditors' asymmetrical loss function'. Such an 
~xaminationmay provide insightintothe robustness of counterexplanation .. · .• 
I' 
....••. · .• Future Studies. could explain w_hy audit grnups outperform in,dividuaLauditors: ·various: . 
theorie~ have been suggested in prior Hterature,and these have.beerire~ie~edin c.hapter · 
'; .. ·. . . . .· . ·.. .· . . . . ;. . . .. . ... . . 
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--_ 2. Fo~ ex~~ple, information load theory is untested in an auditini~if:1;~~·:ent~ ·Further 
; . studies couid manipulate two information load ievels(high and low) between groups 
. and individuals. Because of the groups' ability to process more information (Chalos and -
· • Pickard, 1985). it is expected that they would outperform the individuals at the high 
-_ •• information· load level._ No difference in performance at the low information load level --- -
.' •• .". I • • 
is i!xpected. · . ..~ ·. .' ~ 1., , __ );.• 
. :; 
- In acoillplex task. groups shoi:ild outperform individuals for three reasons~ First;grq11ps 
-- could recall more information (Stasser. 1992), so that vit~l cues which are forgotten' or • 
-_ overlooked by a group member may be identified by other group members. -Seconcl, 
\ ~=--· 
indiyidual members have different abilities and pl:~cessing capabilities and-may process -
. . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . 
the various facets of the task differendy. This results in yarying types and amounts of · 
-information - being _ stored - in --memory. -·when they. -pool· -their different ---store of 
--__ information, the groups' performance is improved (Stasser, 1988; Stasser and 'Qt11s, 
-_ 1985}. Third,_ the process ·of anchoring and adjustment reduces the effectiven~ss of a ---
. . . . . I"' judgment. As described in chapter _ 4, ·groups work with a wider range of anchors --
. . . . . . . . . . . 
because individual members bring different anchors to the judgI11ent process (Sni~zek 
and Henry, 1992}; and the quality of the judgment is improved. An experiment that -
:,·. . .. '· ,· . . . .. . . . .... - . . . . . . '· . , . 
-__ mallipulates two levels cif task comple,dty (high . and fow) ~etween grm1ps and : · 
individuals sho~lci find that audit groups otitperforni individual auditors in the high. 
. . . . . . . . . .. ·, . . 
-_ complexit;lask. Both audit groups and. individuals should perform equally ;ell in, the 
low complexity task.q 
Best member theory states that groups outperfonn individuals by identifying their best 
member and using. that member's judggient as a proxy for the groups' judgment 
181 
.. · {Trotman, 1985). Iselin (1991} found that gro~p members did not attempt to .discover . 
.. ~ . . 
.· .. their .best · ffierriber, ·.and. consequently, . did not outperform the individuals.·, This 
·' . ' .·· . . :· . -· . . . . . . ·. _•;. 
observation could be du~to.the.miture·.oflselin's taskwhichcoinpris~d ten bankruptcy . 
· predictions. His e!(perimental design had particip~nts performed four predictions60 .. 
. .. .. .. . ," . . 
.,. iL::. (whkh were not used ii1the analyses) followed by six othei· predictioris61 • The groups' . 
I, 
. ~- . . . . . 
· inability to identify their best member may be due to a learning effect which caused the 
· performance •. difference between. the experts·.and.novices to diminish. ·When the nature 
. . . . 
of the task is changed to the type of task used in Experiment Three, this learning effect . 
. · is reduced. This allows the best .memb~r to outperform · the. rest ·of the group, and 
. : . . 
: . . . . . . -
consequently, audit groups would be more accurate than individual auditors.· 
. ___ .,,, . '• =. . . . . . 
· .. 
00 The first r~ur predictions were u~ed· to identify participants as n~vi~eandexperrs'. 
:. ~1 The exp.erimen1a1 procedures are described.in chapter 2. · · .. . 
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Appendix A 
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. . Auditors' Evaluation of Internal Controls in the lnvento~y Cycle ' 
'.: I, 
This questionnaire seeks your cooperation in an internal control eyaluation task. All 
information provided will be treated with strict confidence. · 
Your cooper~tion in completing this questionnaire is much appreciated. 
\ ·. . · . .-~ 
Ms Janne Chung 
Prof. Gary S. Monroe 
School of Accounting 
Faculty of Business -
Edith Cowan University 
Pearson St 
Churchlands 6018 
Tel: (64) 9 273 8733 
Fax: (64) 9 273 8121 
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. Dear Participant 
:1 
~. : : . -
; 
:_i 
/,,i 
,.--
,) .. 
I 
''· .. , 
,, 
~) . . 
, . 
.,L· 
.. ·. Thank you for agreeing to participate in our research study which should take about 10 
minutes. Your participation will contribute to our understanding of how auditors 
formulate judgments when evaluating interna1 controls. Before proceeding, please read ·· · 
· the following instructions carefully: · 
l. V{e are interes~ed in a number of issues concerning the evaluation of internal·· 
. controls. As pvrt of our study, we would like you to evaluate the internal control . 
· system in the inventory area. · 
·2. · It. is important you complete all the tasks in this questionnaire'. 
3. It should be emphasised that there are no right and wrong answers. Ai.I that you · 
are asked is to provide your best judgments. The case ts straightforward and 
involves no tricks. 
. . .. 
4. If you have any questions when answering this questionnaire, please raise your 
hand and the instructor will attend to you. Please do not ask questions aloud .. · 
Do not consult your colleagues because each person has a different 
questionnaire. 
It is important that you follow'the instructions. 
\\ 
i,I 
Yours ftlithfully, 
Janne Chung 
Gary S; Monroe . 
. -
School of Accounting -
.Edith Cowan University 
Task I begins on the next page.· 
,f 19,5 
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·Ta<. 
Par: f ~n auditor's task is to evaluate the risk of the internal control system in _the •. --
- .. \. ,,. . 
• mveritory area . 
. -_ ·· --- Please write dqwn in the .spaces prnvided below, the situations· you thirik::mayresultin a 
. high or low risk internal control system. Write down as many situations as you ·can 
think of. Phrases and short sentences .would be sufficient.·· · · · · · 
n --~----,.,_,,_ ~--
Situationsresulting in a high risk internal control system-in the inve-ntory area:. _-.. 
. · Situations resulting in a low risk internal control systeQl inthe inv:entory areit -•-
- . . . . ... = - ·~ . - . - . - .... 
. =.·: ;_; 
.:."": 
. : : . '.. :·:_·' \. /; •::. . . ·. '. . :.- -'·. .' ' - . . . : . : .. ·... . ' :I · .. ·· 
··.· · Please do nol turn over the page unlll you have completed Task I. Task II begins on the ne_xl_page. · 
... . . : . ' . . . ~ . . . . ... : . '. - . . . 
· Task II 
Western Australia Sporting Goods Ltd 
You are in charge of the audit of Western Australia, Sporting Goods Ltd (W ASG) for the· 
·yearending June 30, 19A2. Your firm has been the auditor for the past 12 years and has 
issued unqualified' audit opinions for the last five years. All adjusting entries found as a 
?""~ult of audits in the past' have been adjusted by the client Currently you are engaged 
•'I .: . 
. ·. in ~µe final evaluation of the client's internal control system over inventory in order to 
_;:; -~ . 
·• 'finalise the audit plan for that area. 
Please read through the infonnation below describing' the internal control system. At 
the end of the eYaluation of the internal control system, you will be asked to make 
a:· a.ecision on the' internal controls for that area. (To keep the case brief, not all the 
information you might like to have for your evaluation has been included. To the extent 
that the infonnation is not presented, you should assume that the situation is "normal" in 
that this audit does not involve any unusual or significant undisclosed drcumstances.) 
General History and Background 
WASG is a distributor ofsporting goods of all descriptions, from fishing tackle, to 
hockey gear, to exercise and home gym equipment. The company was founded in Perth 
13 years ago. The company stocks a wide range of products and has a large customer 
base of wholesale and retail stores. The company purchases its products directly from 
various manufacturers. The products are distributed to wholesalers and retailers in Perth 
and Western Australia. 
The company has experienced reasonable growth in the past few years. However, 
· · · ·.·WA.SO has been affected by the current economic downturn. Many of their customers 
. . . . . . 
are experiencing reduced sales and profits and the industry as a whole is going through. 
some tough· times, with numerous business failures. The financial condition of W ASG 
has declined in the first three quarters of I9A2 - sales, profits and earnings per share 
have not met management's expectations. Nor is this situation expected to improve 
'throughout the remainder of 19A2. Management expects total revenues and net income 
. to continue to decline for the remajnder of I9A2. · 
continue next page 
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··.·.The Inventory System in Brief 
In order to assess the client's internal control system, you have collected the following 
· . information by observation, interviewing appropriate personnel, perfonning preliminary 
tests, and other relevant procedures. (For identified controls you may assume that they . · 
· · operated effectively throughout the year. If a control procedures is not mentioned you 
are to assume that it does not exist.) 
. '~ 
W ASG. has recently computerised its inventory system and now maintains perpetual 
. inventory records. Prior to ;the current year the company relied on a periodic inventory 
. .. 
system. WASG has s~veral smaller satellite warehouses. Although all receipts of 
. . . . . 
.. : . . ·.,· . . 
merchandise and shipments to customers are made through the main warehouse. the 
satellite warehouses someti'rnes act as a buffer to absorb extra inventory when increased 
ctemanct. for a particutar item is andcipated. Each satellite warehouse has its own 
. . . . 
· procedures based on those in place at the main WASG warehouse. 
A brief description of each area involved with receipt, wareh9using and shipment of 
merchandise is as follows: 
L Receiving dock - Goc;,.ds are received directly from the suppliers' factories in 
bulk. Other items such as office supplies, repair parts and small fixed assets are 
also received at the receiving dock. 
2. Warehouse - Inventory is held here for repacbging and shipment on customer 
order. 
3. Repackaging area - On customer order, personnel in this area package the 
. shipment according to customer specifications. Sometimes items can be simply 
re-labelled and shipped as received from the factory, other orders may require 
more complex packaging such as changing containers in addition to re-labelling. 
4. Shipping dock - All materials leaving the plant facility cross this dock, and a 
. . . .· . . .. 
shipping report is prepared. Inventory shipments comprise nearly all of total 
shipments. 
~, •'· 
,:.'. 
. continue next page 
·-,-.-~.i 
.. I 
,:-,· 198 I 
' ... =. ~.,'; 
~. '. .. } . 
· -Additional Information 
_ Receipts ofinventory are counted, inspected for damages, completeness, etc. cm.! 
.·. . . . . (j . 
. . .. 
a test basis and a receiving report (not prenumbered) is prepared for all materials. 
crossing the receiving dock. 
- The perpetual inventory records (in units and in $) are maintained by a person 
independent of the inventClry stores custodian. 
. . 
The physical premises of the warehouse are in a wing of the building sepairite 
from the other functions such as administration, but there are no eff.::~tive access 
restrictions to this wing. 
. . ' 
After· inspection, the received items are stored in the warehouse according to · 
general type· i.e., fishing gear, football-related, hockey-related, etc. 
A physical inventory count is done only in conjunction with the preparation of_ 
the financial report at -year-end. The perpetual inventory_ records are not 
reconciled to the physical inventory on hand throughout the year. 
There is no regular review CJf slow-moving or pot~ntially obsolete merchandise. _-_ 
. ·. . . . -_ .... ' -_ . . · .. · . . . . ·. . . . . •- . .· 
. .- . ·.. . . - ·-. .. . 
-_ · · (?rders are prepared for shipment to customers from a copy of the original .sales ·_ · 
· order/invoice (WASG uses multicopy sales invoices) which becomes the bill of 
_ lading (shipping docket). 
Please turn over the page for the questloru relating to,:Task II, --
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·.. Task II (cont) 
· Your task is to evaluate the risk of WASG's internal control system based on the 
· information from the previous three pages. (You may want to view the . · 
information again.) . Please complete the following by circling a number where .. 
appropriate: · 
' ' 
Your evaluation of the risk of the internal control system is: . ·. 
. . . : . ·. . ... .·· •. . 
L 
Low 
2 3 .. 4 '6 ''. ···· ... 7 .. 
High 
Your confidence in having made an accurate evaluation is: (Put a cross (X] on the line 
b~low as appropriate). 
· 1---------J---------1-· -------!----. ----1---. ---- ·1---------1---------1- ·-------!- .-----. -!----- .---1 
0 10 20 30 40 50 . . 60 70 80 90 100 
. Not confident 
at all 
:·,:. -_··, \i .. ,> -::,. 
·.''.• 
,.:.:_~~-:' 1 ~};/, ,' .:':,·· ... _;\,;.;,1:::,,'~~;.~~~-,:;.<.?,:~;:~ ·,..:.,·\ -;',"... .·._:_ --·:··. 
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!' 
Completely 
confident . 
. \,:' ·. : Thennul task Is on th~.nut page;: 
. " 
', ·''. !,:· ... 
. ·Task III 
Your background:· Please tick(,/) the appropriate spaces provided below ~r circle 
. an appropriate number where applicable. · · 
1. Your gender? 
( ) Male ( _) Female 
2. Yburage? yrs 
.. ', . 
. . . 
. . . 
3. Is English your ffrst or native language? . 
. C ) · Yes ( ) No · 
. . . . -. . . 
· 4. • What is the highest level of formal education you have completecl? 
( ) SomeTAFE units 
( · ) · Completed TAFE course 
- .. ( ) Some university units . 
( · ) Graduated from university 
· 5 .. · ·· How many years of working experience do you have?· 
. .-:::._ yrs and __ ._ months 
6. · How many years of audit working experience do you have 
_ yrs and_. __ . mths 
7. . How diffi~ult did you find the tasks given to you previously in this 
questionnaire? . . . 
1 . 2 · · 3 .· 4' 5 , 6 7 8 9 
Not at all 
difticuit . · • 
Somewhat·. 
· · difficult 
Extremely 
difficult .· 
8. How mucheffort do you think an actual internalcontroleval~ation task will 
require?· · · · · · · · · · · 
l· 2· 3 .. ·. 4_· 5 6 7 8 9 
. Very little .. 
t?ffort · 
-~{-' 
1i 
Somee!Ton . ·.· A grent deal 
..of effort .. 
. · .. < 9. HQWffiUFh effort did you expend on the tasks in this questionnaire?' .. 
::• 
. '.• ·. 
i · ·. 2 " 3 4 5 . 6 .· 7. . 8 9 . 
•. ,,Very little Some effort. . ·. A grent cfeti.1 . 
effort · · · · . of effort - · 
· ... : . . .. ·: : . . . . . . . . . :· . 
. . ·. Thank you for your cooperation in .this study •. · ..
lNCRaJ. 
· .. ; ·:.-.. .-I 
(' 
Appendix:B 
. December 1996 · 
. Dear Pmfessional Colleague 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research project which ,should take about 20 · 
minutes to complete. We are interested in a number of issues concerning a company's 
ability to continue as a going-concern. Your participation will help us develop ways for . · 
· improving going-concern audits. · 
Below is a list of instructions you should read before proceeding: 
I. You will be required to audit the going-concern status of a company. 
2. The Ut,k you are required to perform will be divided into two parts. In the first 
pitrt of the experiment you will be given the background infonnation and the 
audit findings of your audit team. You should familiarise yourself with this . 
information. In the second part of the experiment you will be asked some 
questions about yourself. Please complete both parts ofthe experiment. 
3. If you have any questions, please raise your hand und you will be attended to .. 
. individually. 
4. Please complete the attached receipt Strict confidentiality will be maintained, 
but details are required to assist in paying you. Your identity will be kept 
confidential at all times . 
. 5. It is important that you adhere strictly to the instructions. 
Thank you .for your cooperation in this research project. 
Yours sincerely 
Janne Chung (Lecturer) 
··· Oary S. Monroe (Professor). 
School of Accounting 
Edith Cowan University 
'. -· ···-· ___ :::.· .. ·.·. 
·. _-..... 
grpl 
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Part! . 
. · . 
. . 
You have been assigned to an audit group for the purpose of auditing. the going-concern -_ -· 
status of a company. Since this study is concerned with group judgments. it is essential __ 
that you discuss and work on the case as a group. 
Assume you are 3:n audit sei:iior assigned to the t1udit of the f~llo~ing company: ABC 
Pty Ltd which is incorporated in 1967~ operates mainly in theMelbourne metropolitan 
area. The main 11ctivity of the company is the manufacture and sale of roller shutt~rs. 
Even though it ~s an exempt proprietµ.ry company, ABC has elected to be audited 
because management feels that the company w~uld benefit from an independent audit. 
The following are eight information items that your audit team has noted during the 
1996 financial report audit: 
"")_i 
l. · Legal proceedings have been started against the company that may result in :; 
financial judgment that could not be met. 
2. The company may have idle assets which it ca11 sell for cash. _ 
3. The fire department may make roller shutter doors and windows illegal m 
residential properties because of the risk they pose in the event of a fire. 
. . 
. . J: . · ... 
--_- _ 4. Management may take steps to reduce overhead and administrative expenses 
5. - A fire destroyed the warehouse qrn.t may be uninsured. 
6. ' ;, Associates of the company may take up a new issue of the company's shares ... 
7. Sqrne !Jf the comp~ny's fixed-term borrowings are approaching maturity and the 
_ company may not hDve realistic prospects of remtwal or repayment. · 
8. Current shareholders may agree to contribute additional capii'al. 
Please turn over the page for questioru; J'!latlng to ABC Ply Ltd. 
" 
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·· .. You ·should discuss and work on the case as a group fo·arrive at a ccmsens~s-oriJhe ·· . 
• foiiowing questions: . . . . . . . ,. . . ,, . . . 0 . 
. . 
Based on your group's evaluation· of the information presented on page 2, 'please 
·' ... indicate how likely it is that ABC is or is not a going concern: · 
l 
Agoing- _ 
concern 
2 
. ' .'J. 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not a going- ._, 
concern 
Indicate your group's confidence that the above answer is correct by placing a cross 
(X) on the line below. -- · · -
I·----- .--1··-. ---··1·-----·--1- .. -- -~ -·l·-. ---- . 1------ .. --1---· ···--1- ·-------1------ ---1------ ---1-
0 10 20 30 . 40 50 60 70 ' · 80 90 . . 
100 
Not confident 
at all 
· Completely 
confident · 
,_,'.) 
: : : < .-· > > " .·_ .- •.... · ._· ,' . . .. · ...••......•.. '' 
When yoil haveomweml these questlo~ please fosert Ibis part (I~ pages 1 to 3) Into tbe envelope 
·· provided and proceed to Part II, -,<;~. 
,', .- ;- ._:·~ ··-~. ': .'' -~--... 
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Please ensure that Part I (te., pages 1 to 3) is inserted into the envelope 
·.) 
provided before proceeding to the next task. 
··-;; 
'ii 
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,, 
;1r·--
_.)~/ 
!!, 
I 
I .·-, 
. . 
·p-· 
~}-' 
·Partil 
·- \(· 
I}-, . 
---,Based on your group's evaluation pf.the infonnation presented in the ~mun experimental 
. . : . 
part of this research project, please. list below the information. items that your group . 
. . 
· -considered to be relevant to the audit of ABC Pty Ltd's going-concern status: 
·_ r~- . 
. ·I 
~·j'· ·. 
,·. . . ' .· . . .· . 
., 
_,,, 
·n Please t~rn over the. page when you have completed this ta~k. 
,, . 
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. . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . _.. . .. : ·. · .. 
. I',, ." . . ' . 
On the previous page, you have just listed those information items that .were relevant to 
. . . 
- your ~ro~p's audit of ABC Pty Ltd's going-concern status. Ple~e rate how relevant 
!! 
each of these items was to your group's assessment of the goint·concem status of ABC _ 
· Pty Ltd. Please turn back to the previous page, and using the scale shown below, place 
the rating of each item in the left hand margin next to the item being rated. 
~ J 
l 
Slightly 
-relevant 
2 3 4 
· -Moderately 
relevant 
5 6 7 
Highly _ 
relevant,'; 
r 
1_'. 
,--;-:. 
.~-_. 
', .t 
. u· 
.,-
. . : ·. . . 
. . . . . ·. . . . ·.. . . . . 
: . . 
... ·. . . . . . . . ·. . . ,.· . 
. · . . . . . .·· · .... · .·.. . ' . 
. Please turn over the.page whenyou ~~e ~ady. -
·','·/ :_ tJ.' 
·,D::,_'-~:::i:,:};::::~:.!~~~:Lii~:\I:;~;~::;~§'.;::.~~w{:,:.:::___ ... , ... _.. _ ; .· -.... : -, ... _, .;.·. -
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·This section asks you questions about yourself and should be completed individually. 
Please do not discuss these questions with other members of your group. Please tick(~) · 
the appropriate spaces provided below or circle an appropriate number; 
.1. Your gender? ( ) . Male ( ) Female 
· i · · Your age? ( ) yrs 
" 
3. ·. 15:;EngHsh your first or native language? ( ) Yes 
. . . . . . ~ . 
. c· ) No 
4. I have __ · years and _i_:_ ~onths·working experience of which_ years 
5 .. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
and months are in'auditing. 
What is your position in your firm? 
( ) Audit Junior ( ) Audit Senior :;( . ·) Supervisor 
ii,_.I I 
. How difficult did you find the. tasks given to· you previously m the main 
· experimental part of this research project? 
I 2 3 4 5 
Not ut ull 
difficult ,, 
Somewhat· 
difficult 
6 7 8 9" • 1i i• 
. E~trcmely 
di°fficult 
-: ;· . 
How much effort do you think an actual audit of a company's going-concern 
status will require? 
l 2 3· 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Very little 
. effort ·· 
Some 
effort 
A great deal 
of effort · 
;,•, 
How much effort did yoi(expend on the main experimental part of this research 
· project? · · 
t.. 2 '3 4 5. 6 ; 7 8 ' 9 {(' ·. 
Very little 
effort 
r; 
Some 
. effort 
. Strongly 
dlsligr~e 
• . A great deal 
of effort 
Strongly 
agree 
I am satisfied with my group's judgments. I 2 3 4 5,:- 6 7 
10. How would you rate the amount of interaction in your gro~p's audit process? 
', · 1 2 1 4 5 6 7 ~-· . 9 
. .-: :_ 
':·· -'i 
' ; ·~i .... ·.\,:. • 
No interaction· 
at all 
Moderate nmourit 
of interaction 
A lot of 
. interac~ion 
jt . . . 
Please insert all the experimental materials into the envelope provideil: Thank you for your 
cooperation in this study .. 
. : . : : ; . . ;".;, '~ 
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AppendixC 
Dear Professic:>nal Colleague 
,, 
\, 
December 1996 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research project which should take about 30 · 
minutes to complete. The purpose of this research is to study judgments auditors make 
during the audit of the inventory balance. Your participation· wi1l help us develop ways 
for improving audit judgments. · · 
Below is a list of instructions you should read before proceeding: 
1. . You will be required to perfonn the audit of the inventory balance of a real but 
'disguised company in the experiment. 
2. The 'task you are required to perfonn will be divided into two parts. Please 
complete both parts of the experiment. In the first part of the experiment you . 
will be given the background infonnation and the working papers for the audit of · 
the inventory balance. You should familiarise yourself with this information. 
3. If you have any questions. please raise your hand and you will be attended fo 
individually. " 
4. Please complete the attached receipt and present it to the instructor for payment 
at t~e end of the experiment. Strict confidentiality will be maintained, but 
details are required to assist in pnying you. Your identity wi1l be kept 
confidential at all times. 
5. It is important that you adhere strictly to the instructions. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this research project. 
' ' 
Yours since.rely 
. Janrie Chung (Lecturer) 
Gary Monroe (Professor) 
Sc~ool of Accounting 
·. Edith Cowan University. 
:·1 . 
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Part I · 
Instructions 
In this part of the experiment, you have been assigned to groups. Since this 
·._study is concerned with group judgments, it is essential: that you discuss and 
. w<{:::'.,on the case together. · . ': · ·. ·. •' 
Before -you commence discussion as a group, you should familiarise yollrself .· 
· with the.case materials. It should take you about 15 minutes. 
2 .. · " 1The case materials, which begin on the next page, contain general background . 
· information about the client as well as a list of audit evidence. 
. . . .· . 
3. If you:have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and the 
instructor will attend to. you. Please do not ask questions aloud during the 
experiment · 
n 
.. ·-~ . . .. 
· ... ' ·:· '' .. __ · .· .· ',. . ·_ . ' .... ' . ' .. 
'< ~lease turn o~er the page when you are ~ady. ' 
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The Client: Tucker House Ltd 
Tucker House Ltd operates a chain of fast food restaurants. The company began in 
1991 and by the end of 1996 had grown to 41 units. located primarily in the eastern 
states. Tucker House uses a financial accounting year end of 31 October. 
Restaurants 
The atmosphere of the restaurants is similar to most fast food restaurants. attractive, 
bright and clean. All of the restaurants open 7 days a week for lunch an~ dinner. The 
busier restaurants open for breakfast as well. The menu is more up-market than most 
hamburger outlets serving steak sandwiches, beef burgers, selected chicken items, and 
the usual drinks and desserts. 
Operational control has been maintained through a computerised information system. 
Each restaurant is equipped with specially designed computerised cash registers that 
have the menu items incorporated on them. This system is used to compute on a daily, 
weekly and monthly basis, separately for eac.h of the restaurant units. profit and loss, 
sales and cost breakdown by product, labour productivity, payroll and variations from 
budget. 
The Purchasing and Warehousing Division 
The company operates its own purchasing and warehousing division (PWD) from which 
all the restaurants are supplied with portion-controlled units of meat, poultry and other 
food items, as well as paper and other supplies. 
The PWD includes meat cutting rooms, refrigeration and freezer storage space. The 
PWD processes much of the meat required by the restaurants and makes all the sauces 
and dressings. The company purchases other items in large quantities in anticipation of 
seasonal price fluctuations. 
The effort to control meat cost is the most important urea of cost control at Tucker 
House. Meat represents 80% of food costs, or almost 33% of sales, and management 
feels that one of the keys to Tucker House's success is the PWD which makes it possible 
for Tucker House to cope with changes in the prices of meat. 
The Account: Inventory at financial year end 31.10.96 
Type of Inventory 
Meat 
· Other (non-meat) food/beverages 
Total food/beverages 
Supplies 
Others 
Total: All inventory 
Instructions 
i 
2,615,546 
335,620 
2,951,166 
266,942 
269.286 
3,487.394 
Percentage of Total 
75.0% 
10.0% 
85.0% 
7.5% 
7.5% 
100.0% 
In order for you to perform an audit of Tucker House's inventory balance. the following 
information items are available. You should only evaluate those information items you 
consider are necessary for fanning an opinion on whether or not the inventory balance is 
fairly stated. 
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE 
Information about Tucker House Directors, Management and Employees ................. pg 4 
L · - Key management personnel 
2. Members of the Board of Directors 
3. Board structure and number of meetings 
4. Board members comments regarding managing director and financial di_rector 
Other Information about Tucker House .......................................... u ....... H ................................... pg 6 
5. Menu prices for main meals, 1994-96; average bill per customer 
6. Main meal sales by type (percentages) 
7. Number of restaurant units in operution, 1994-96 
8. Expansion costs and plans 
9. History of share offerings and debt financing 
l 0. Management forecast of 1996 sales/earnings 
Inventory and lnventory .. related Financial Report Data/Ratios .................................... pg 8 
11. Weighted average annual sales per restaurant unit, 1994-96 
12. Cost of Sales as a percentage of Sales, 1994-96 
13. Cost of Sales percentage breakdown (food/beverages vs. labour), 1994~96 
14. Total purchases of food and beverages, 1994-96 
15. Total inventories ($), 1994-96 
16. Inventory turnover and number of days sales in ending inventory, 1994-96 
17. Inventory location (Restaurants vs PWD), 1995-96 
18. Percentage breakdown of inventory by type, 1994-96 
19. Percentage breakdown of meat inventory by type, 1996 
20. Purchase commitments ($) for meat at financial year end, 1994-96 
Other Financial Report Information .................... 111 .............. ,. ........... ,. ............................................ pg 11 
21. Current assets, by type, as a percentage of total assets, 1994-96 
22. Current liabilities, by type, as a percentage of total liabilities and shareholders 
equity,' 1994-96 
23. Gross sales, 1994-96 
24. Net income as a percentage of Sales, 1994-96 
Financial Ratios (Other than inventoryMrelated) ........................................................... pg 12 
25. Current ratio and Quick ratio, 1994-96 
26. Receivables turnover & Number of days sales in ending accounts receivables, 
1994-96 
27. Earnings per share, 1994-96 
28. Price-Earnings ratio, 1994-96 
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--Results of 1996 Audit Procedures .................. u ... , .............. H ......................... ~ ........ .,. •• ~ .... ~ •• '.'.··"'~-..... pg l;J _ 
29. Results of physical inventory observation at restaurants 
30. ~ow restaurant test units for inventory observation were chosen 
31. Results of analytical comparisons/reviews for unobserved restaurants 
32. Results of physical inventory observation at PWD 
33. Results of inventory pricing tests 
34. Results of inventory cutoff tests 
35. Audit procedures performed related to purchase commitments 
36. 1996 Management Letter comments re internal control weaknesses ·. 
37. Evaluation of effectiveness of Internal Audit function 
38 '' 1996 Solicitor's Letter ' 
Inventory Policies/Background and Selected Client Records ....................... ; .............. pg 18 
· 39. PWD history (size, expansions) - 1992-96 
40. Beef processing and purchasing policies 
41. Accounting records/internal controls for PWD inventory 
42. Sources (vendors) for food, beverage and supply purchases 
43. Client records: Receiving Log, Week 52, FY 96 
44. Client records: Receiving Log, Week 1, FY 97 
45. Client records: Weekly Inventory Summary, Week 51, FY 96 
46. Client records: Weekly Inventory Summary, Week 52, FY 96 
.;47. Client records: Physical Inventory Counts, 3 largest items, FY 95 
48. Client records: Weekly Inventory Summary, Week l, FY 97 
(' 
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INFORMATION ABOUT TUCKER HOUSE DIRECTORS, MANAGEMENT 
.AND EMPLOYEES 
1. Key Management Personnel 
Jeffrey Hunerg - Founder, Managing Director, Chairman of the Board. Mr. Hunerg, an 
solicitor, directly owns 13.6% of the outstanding shares of Tucker House plus another 
4.3% held in trust for his minor children and may be deemed to have controlling interest 
in the company._ 
Robert Dike - Deputy Managing Director, Financial Director since 1992, Treasurer, 
Member of the Board. Mr Dike, a CA, worked as an auditor for a Melbourne.· public 
accounting film for 4 years prior to joining Tucker House in 1991. 
- -
Albert Nash ~ accountant since 1995, responsible for preparation of financial ~eports, 
_reports to Dike. 
Donalri Chioni - Internal Auditor since 1994, previously -Asst. -Manager and then 
Manager of a .restaurant unit for 2 years. 
David White - Manager of Purchasing & Production since 1994, formerly Manager of -
PWD since 1992. 
Mel Hellman - Manager of PWD since- 1994, formerly Manager of the construction 
subsidiary for one year. 
No member of management other than Hunei'g owns over 2 % of the outstanding Tucker 
House shares. , 
2. Members of the Board of Directors 
~ 
Jeffrey Hunerg 
Robert Dike 
Chip Hellman 
Non~executive Directors 
R. J. Cramden 
John Burns 
Edmund Lieberman 
Richard Chatte 
Kevin Jones 
* These directors as a group own 4.6% of shares. 
%- of 0/S Shares Held 
13.6% directly, 4.3% through children 
* 
* 
.4.6% 
* 
* 
All directors but Hellman were early investors and have served contiriu_ously since the 
- -_ -_ · firm began. Hellman is newly appointed. -
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3. Board Structure and Number of Meetings, 1994-96 
Board meetings are called by Hunerg and are generally held when a specific matter 
requires Board action. Meetings tend to be fairly brief, usually 1 ~2 hours, and 
disagreements are rare. The number of meetings held per year is: 
1995 
6 
1996 
4 
There are only 2 subcommittees to the Board. The Executive Committee (Hunerg, Dike 
and Cramden) forms "the brain trust" for day-to-day operating decisions. The Audit 
Committee meets with the auditors semi~annually, but other than this does not meet 
during the year. In addition, committee members receive quarterly earnings information 
for their review. 
4, Board Member Comments Regarding Managing Director and Financial 
Director 
In a meeting of the audit committee with the auditors, the directors commented that 
Hunerg is "a brilliant promoter who runs Tucker House with an iron fist" and said that 
they are "impressed by both the results produced by Hunerg and by his apparently 
modest salary demands". 
The Board feel that Dike has been instrumental in improving the company's accounting 
and financial operations and they appreciate the manner in which he has been able to 
"get along with Hunerg and accept being second in command". The first company 
financial director resigned in July 91 over constant disagreements with Hunerg, 
primarily over Hunerg's early policy of deliberately paying creditors' invoices late and 
"bickering with suppliers' over invoiced amounts in an effort to maximise Tucker 
House's cash position. The escalating disagreements between Rossmoor and Hunerg 
culminated in a demand by Hunerg that Rossmoor either let Hunerg run Tucker House . 
as he wish or leave. Rossmoor stayed only long enough to help break in Dike and has 
been inactive in the company ever since. 
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OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT TUCKER HOUSE 
S. Menu Prices (Main meals), 1994·96: Average Sale Per Customer 
.Financial Year '1'rice range: dinner main 
meals 
·1994 
1995 
$·3.45Ts°.95 
$3.50-$5.95 
· ·Average bill per customer: 
6. 
1996: $6.88-$7.00 
1995: $6.25 
Main meal Sales by Type (Percentagev 
Main meal 
Steak sandwich 
Supreme steak sandwich 
Deluxe burger 
Doner kebabs: beef 
cheese 
chicken 
Tacos: beef 
· chicken 
Tucker House Combination Platter · 
Total 
Price range: lunch main 
~ 
$1.95-$3.95 
$1.95-$4.65 
Percentage of number of meals sold 
6% 
21% 
15% 
4% 
6% 
3% 
18% 
8% 
. 19% 
7. Number of Restaurants in Operation, 1994-96 
Number of restaurants 
open at FYE 
Percentagie increase over 
previous year 
Weighted average number 
of units open for year 
Percentage increase over 
previous year 
, 28 34 41 
87% 21% 21 % 
20.42 32.25 · .... 35A2 · 
133% 58% 18% 
Only 1 unit has ever been closed. It opened in 1994 and closed in 1996 when revenues 
failed to meet expectations. 
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8. Expansion Costs and Plans 
All units are in leased premises. 15 new locations are planned for FY 97, including the 
company's first locations outside of the east. Each new location will cost between 
$200-350,000 to investigate, develop and equip. 
9. History of Share Offerings and Debt Financing 
· During 1990, Jeffrey Hunerg and R. J. Cramden, two of the three founders of the firm, 
raised privately about $200,000 to finance the opening of the initial unit. During 1991, 
an :1dditional $300,0GO was obtained by the sale of the 100,000 shares of ordinary 
shares. 
In 1992, to finance rhr; opening of the PWD, several small bank loans ($50-100,000) 
. were obtained during this period with Hunerg und his wife and Dike and his wife acting 
as guarantors. 
To finance further expansion, the company made a public offering of 220,000 ordinary 
shares at $12.50/share in June 1993. Expansions since that date have been financed by 
the proceeds of the public offering and an additional $4,000,000 borrowed in 1995 and 
l996 under a revolving credit agreement at an interest rate of 1 % over the lending 
bank's large business prime. 
The shares, after a 3:2 split in March l 996, closed at 8.80 asked, 6.60 bid on the stock 
exchange at 1/ 11/96, a trading range which has been fairly stable since the split. The 
company intends to offer for sale 450,000 shares not later than 120 days after FYE 
31/ 10/96. The proceeds will be used to repay the borrowings, finance openings of 
additional restaurants and for working capital. The company still expects to use the 
revolving credit agreement from time to time to finance expansion. 
10. Management Forecasts Made of 1996 Sales/Earnings 
In April 1996, Hunerg and Dike appeared before the Australian Association of Financial 
Planners and predicted 20-25% gain in sales and a 40% increase in profit for FY 96 
over FY 95. 
In an April 10th press release, Tucker House disclosed an EPS prediction of $ l .86 for 
FY96. 
These were the first pub1icly announced forecasts the company had ever made. 
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INVENTORY AND INVENTORY-RELATED FINANCIAL REPORT 
DAT A/RATIOS 
11. Weighted AYerage Annual Sales Per Restaurant, 1994-1996 
!£!!!: Weighted average annual sales per restaurant 
1994 $813,257 5.9% increase 
1995 $805,299 1.0% decrease 
1996 $856,592 6.3% increase 
The decrease from 1994 and 1995 was significantly affected by a May-July 1995 
promotion offering $2 off any main meal (which meant most meals were sold at a loss) 
in an effort to combat declining customer counts from late 1994 to mid-1995. The 
promotion was "too successful" as customer counts increased by 15%, far higher 
management had anticipated. Third quarter 1995 earnings were only $0.0 I versus $0.32 
the prior year. 
The range of annual sales/unit in 1996 was $5 l 6,412-$1,972,048. 
12. 
~ 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Cc.. :t of Sales as a Percentage of Sales, 1994-96 
Cost of Sales as a % of Sales 
59.4% 
59.9% 
59.0% 
Management feels that as the size of the company has increased there has been an 
increase in efficiency in purchasing, production and distribution. Also, over the years 
there has been an increasing portion of total sales represented by relatively higher profit 
items, such as alcoholic beverages (which accounted for 14% of 1994 sales, 16% of 
. 1995 sales and 26% of 1996 sales). However, the effects of these two improvements 
have been generally offset by increased labour costs. 
13. Cost of Sales Breakdown (Food/Beverage vs. Labour) 1994-1996 
Components of cost of sales: 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Food & Beverage 
65.66% 
65.19% 
65.96% 
65.51% 
61.72% 
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Labour & Payroll Tax 
34.34% 
34.81% 
34.04% 
34.49% 
38.28% 
I 
14. · Total Purchases of Food/Beverages, 1994·96* 
~ 
1994 
1995 
.1996 
Food/beverages purchases 
$ 7,069,325 
$11,161,728 
$12,024,682 
15. Total Inventories ($). 1994.96* 
Year 
1994•.· 
1995·· 
1996 
Total Inventory 
$1,230,636 
$2,352,465 
$3,487,394 
Increase over prior year 
142.7% 
57.9% 
7.7% 
Increase over Prior Year 
105% 
91% 
48% 
Inventory is valued at FIFO cost, which approximates market. 
16. · Inventory Turnover & Number of Days Sales in Ending Inventory. 1994· 
96* 
Inventory Turnover 
1994 10.8 times 
1995 8.7 times 
1996 6, 1 times 
PWD was expanded in mid-1995. 
17. Inventory Location (Restaurant vs. PWD), 1995·96 
FY 1996 
Location: Dollars % 
Restaurants $ 770,001 22 
# Days Sales in Ending 
Inventory 
45.7 days 
· 55.1 days 
71.1 days 
FY 1995 
Dollars 
$ 480,103 
% 
20 
PWD $2,717,393 __1ft ~1.872.362 Jill 
Totals $3,487,394 100 
The per unit averages at year end were: 
Year 
1996 
1995 >,·· 
Number of Units 
41 
34 
* 1993 is the first full year of operations. 
A vg./Unit at Rest. 
$18,781 
$14,121 
219 
$2,352,465 100 
AvgJUnit at PWD 
$66,277 
$55,069 
II 
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· 18; ~.-.tage Breakdown of Inventory by Type, 1994-96 
·•· Food arid beverages 
Supplies 
. Other supplies 
Totals 
Note: 1996 figures are unaudited. 
1996 
85% 
7.5% 
7.5% 
100% 
1995 
84% 
7% 
9% 
100% 
1994 
82% 
9% 
10% 
100% 
19. Percentage Breakdown of Meat Inventory by Type. 1996 
Percentage of Dollar Value of Ending 
Meatlnventorx 
Prepared, portion controlled: 
Steak sandwich (230-gm. serving) 
Supreme steak sandwich (260-gm. 
serving) 
Deluxe burger (beef, 2 per serving) 
Doner kebabs (beef, 3/serving) 
Tacos {beef, 3/serving) 
Ground beef (will be used in fillings 
for deluxe burger, tacos, and <loner 
.. kebabs) 
·. Beef in bulk (uncut, unprocessed 
Total 
20. Purchase Commitments ($) for Meat at FYE, 1994-96 
.~ 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Commitment at FYE 
$2,500,000 
none 
$ 530,000 
23% 
8% 
7% 
5% 
7% 
21% 
29% 
100% 
Related Deposit 
none 
$130,000 
.·, 
1/. 
Purchase commitments are made only when Tucker House purchasing personnel feel 
that conditions are favourable. 
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OTHER FINANCIAL REPORT INFORMATION 
21. Current Assets, by Type, as % of Total Assets, 1994-96 
All percentages are percentage of total assets. 
Year Cash Trade Ale Other Ale Inventor:}! Preuaids Total CA 
Rbles Rbles 
1994 10.4% 3.0% 11.6% 3.7% 28.7% 
1995 6.5% 3.7% 16.4% 4.5% 31.1% 
1996 5.7% 4.6% 18.4% 5.6% 34.3% 
22. Current Liabilities, By Type, as % of Total Liabilities + Shareholders 
Equity, 1994-96 
All percentages ure percent of total liabilities and shareholders equity. 
Year Ale Pbles Accrued Notes Pbles Taxes Total Current 
!d!!!!: - Current payable Liab. 
-1994 9.8% 3.7% 1.4% 3.0% 17.9% 
1995 13.3% 4.2% 3.8% 0.9% 22.2% 
1996 11.8% 4.2% 2.4% 17.6% 
23. Gross Sales, 1994-96 
X£!!!: Gross Sales % Increase Over Prior Year 
1994 $16,603,993 14 7 .0% increase 
1995 $25,970,904 56.4% increase 
1996 $30,337,623 16.8% increase 
Management analysis: These increases are due almost exclusively to the opening of 
new restaurants each year. For FY 96, the aggregate sales of restaurants open in any of 
the three previous financial years were slightly greater than sales of those restaurants in 
FY 95. Sales per customer has increased in each of the years, primarily due to increased 
sales of beverages (a high profit margin item) and, to a lesser extent, increased menu 
prices. Customer counts in FY 96 were approximately 2% ahead of FY 95. 
24. Net Income as a Percentage of Sales, 1994-96 
~ Net Income as a % of Sale~ 
1994 5.1% 
1995 3.6% 
1996 4.5% 
Management analys.is: The decline in 1995 results primarily from the effects of a 
disastrous sales promotion. The 1995 and 1996 figures also reflect the increasingly 
difficult economic times. 
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FINANCIAL RATIOS (OTHER THA~l'INVEN~ORY-RELATED) 
25. Current Ratio and Quick Ratio, 199;j.96 · 
Year 
· 1994 
1995 
1996 
Current Ratio 
1.60: l 
1.40: l 
1.94:l 
Quick Ratio 
0.75:1 
0.46:1 
0.50:l 
26. Receivables Turnover/Days Sales in Ending AR, 1994-96 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Receivables Turnover 
73.6 times 
6 l.5 times 
43.5 times 
Days Sales in Ending Ale 
Rbles 
7.0 days 
7.4 days 
10.4 days 
Management analysis: All trade receivables represent amounts due from various 
national credit card companies. To date the company has had no bad debt experience 
with this type of receivable. Credit use by customers has been increasing over time. 
27. Earnings Pei· Share, 1994-96 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Earnings Per Share 
basic diluted 
$0.68 $0.67 
$0.76 $0.74 
$1. IO $1.05 
Increase over Prior Year 
basic diluted 
112.5% 109.4% 
11.8% 10.4% 
44.7% 41.9% 
Source of dilution: share options (directors, officers, and key employees) 
Weighted average of outstanding shares have increased from 876,852 (primary and 
fully-diluted) in 1992 to 1,238,000 primary (1,333,238 fully diluted) for 1996. 
28. Price-Earnings Ratio, 1994-96 
,· 
~ Price-Earnings Ratio 
1994 12.13:1 
1995 2.10:1 
1996 7.38: 1 
Management analysis: 1995 drop due ,to poor fourth quarter 1995 earnings resulting 
from sales promotion's reduction of profits. · 
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RESULTS OF THE 1996 AUDIT PROCEDURES 
29. Results of Physical Inventory Observation at Restaurants 
Each unit manager performs a stocktake on the final night of the financial year . and 
forwards the counts to corporate headquarters for inclusion in the final inventory 
summary. In FY 96, the audit teams observed the physical inventory at 12 tested units, 
test-counted all the larger and more expensive items and also counted some of the 
smaller items. Inventory cutoff was also tested. 
The conclusions of the observers were: 
(1) No exceptions to the physical counts noted at any unit. 
(2) AU 12 units had larger than normal receipts during the last week of the FY, but no 
cutoff problems were noted (i.e., all restaurants receiving reports matched properly with 
all PWD shipping reports for the cutoff period). Several unit managers said they had 
been held to very "tight" inventory levels in the previous several months and welcomed 
the increase. 
(3) One manager complained severely about a change in company policy: In previous 
years, unit managers retained one copy of their physical inventory counts and forwarded 
the other copies to corporate headquarters. This year, per a memo from D. Chioni, 
Internal Auditor, all copies were to be sent to headquarters. The unit manager feels this 
is a loss of valuable information to his unit at the start of the financial year. Chioni has 
said that he will send the Manager a photocopy of the count sheets and that the policy 
was changed to keep better control· of any changes made to perpetual inventory records 
as a result of the physical count. 
30. How Restaurant Test Units for Observation Were Chosen 
In FY 9~.12 of the 41 units were selected as test units for a 29.3% coverage (FY 95: 16 
out of 34);mits [47% coverage]). 
The reduction in scope since the previous fimincial year was due to fl ve factors: ( l) no 
significant problems had been noted in prior observations; (2) there was steady 
improvement over the past 4 years in internal control; (3) Nush had shown increasing 
sophistication as an accountant; ( 4) the Internal Audit fun ct ion was functioning well in 
1996: and ( 5) FY 96 tests of compliance with in ventory"related controls revealed no 
exceptions. 
The 12 units to be observed were selected in August to include the 6 largest units and a 
random selection of 6 other units. Details of the unit inventory observation were 
coordinated with Chioni well in advance of FYE. All preparations and arrangements 
were complete by October 1. 
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31. · Results: Analytical Comparisons/Reviews, Unobserved Units 
Audit tests of the restaurant units where the physical inventory was not observed 
consisted of; 
1) . All multiplication and addition on inventory count sheets tested. 
Results: no arithmetical errors noted. 
2) Compared current year quantity to prior year quantity for each item (at the same 
. unit). 
Results: At Units 10 and 16, some items quantities DOUBLED at these units. 
However. the dollar amounts of these items are· immaterial in relation to 
inventory as a whole as the entire inventory at Units IO and 16 accounts for only 
about 1 % of total inventory. 
3) Compared current year quantity (expressed as a percentage of inventory) for each 
item at the unobserved unit to the quantity for the same item at the 12 observed 
units. 
Results: No significant differences in level of inventory at unobserved units vs. 
observed units. 
32. Results of Physical Inventory Observation At The Purchasing and 
Warehousing Division {PWD) 
Tucker House did a complete inventory at the PWD at the close of business Saturday 
October 30 (the PWD is closed on Sundays). The audit team observers perfonned the 
following procedures: 
I) For meat: Perform a 100% check that the number of boxes in the freezers agrees 
with the client count sheet. Spot-check some boxes to make sure the item/box 
count is correct and boxes are full. 
2) For other items: Take numerous test counts. 
3) For all items: Tie the physical counts to the Weekly Inventory Summary 
(perpetual quantity records) for Week 52, FY 96. 
Results: Minor differences for a few of the tested items were adjusted on the count 
sheets by the PWD Manager. No material differences between the counts and the 
Weekly Inventory Summary quantities were noted. The freezer doors were sealed and 
the auditors were present at the opening of business Monday November 1 to observe 
that the seals were unbroken. 
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33~ · Results of Inventory Pricing Tests 
,Results of the pricing tests generally indicated the following relationship between unit 
· price used to value ending inventory (which was obtained as 11aggregate dollar value of 
perpetual inventory per perpetual inventory records'divided by number of units on hand 
per perpetual inventory records), most recent cost processed, and most recent cost 
purchased: 
· Supreme steak sandwich 
·. Steak sandwich 
Deluxe burger 
Unit Price 
$1.25 
$2.45 
$ .98 
!:Processed 
$1.03 
$2.14 .. 
$ .70 
· Note: the unit quantity for each item is a single-serving portion. 
$-Purchased 
$1.24 
. $2.46 
$ .. 94 
The relationship of prices for other meat and non-meat items was similar to the above. 
Prices used to value inventory at the restaurants were identical to those used to value 
PWD inventory. 
. -;.~, 
34, Results of Inventory Cutoff Tests 
To test inventory cutoff, the following audit procedures were perf.ormed: 
1) For all additions listed on the Weekly Inventory Summary for Week 52, the 
related receiving report and invoice were examined and the item was traced to 
Accounts Payable. 
. . . . 
Result: All payables were recorded properly. _No unrecorded items noted. 
2). All invoices received in the first two weeks of FY97 were checked for any 
unrecorded FY 96 liabilities, 
Result: No unrecorded items found. 
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35. Audit Procedures Performed Related to Purchase Commitments 
On 2/ 10/96, an order for 113,600 kgs. of portion-controlled 260-gms steaks for Supreme 
steak sandwich at $4.66 per kg. was placed with Canning Beef Company (CBC) for 
delivery from November 1996 through February 1997. Delivery, per usual, was to be by 
Tucker House trucks. On 16/10 and 26/10, cheques for $65,000 each were paid to CBC 
as a $130,000 advance on this order. 
Per David White, Vice President of Purchasing and Production, it is the policy of CBC 
to request small advance payments on long-term orders at a set price. Although Tucker 
House has never been requested to pay such an advance before, White feels that the 
payment of such advances may become more common due to the general state of the 
economy. 
Audit steps taken: The standard industry practice is to make meat purchases orally 
without any written confirming purchase order. However, due to the nature of this 
purchase, Tucker House sent a confirming purchase order to CBC on October 30 and 
requested the return of a signed copy. The returned P. 0. signed by the Deputy General 
Manager of CBC, was examined and agreed in all aspects to the terms described above. 
The two cancelled cheques were also examined. The $130,000 advance was originally 
booked by Tucker House as an Account Receivable, but the client has agreed that !his 
should be reclassified as a prepaid for the financial report. Disclosure is complete. 
36. 1996 Management Letter Comments Re Internal Control Weaknesses 
Overall, audits have found the books and records to be in good condition. However, 
two significant internal control weaknesses are present: 
1) Depreciation schedules are not updated on a timely basis and frequently contain 
errors such as failure to record transfers of items between units. 
2) Regarding control of Accounts Payable: Most invoices are received by the 
Accounts Payable Department from the restaurants, the PWD or directly from the 
vendors. Others are received directly by department heads. Priority items such 
as beverages, food and utilities are recorded in the Purchases Journal 
immediately without further approval. However, invoices for non-priority items 
such as advertising and repairs and maintenance are sent to the applicable 
department heads for approval prior to being recorded in the Purchases Journal. 
No control is maintained by the Ne Pbles Department on the invoices sent out 
for approval. Also, vendor reconciliations are not perfonned on any regular 
basis, but only "as needed to resolve disputes". 
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37, Evaluation of Effectiveness of Internal Audit Function 
The Internal Audit Staff was established in 1994. Review of the backgroundG of the 
staff and the Internal Audit reports indicates that the staff is functioning effectively. 
Don Chioni, the head of Internal Audit, has been very cooperative in coordinating 
physical inventory observation and planning for the most efficient utilisation of Tucker 
House personnel for the external audit. 
38. 1996 Solicitor's Letter 
The company is involved in no litigation other than ordinary routine litigation incidental 
to its busines:,; per the Solicitor's Letter dated 26/11/96 from Tucker House's legal 
adviser. ·· 
Tucker House has used the same legal adviser since its inception. 
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INVENTORY POLICIES/BACKGROUND AND SELECTED CLIENT 
RECORDS 
39. Purchasing and Warehousing Division (PWD) History (Size, Expansions), 
1992-96 
The PWD was established in April 1992 in leased premises in a suburb of Melbourne. 
The initial term of the lease was for 10 years. In May 1995, the facilities were expanded 
by leasing an additional l, 100 sq. metres (bringing the total size to its current level of 
2,100 sq. metres, of which 250 sq. metres is freezer space). 
40. Beef Processing and Purchasing Policies 
Although the company purchases some portion-controlled beef cuts from independent 
meat processors, almost 80% of its beef requirements are processed and supplied by the 
company's PWD. The PWD purchases beef in large quantities in anticipation of 
seasonal price fluctuations and, as a result, is better able to control costs and maintain 
stable menu prices. The company normally stocks approximately 12 weeks inventory of 
beef at the PWD although greater quantities are maintained or contracted for when it is 
considered economically advantageous to do so. All shipments of meat, both purchases 
and deliveries, ure made in Tucker House's own refrige!'ated tmcks. 
41. Accoundng Records/Internal Controls for PWD fnyentory 
Meat is inventoried on a perpetual basis with the quantity recorded in units consisting of 
a single-portion of the main meal. Thus, for example, a unit of Steak sandwich is a 230-
gm. portion of steak and a unit of Beef Doner kebab is three <loner kebabs. 
Each unit of meat is sealed in vacuum packaging to preserve freshness and is stored 
either 40 or 80 units to a box depending on size. The boxes are plain brown boxes made 
specifically for meat storage and are labelled with a Health Dept Seal (the PWD is 
inspected and licensed by the Health Dept) and a Tucker House colour-coded labels. 
The Weekly Inventory Summary lists by item, in units only, the beginning inventory, 
additions during the week, shipments during the week, and ending inventory. This 
document, along with Weekly Sales Reports (by item) from the restaurant units, is the 
primary source of infonnation for purchasing and production decision making. A 
separate document, cailed the Flash, shows the dollar totals for each item currently in 
inventory. 
Non-meat inventories are similarly accounted for. 
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42. Sources (V'.!ndors) for Food, Beverages and Supply Purchases 
Purchases of all inventoried items are made frort. suppliers unaffiliated with the 
company. No one supplier has accounted from year ~o year for a significant portion of 
the company's purchases, although in a particular year a single supplier may account for 
a significant portion. 
During FY 96, one supplier of beef, Canning Beef Company (CBC), accounted for 
approximately 17% of the company's total food and beverage purchases and the 
company continues to purchase a major portion of its beef from that supplier. 
Alternative sources of food and beverage products are readily available. 
43. Client Records: Receiving Log for Week 52, FY 96 
AH receiving reports are consecutively numbered. Items received: 
25/10 - 360 kgs. diced chicken meat 
1,360 kgs. tomatoes 
4,100 kgs. bulk beef 
26/ l O - 450 kgs. cheddar cheese 
230 kgs. Swiss cheese 
27/10 - 14,500 kgs. steak sandwich 
13,100 kgs. steak sandwich 
28/10 - l,180 kgs. steak sandwich 
500,000 paper napkins 
900 kgs. tomatoes 
29/10 - 110 kgs. pickles 
360 dozen plastic cups 
30/10 - 31/10 - dock closed 
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44. Client Records: Receiving Loe: For Week 1, FY97 
All receiving reports are r.onsecutively numbered. Items received: 
l/ 11 - 1,460 kgs. tomatoes 
680 kgs. com flour 
2/11 - 230 kgs. wheat flour 
450 kgs. shortening 
3/ l 1 - 200 litres disinfectant 
4/ l l - 900 kgs. tomatoes 
5/11 - no shipment received 
6/11 and 7/11 - dock closed 
45. Client Records: Weekly Inventory Summary, Week 51, FY 96 
In portion-controlled single-serving units, three largest items: 
SuJ!reme steak 
Steak sandwich sandwich 
(230-gm) (260-gm) 
Beginning Inventory 42,800 175.000 
Additions: 
Processed -0- -0-
Purchased -0- -0-
Shipments to 
Restaurants (5,600) (20,480) 
Ending Inventorv 37,200 154,520 
230 
Deluxe burger 
(2) 
145,000 
-0-
-0-
(14,200) 
130,800 
I 
46. Client Records: Weekly Inventory Summary, Week 52, FY 96 
In portion-controlled single-serving units, three largest items: 
Su~reme steak 
Steak sandwich sandwich 
(230-gm) (260-gm) 
Beginning Inventory 197,200 154,520 
Additions: 
Processed -0- -0-
Purchased 5,200 -0-
Shipments to 
Restaurants (8.400) (31,520) 
Ending Inventory 194,000 123.000 
47. Client Records: Physical Inventory Counts, 1/11/95 
Physical inventory counts at the PWD for FY 95, 3 largest items: 
Supreme steak sandwich - 204,000 units (serving) 
Steak sandwich - 55,000 units 
Deluxe burger- 141,000 units 
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Deluxe burger 
(2) 
130,800 
50,000 
-0-
(21,800) 
159.000 
I 
.. 
·•., 
48. Client Records: Weekly Inventory Summary, Week 1, FY97 
In portion-controlled single-serving units, three largest items: 
Suereme steak 
Steak sandwich sandwich Deluxe burger 
(230-gm) (260-gm) (2) 
Beginning Inventory 34,000 283,000 159,000 
Additions: 
Processed 23,600 -0- -0-
Purchased -0- -0- -0-
Shipments to 
Restaurants (2,600) (9,480) (7,000) 
Ending Inventory 55,000 273,520 152,000 
Whe'n you arc ready, please read the information presented on page 25. 
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Welcome to the group sectiob of the experiment. 
For this experiment, assume that you have been assigned as a member of an audit group 
for the audit of the inventory balance of Tucker House Co Ltd. Please examine the 
enclosed materials and follow the instructions closely. As you complete the various 
tasks, you should insert them into the envelope provided. You are pennitted to refer to 
the audit working papers of Tucker House Co Ltd throughout the experiment. Please 
place all the experimental materials into the envelope at the end of the experiment. 
Please do not turn over the page until all the group members are ready. 
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Taskl 
· - You should discuss and work on the case as a group to arrive at a consensus on t6e 
fo1iowing questions. · 
Based on your group's evaluation of the case materials, indicate whether the inventory -
.of Tucker House Co Ltd is or is not fairly presented by. placing a tick ( .../ ) in the · 
,. appropriate box. 
[ ] · The inventory balance of Tucker House Co Ltd is fairly presented. 
[ ] The inventory balance of Tucker House Co Ltd is not fairly presented. 
Indicate your group's confidence that the above answer is correct by placing a cross 
(X) on the line below. ',- -- · ---- ---- -· 
-1---------l---------1---------1---------1-------- -.l---------1---------1---------1---------l---------1-----.---
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 , .. 
Not confident 
at all · 
Completely 
confident . 
Based on your group's evaluation of the information, please indicate how likely does 
your group think that the inventory balance may be fairly or not fairly presented: 
· Fairly 
presented 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not fairly 
presented 
Indicate your group's confidence that the above answer is correct by placing a cross 
(X) on the line below. 
1-- _ -----".'I ----- _ -· 1---------1-------- -1-~-----~ 1---------1------ ---1. --------!---------!---".'-~ --I 
- 0 10 - 20 30 40 50 60 70 - - 80 90 100 
Not confident Completely 
at all . confident 
.-~~-' 
When you have answered these questions, please insert this section Into the envelope provided and 
proceed to Task 2, · 
234 
.. 
' ' . . '' .• :~:. ... . • .. : ~ . ' .i: 
i::'.~:.:· ·'.·~ :~·-.'~--~ ~-~;·: .. :~ ... ~ .:.: '.=~- ·.'.~·; :: ::.~·:~.~~-\-;; ;~.:::.~ \f :_·~· ~ '.. ;.'r; ;: 1 ;~ :.:: .. \ ~,· . ,:;.·~~ :·; . . ··· '. .. > .. ·.-,i·. .·.·_: , .. , .·-.... ·· . 
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. ...• > . 
-1 
_··-~~ ~=-~·i-::.' :: 
-r~:.:-~---\· .. 
1_;· 
(;•; 
. -!.J) ----
.--::_.,• 
Do noHurn over the page until you bave inserted Task I intt,;the envelope 
. . .-· . . -_ provided~ . . 
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Task2 
There are many ways by which people can check the appropriateness of their decision. · 
One of these is to require your group to consider why the group's decision in Task l · 
may be incorrect. 
Please discuss among yourselves the reasons why your previous answer may be 
incorrect and/or v:hy tl•e alternative you rejected may be correct. 
(Note: The reasons you will be considering for this task should be regarded as 'pre- . 
working notes'. That is, your reasons will not go directly into the planning audit 
working papers but will serve as potential material for a subsequent working paper 
examination.) 
{i~.'~-
.·? ' 
When you have completed your discussion, please proceed to the next pag~. Do not turn ovel,'. the 
·· · page until you are ready. 
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Task 3-
. Please write down -in _ the spaces provided below, the reasons _ why -your -previous_. 
judgment (in Task I) may be incorrect and/or why the alternative you rejected may be -
cc.irrect _ Only one of you need write these reasons down. -Phrases and short senieric~s -
would suffice. 
..-
.i ~-· 
;, ... ·: _____________________________ _ 
.• -~-
.. :.:.:.:::.:,:,. /.,' 
,,~-'----------------~----'--~---,--------
',.:;.:;·,·-I 
When you have written down your reasons, please insert Task 3 into the envelope provided and 
proceed to Task 4. 
V:';·~ ::?:,,,·.·····-,.:: ,:;\L~11;~\.~:t,:;.;:.I:~::,:1.::s;c..~ ;,: .. ·.~;.·,•·• ,· -._··.·.,-!;~;.•: .•. ) ·-··· ·: ......... · '. 
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(,), 
Do not turn over the page until have you inserted Task 3 into the envelope 
provided. 
,"/ 
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Task4 . 
. ---. You should discuss and work as a group to arrive at a cons~nsus on the ,follciwirtg · 
questions~ · · · i,,..,__ · · 
. . . . 
. . 
1! ... 
,1'·· \\ .· 
_· '\ 
· Based on your group's evaluation of the case materials, indicate whether the invent~ry. 
of Tucker House Co Ltd is or is not fairly presented by placing a tick ('1) in the 
. . .. ~=- ...•. 
appropriate box. . 
[ J The inventory balance of Tucker House Co Ltd is fairly presented.· 
[ ] The inventory balance of Tucker House Co Ltd is not fairly presented. 
Indicate your group's confidence that the above answer is correct by placing a cro·ss 
(X) on the line below. · · ' · 
. 1---------1-. -------l---------1----------1---------1--------- I-.----- . 1---- -----1-- ·. --- --I-__ .· ----. I 
.· 0 10 20 30 40 50 . 60 . 70 80 90 . 100 
Not confident 
at all,> 
··completely 
confident 
Based on your group's evaluation of the case materials, please indicate how likely does 
your group think that the inventory balance may be fairly or not fairly presented: 
1 
Fairly 
presented 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not fairly 
presented 
Indicate your group's confidence that the above answer is correct by placing a cross 
· (X) on the line below. !; 
1---------1---------1---------1---------1---------1 · ------· -1---------1---------!---------!---------1 
0 10 20 30 40 50 .· 60 . 70 80 . 90 · J 00 
Not confident 
at all 
. . . . 
Completely 
confident 
Generating th~ reasons to support why your group's judgment may be incorrect was 
·. . .. ' . .. !, 
1 
• Very 
.easy 
7·.· 
2 3 ' 4. 5 .· 6 7 8 9 
Very 
. ·. difficult 
.· · This marks the end of the group section of this research project, The next section asks you · 
questions about yourself and shoulcl be completed indlviduallr, 
·:··· .... 
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· . · , Part II: Your background: Please tick(~) the appropriate spaces provided below 
. . . or circle an appropriate number. 
1. Your gender? 
( ) Male ( ) Female 
,' ,· 
"2: Your age? ( ) yrs 
· 3. ... Is English your first or native language? ' 
( ) Yes ( ) No 
. ' . . 
4. I have __ ._ years and_._._. months working experience of which~ years· 
5. 
6. 
·· and_ months are in auditing. · 
What is your position in your firm? 
( ) Audit Junior _ ( ~- AuditSenior 
lam satisfied with my group's decisions 
( . ) Supervisor 
. Strongly 
disagree 
l 2 3 
Strongly 
agree 
4 5 6 7 
7. How would you rutethe amount of interaction in your group's audit process? 
I 2 ._· 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
No interaction 
at all 
· Moderate amount 
of inli:mction 
A lot of 
interaction 
8. How difficult did you find the tasks given to you· previously in the main 
experimental part of this research project'? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Not at ull 
difficult 
Somewhat 
difficult 
Extremely 
difficult 
· 9. How much effort do you think an actual audit of inventory balance will require?_ 
10. 
I 2 , 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Very little 
effort 
Some 
effort 
A great deal 
of effort 
How much effort did you expend ori the. main experimental section of this 
research project? 
I::, 2 3 4 5 
·- .. , 
'Very little 
effort 
Some 
· effort 
6 7 8 9 
A greo.t deal 
of effort. 
This marks the end or the experiment. Please place all research materials Into the envelope 
· provided (including materials from the tasks you performed individually), · 
Thank you for your cooperation in lhis research projed.; 
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